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1. Introduction 
The current research builds on existing work of examining the behaviour of local 
governments in Norway by Aaberge and Langørgen (2003), Aaberge and Langørgen 
(2006), Langørgen, Galloway, Mogstad and Aaberge (2005) among others. Using previous 
work on the subject as a foundation, the key purpose of this paper is to analyse local 
government spending behaviour in a dynamic framework facilitated by a panel dataset, 
combining municipality data for the years  2001 to 2008. A local government is 
represented by a dominant party or coalition and has preferences, given by a Stone-
Geary utility function, over the budget surplus (sector zero) and output in 12 service 
sectors. Since local governments are assumed to be utility maximising agents, they 
choose the best combination of budget surplus or deficit and output of public services, 
subject to the budget constraint that total spending (spending and budget surplus) does 
not exceed total income, which consists of grants from the central government and local 
taxes. Furthermore, local government spending is analysed in a simultaneous framework, 
that is using a structural model where government expenditure in each service sector is 
endogenous and dependent on the expenditures in the other sectors, since allocating a 
larger share of income to one sector will reduce the share of income in other sectors.
Local government expenditure in each sector is modeled to consist of two components: 
the minimum required expenditure, that is expenditure required to meet the public service 
mandates dictated by the central government or the expert opinion consensus among 
local government, and the discretionary income – the remaining income after the 
minimum required expenditure has been covered – which is divided between the sectors 
according to local priorities. The share of discretionary income allocated to a sector is the 
marginal budget share for that sector. 
Since data on public service prices are not available, this paper uses the method 
employed by Aaberge and Langørgen (2003, 2006), namely using information on 
municipality characteristics that capture variation in costs and capacity to produce local 
public services in order to estimate the expenditure for each sector. Minimum required 
expenditure (sector-specific subsistence spending) and minimum fiscal surplus are 
assumed to depend on central government regulations and technological constraints, 
represented by factors that include demographic variables (residents in specific age 
groups, civil status, employment status etc), settlement pattern within a municipality, 
economies of scale, climatic conditions (e.g. amount of snowfall), sewage purification 
regulations. Marginal budget shares are assumed to vary with local population's average 
education level, settlement density and the political party composition of the local council.
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The independent contribution of this  study is  to extend the existing research on 
Norwegian local governments’ behaviour, which uses cross-sectional data, by combining 
the cross-sections for the 8  available years (2001 – 2008). This will allow for a quasi-
dynamic study and long-term analysis of local government behaviour, also allowing one to 
account for any municipality or time heterogeneity not captured by the included 
explanatory variables. This study is quasi-dynamic because it contains both static and 
dynamic elements. It is static in a sense that it is not based on intertemporal optimisation. 
That is local governments’ preferences are observed at a point in time with no explicit 
relationship between preferences across time periods. Moreover, local governments are 
assumed to be subject to a static budget constraint; that is a budget condition that is not 
specified to include linkages between different time periods. However, this study analyses 
changes over time in local government spending behaviour, exploiting both cross-section 
and time-series variation in the data, and is therefore referred to as quasi-dynamic. Panel 
data is well-suited to analysing the dynamics of change as well as to controlling for the 
unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, a panel study allows for a richer analysis of how local 
government behaviour changes over time in the presence of unobserved municipality and 
time effects. 
Well-known panel data methods such as fixed effects estimation are adapted to 
estimating a system of equations. Models with both municipality and time effects are 
developed and estimated using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood technique. All 
empirical analysis, including model estimations, is conducted using the SAS software1. 
Models with municipality fixed effects and/ or time effects are found to perform better than 
the benchmark model which accounts for increasing minimum required expenditures only 
through income growth. When unobserved time and municipality heterogeneity are not 
taken into account, the effects on the minimum required expenditures are usually biased. 
The municipality heterogeneity is modeled in two ways: by introducing municipality-
specific dummy variables or dummy variables for labour market regions into which all 
municipalities are grouped. Many of the region effects are found significantly different from 
the Oslo region, which is  chosen as the reference, particularly when region effects are 
included together with the time effects. Finally a dynamic model is estimated to analyse 
the dynamics of adjustment of municipality spending over time, where spending is 
modeled as a weighted average of optimal long-run spending and the spending in the 
previous period. The weight measures the speed of adjustment to equilibrium and is 
estimated to be relatively low, suggesting sluggishness in the municipalities’ spending 
behaviour over time. 
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1 Program code is available on request.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains a literature review of 
selected studies of local government behaviour and the different models used. Section 3 
discusses some well-known panel data methods such as fixed effects and random effects 
regression as well as their application to balanced and unbalanced data sets. Section 4 
presents the benchmark model used and comments on some of the issues that may arise 
in applying the model to a panel data set. Section 5 suggests some possible model 
variants that extend the benchmark model to account for unobserved heterogeneity. 
Section 6 outlines the data used and provides a discussion of the results obtained by 
estimating the models in Section 5. A discussion of the change in the parameters of 
interest between different model formulations is also provided. Section 7 concludes.
2. Literature review
A number of studies have already been conducted on various aspects of economic 
behaviour of local governments. Both the expenditure and the revenue sides of the local 
governments’ budgets have been discussed, using models appropriate to the particular 
question under investigation. Some studies are based on cross-section data, while others 
make use of panel data to capture any possible unobserved heterogeneity.
Borge (1995) focuses on the revenue aspect and analyses determinants of fee income for 
Norwegian municipalities, using a representative voter model where the utility function of 
the pivotal voter is maximised subject to the relevant resource constraint (disposable 
income is spent on private consumption and user fees). A separable utility function is 
assumed. Its arguments are per capita service production of free services, services 
subject to user fees and the level of private consumption, as well as sociodemographic 
variables such as share of children, youth and the elderly in a municipality’s population. 
Two additional variables are included to capture structural differences across local 
governments: population size and settlement pattern (average traveling distance to the 
center of the municipality). The estimation is conducted using panel data of 414 
municipalities for the years 1980 – 1990; time dummies are included additively allowing 
the intercept to shift from year to year. These dummy variables capture the shift in the 
functional responsibility between the counties and the municipalities, and the effects of 
any left-out variables that vary over time. A municipality-specific term is  also included, 
which is assumed constant, fixed or random depending on the specification. Borge 
(1995) finds among other things that higher private income and higher compulsory 
expenditures contribute to an increase in fee income.
Other studies focus extensively on the expenditure side of the budgets, analysing how a 
fixed total budget is allocated among different service sectors. In a dynamics-centred 
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analysis Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen (1995) develop a partial adjustment model with 
endogenous speed of adjustment to analyse how pressure from interest groups and mass 
media influence the adjustment process of local governments’ spending. Based on a 
combined cross-section and time-series data set for Norwegian local governments, the 
sluggishness of the adjustment process is estimated for 6  service sectors2, with pressure 
groups related to primary education explaining an important part of the sluggishness 
observed. Pressure groups promoting kindergartens and health care or care for the 
elderly are found to stimulate budget reallocations. Similarly to Borge (1995), the desired 
allocation is influenced by the share of youth, the share of the elderly and the share of 
children. Additional variables are population density, population growth and the inverse of 
the population size. As in Borge (1995), the intercepts are allowed to vary over time for 
the available years 1984 – 1990. 
The reduced form of the partial adjustment model is estimated. 
(2.1)Ait =
1
1+ h(POL) α i0 +α i1 logYt +α i2 log It +α i3Zt +α i4POL( ) + 1−
1
1+ h(POL)
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
Ait−1
where Ait is local government spending share in sector i in year t, Yt is total local 
government spending per capita, It is  per capita private consumption and Zt is a vector of 
sociodemographic characteristics. The budget constraint is satisfied with the spending 
shares adding up to 1 for all 6 sectors. 
The adjustment coefficient 
1
1+ h(POL)  for each local government measures the share of 
the desired change which is implemented in the first year and POL is  a vector of interest 
group variables. In the benchmark model a constant speed of adjustment is assumed 
with the POL vector empty. 
The two extensions of the benchmark model are based on a non-constant speed of 
adjustment 
1
1+ µt where µt = h(POL) and POL includes variables that capture the 
pressure form special interest groups and pressure from the mass media. 
All versions of the model are estimated in reduced form by a system technique. Borge, 
Rattsø and Sørensen (1995) cite three key reasons for analysing the sector expenditure 
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2 The service sectors are: administration, education, health, kindergartens, culture and infrastructure.
shares simultaneously. First, the error terms of the demand equations are correlated due 
to the budget constraint and should therefore be estimated as a system instead of 
equation by equation to obtain efficient estimates. Second, a system technique is required 
to capture restrictions on the model’s parameters. Third, since the demand equations are 
non-linear in the parameters in two of the model’s specifications, a non-linear estimation 
method is needed. In estimating these models the Fixed Information Maximum Likelihood 
method is used, a system technique that handles non-linear restrictions. The benchmark 
constant speed of adjustment model is  linear in the parameters, and is estimated by the 
SUR method (Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen, 1995). To avoid a singular covariance matrix, 
one of the equations is omitted from the estimation. The demand equation of this sector is 
determined by the budget restriction and the estimated coefficients for the other sectors. 
Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen (1995) chose cultural services as the residual sector.
Conclusions derived by Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen (1995) are mostly reasonable and in 
line with expectations. An increase in the share of youths contributes to a significantly 
higher expenditure share for primary education, while the share of elderly has a similar 
effect on resources allocated towards health care or care for the elderly. However, 
spending on kindergartens is not significantly related to the share of children in the 
community. As expected based on the budget constraint, higher expenditures in one 
sector are financed by cutbacks in other sectors. Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen (1995) 
report a negative effect of the share of elderly on the expenditure on primary education, 
kindergartens and cultural services, and similarly a negative effect of the share of youth 
(7-15 years) on kindergartens, cultural services and infrastructure. Evidence of economies 
of scale is  found in the administration and primary education sectors. Although the current 
study is related to the Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen (1995) paper both in its goals, type of 
data used and the factors proposed to explain spending behaviour variation in different 
service sectors, some important differences must be highlighted. The key methodological 
difference between Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen (1995) and the present study is that the 
former estimates a simultaneous reduced form Almost Ideal Linear Demand System, while 
this paper follows the methodology of Aaberge and Langørgen (2003, 2006) in estimating 
a structural simultaneous Linear Expenditure System. By estimating the model in its 
structural form, we are able to derive the structural parameters directly, which facilitates 
the analysis of parameters of interest (the effects of service target groups and other 
sector-specific factors on the minimum required expenditures and marginal budget shares 
in different service sectors). Moreover, Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen (1995) are not able to 
include price effects in their model as prices of the local government services are not 
observed. Following Langørgen and Aaberge (2003), the present study incorporates 
prices into the model through the minimum required expenditure parameters. 
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In Aaberge and Langørgen (2003, 2006) variations in spending per capita in various 
service sectors are analysed by specifying the expenditure in each service sector to 
consist of two components: the minimum required expenditure according to the service 
provision standards set by the central government, and the additional expenditure in each 
sector after the minimum requirement has been met (the share of the discretionary 
income allocated to each service sector according to local priorities). Each municipality's 
operating expenses by service sector (indexed by i) are decomposed as follows: 
(2.2) ui = α i + βi y − α i
i=0
12
∑⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
      i = 0,...,12
where ui is the per capita expenditure in service sector i, α i is the minimum required 
expenditure and βi is the marginal budget share in service sector i; y is total income. 
The minimum required expenditure, marginal budget shares and discretionary income 
vary between municipalities as functions of observable characteristics. A detailed 
description of the way minimum required expenditures and marginal budget shares are 
modeled, as well as the derivation of the Linear Expenditure System, is provided in 
Section 4.2. 
Allers and Elhorst (2007) investigate fiscal policy interaction, testing for interdependent 
behavior among Dutch municipalities with respect to taxation and spending in 9 public 
service sectors using a structural form simultaneous equation framework.The expenditure 
in a particular service sector is assumed to depend on the price or cost variables of other 
service sectors. A linear expenditure system (LES) is developed following the logic of 
Aaberge and Langørgen (2003, 2006) with some notational differences. However, Allers 
and Elhorst (2007) develop two extended versions of the model: the first includes a 
spatially lagged dependent variable and the second – a spatial autoregressive process in 
the error term of each equation. 
The spatial lag model posits that a municipality’s fiscal policy depends on the fiscal policy 
in neighbouring municipalities and on a set of observed local characteristics. Allers and 
Elhorst (2007) formulate the spatial lag by making minimum required expenditure 
dependent on the expenditure of neighboring municipalities. Using the notation of 
Aaberge and Langørgen (2003, 2006) described above and including an error term εi , 
the spacial lag model is given by:
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(2.3) ui = δ iWui +α i + βi y − α i
i=1
9
∑⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+ εi       i = 1,...,9
where Wui is the dependent variable observed in neighboring municipalities according to 
a spatial weights matrix W describing the spatial arrangement of the municipalities in the 
sample, δi is the spatial autoregressive coefficient and α i and βi are a function of 
exogenous variables determining the cost of reaching the minimum standard for public 
service sector i and exogenous variables determining the share of discretionary income 
spent on service i, respectively. 
The spatial error model, on the other hand, posits that a municipality’s  fiscal policy 
depends on a set of observed local characteristics and that the error terms are correlated 
across space, resulting in the following version of the  LES:
(2.4) ui = α i + βi y − α i
i=1
9
∑⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+ φi    i = 1,...,9  and φi = λiWφi + εi
where φi is the spatially autocorrelated error term, W is a spatial weights matrix 
describing the spatial arrangement of the municipalities in the sample and λi is the spatial 
autocorrelation coefficient. The spatial error model is consistent with a situation where 
determinants of fiscal policy omitted from the model are spatially autocorrelated, and with 
a situation where unobserved shocks follow a spatial pattern (Allers and Elhorst, 2007).
To estimate the spatial LES Allers and Elhorst (2007) use cross-sectional data from 496 
Dutch municipalities in 2002. However, the authors acknowledge that a panel data study 
would offer an opportunity to control for non-observed local characteristics, which do not 
vary over time. Thus, the estimation may be further extended by adding spatial fixed or 
random effects to each equation within LES to account for these characteristics.
Similarly to Allers and Elhorst (2007), the current paper closely follows the methodology 
and arguments of Aaberge and Langørgen (2003, 2006), which are outlined in Section 
4.2. However, while the simple benchmark model is the same in all of these papers, the 
current research focuses on fixed effects estimation, extending the work of Langørgen 
and Aaberge (2003, 2006) in the context of panel data, rather than employing the spacial 
lag or spacial error models of Allers and Elhorst (2007). While these models certainly yield 
insight into possible interaction elements in the behaviour of local municipalities, this issue 
is not the primary focus of this paper. Rather, the objective is to analyse the dynamics of 
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municipalities’ spending behaviour, comparing the estimated effects  on the minimum 
required expenditures and budget shares with those based on cross-sectional estimations 
and a chosen baseline model. 
3. Theoretical foundations and methods
3.1. Advantages and limitations of panel data 
Advantages and limitations of panel data are discussed in, among others, Hsiao (1985), 
Baltagi (2005), Wooldridge (2002a) and Gujarati (2003). Panel data allows one to look at 
dynamic relationships and is better suited to analysis of dynamics of change or 
adjustment. Panel data also makes it possible to control for unobserved cross section 
heterogeneity (i.e. take into account unobserved individual or time effects by including 
them in the model) (Wooldridge, 2002a). Having access to a panel data set also 
significantly increases the number of observations, provides a more informative data set, 
less collinearity among variables, more variability and more degrees of freedom (Gujarati, 
2003). Limitations include panel surveys design and data collection problems, 
measurement errors, self-selectivity, non-response and attrition (Baltagi, 2005). Some of 
these are less relevant for this study. However, an important and relevant problem 
associated with the short time-series panels is the incidental parameters problem. 
3.1.1. Incidental parameters problem
A characteristic feature of a typical panel data set is a large number of cross-sectional 
units combined with a small time dimension (each unit observed only a few times). This 
feature causes a so-called incidental parameters  problem, whereby the number of 
parameters increases with the sample size leading to a loss in consistency of these 
parameters (Beck, 2004). For example, when a fixed effects model is estimated, cross-
sectional unit-specific intercepts are added to the regression in the form of dummy 
variables. Treating these parameters as parameters to be estimated leads to the incidental 
parameter problem as discussed by Neyman and Scott (1948) and Chamberlain (1980). 
Whether the inconsistency in estimating the fixed effects will give rise to inconsistency for 
estimators of the structural parameters of interest, say  θ , depends on whether the 
estimators of  θ satisfy the Neyman-Scott principle. That is, if there exist functions
 
ψ Nj y1,...., yN | θ( ), j = 1,....,m  of observables yi = yi1,....., yiT( ) 'which are independent of the 
incidental parameters such that when  θ are the true values,  ψ Nj y1,...., yN |
θ( ) converge to 
zero in probability as N tends to infinity, then an estimator  ˆθ derived by solving 
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ψ Nj y1,...., yN | ˆθ( ) = 0, j = 1,...,m , is consistent under suitable regularity conditions (Hsiao, 
1985:136). 
Green (2001) provides an accessible discussion of the problem. In a single linear equation 
case with fixed individual effects, the parameters can be estimated by the Least Squares 
Dummy Variable (LSDV) or 'within groups' estimator, denoted bLSDV. This  is  computed by 
least squares regression of the dependent variable, from which its mean over all time 
periods (T) is subtracted, on the same transformation of the explanatory variables. The 
slope parameters can also be estimated using first differences. Under the assumptions, 
bLSDV is a consistent estimator of the parameters associated with the explanatory 
variables. However, the individual fixed effects are each estimated with the T(i) individual 
specific observations for each cross-sectional unit i. Since T(i) is typically small, and is 
fixed, the LSDV estimator of the fixed effects is inconsistent. However this inconsistency is 
not transmitted to the LSDV estimator bLSDV because it is not a function of the fixed 
effects estimator (Green, 2001:2). That is the Neyman-Scott principle is satisfied. 
The incidental parameter problem disappears if the effects are treated as random since 
they are assumed to possess a probability density function characterized by a finite 
number of parameters. However, making specific distributional assumptions imposes a 
degree of restrictiveness, whose severity depends on the type of the model being 
investigated (Hsiao,1985:136).
3.2. Fixed effects
In a panel data set, the same unit (for example an individual, firm or municipality) is 
followed over a number of time periods. In this framework there may be effects that are 
not captured by the vector of explanatory variables. Wooldridge (2002a) represents these 
effects as an omitted random variable “c”, called an unobserved effect. In the context of 
the local government expenditure model, this  is a municipality effect ck where k is a 
municipality index. The population regression function is then given by:
(3.1) E[ykt | xkt ,ck ] = b0 + xktb + ck       t = 1,2,...,T      k = 1,2,...,K
where 
(3.2) xktb = b1x1kt + ....+ bJ xJkt
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and x jkt  indicates variable j at time t and municipality k, b1, ... , bJ are slope parameters 
and b0 is the intercept.
Hsiao (1985) offers a classification of variables used in panel data analyses, which is 
particularly useful in the discussion of fixed effects estimation that follows. Economic 
variables are divided into three types: individual time-invariant, period individual-invariant, 
and individual-time varying variables. The individual time-invariant variables are the same 
for a given cross-sectional unit through time but vary across cross-sectional units. 
Examples include ability, sex, and socio-economic background. The period individual-
invariant variables are the same for all cross-sectional units at a given point in time but 
vary through time. Examples of these are prices, interest rates and widespread optimism 
or pessimism. The individual-time varying variables are variables that vary across cross-
sectional units at a point in time and also exhibit variations through time, for example firm 
profits, sales, and capital stock (Hsiao, 1985:130). 
In equation (3.1) ck is assumed to be of the first type (time-invariant or time-constant), i.e. 
ck has the same effect on the mean response in each time period (Wooldridge, 2002a). If 
the unit of observation is a municipality, ck contains unobserved municipality 
characteristics—such as administrative structure and efficiency—that can be viewed as 
being roughly constant over the period in question. Allers  (2007) also suggests work 
ethos as an unobserved effect which influences local government efficiency. In a model of 
municipality expenditures where the observed explanatory variables are factors affecting 
minimum required expenditures and the factors affecting the share of the discretionary 
income used on various sectors, an unobserved effect represents all factors affecting 
municipality expenditures that are constant (or roughly constant) over time. Geographical 
position for example is constant over time (except in cases where municipalities merge, in 
which case it is still approximately constant over the period of interest). Whether a 
municipality is located on relatively flat land or in a mountainous region may have an effect 
on some of the expenditures, such as road infrastructure, as it is more difficult and costly 
to build roads on mountainous terrain. Also, a mountainous area may be more suitable for 
skiing such that a municipality may spend more on sporting activities and skiing 
infrastructure in the culture and recreation sector.
In most applications, the main reason for collecting panel data is to allow for the 
unobserved effect to be correlated with the explanatory variables, i.e.
(3.3) Ε[x 'kt ,ck ] ≠ 0
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where x is a vector of explanatory variables, ck is the fixed effect and 0 is a vector of 
zeros.
In this situation, a fixed effects model may be appropriate (Wooldridge,2002b). For 
example, in modelling municipality expenditures we may allow the unmeasured 
municipality factors to be correlated with some of the explanatory variables – for example 
geographic location may be correlated with population density and amount of snowfall. 
A method commonly applied in the literature to model these time-constant unobserved 
effects is Least Squares Dummy Variable regression. Typically a dummy variable for each 
cross-sectional unit (here: municipality) is added, omitting a base category municipality to 
avoid the so-called dummy variable trap of perfect collinearity. However, when the number 
of cross-sectional units is very large (300 – 400 municipalities) and the time period is small 
(here: 8  years), the estimation may be difficult as there may not be enough degrees of 
freedom. The incidental parameters problem is also applicable in this situation.
We may also have unobserved effects that are constant across municipalities but not time 
(what Hsiao (1985) calls  period individual-invariant effects, or more simply time effects). 
There may be omitted variables that capture effects or characteristics that at a given time 
are common to all municipalities. For example, central government legislation that affects 
spending behaviour of all municipalities in a given year is one such unobserved effect. 
A potential pitfall of this type of model is that when we include a full set of year dummies
—that is, year dummies for all years but the base—we cannot estimate the effect of any 
variable whose change is  constant over time. This is a consequence of the fixed effects 
taking up the between unit variation in the variables, making it impossible to estimate the 
impacts of any variables that do not vary over time (Beck, 2004). On first examination, 
however, this does not seem to be relevant to the expenditure model for local 
governments; however, population size does appear to be roughly constant over time. 
Moreover, the parameters of time-invariant variables cannot be estimated in the fixed 
effect model. This is a consequence of the fixed effects taking up the between unit 
variation in the variables, making it impossible to estimate the impacts of any variables 
that do not vary over time (Beck, 2004). For example Allers (2007) discusses soil 
condition as a time-invariant explanatory variable which impacts road and sanitation 
costs. This variable is  effectively removed (its effect cannot be estimated) when fixed 
effects for municipalities  are introduced. Similarly, if we have variables that change very 
slowly over time (such as institutional measures), then the fixed effects approach will 
essentially wipe them out (Beck, 2004). 
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However, the time-invariant variables can be interacted with variables that change over 
time and, in particular, with year dummy variables. For example, in a wage equation where 
education is constant over time for each individual, we can interact education with each 
year dummy to see how the return to education has changed over time. Even though 
fixed effects cannot be used to estimate the return to education in the base period –  and 
hence in any period – we can see how the return to education in each year differs from 
that in the base period (Wooldridge, 2002b:444).
3.2.1. Interactive fixed effects
In the standard fixed effects models, fixed and time effects are typically introduced 
separately, either additively or multiplicatively depending on the model’s assumption. 
However, it is also possible to introduce these effects in a way that links the time and 
cross-sectional heterogeneity. Arellano and Honoré (2000) discuss an example of a model 
where individual effects are interacted with the time effects. The model is formulated in the 
following way:
(3.4) ykt = bxkt + δ tηk +υkt
where b is a vector of parameters, xkt is  a vector of explanatory variables, k represents a 
cross-sectional unit such as municipality and t is the time index.
In this specification the time effects could represent an aggregate shock, which is allowed 
to have individual-specific fixed effects on ykt , measured by ηk . In this case we clearly 
cannot simply first difference away the fixed effects. The authors then go on to suggest a 
transformation first derived by Chamberlain (1984), which provides a solution (Arellano 
and Honoré, 2000:25). Generalising the previous specification to
(3.5) fkt = gktηk +υkt
where E(υkt | xk ) = 0 , xk are some predetermined variables and gkt is a function of 
predetermined variables and unknown parameters. Dividing by gkt and first differencing, 
they obtain 
(3.6) fk (t−1) − (gkt−1gk (t−1) ) fkt = vk (t−1) − (gkt−1gk (t−1) )vkt = v+kt
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Hübler (2006) suggests a similar model, specifying a time-varying individual effect where 
the effect varies e.g. with cyclical ups and downs, although individual characteristics stay 
the same. He argues that one cannot expect that unobserved individual effects to have 
the same effects in different situations, such as different time periods (Hübler, 2006).
3.2.2. Partial adjustment model
A dynamic variant of the fixed effects model can be specified as a partial adjustment 
model, which includes a lagged dependent variable as well as possibly lagged 
explanatory variables in addition to the fixed and time effects. Arellano and Honoré (2000) 
discuss a model of this type: 
(3.7) ykt = αyk (t−1) + β0xkt + β1xk (t−1) + δ t +ηk +υkt ,   k = 1,...,K , t = 2,...,T
(3.8.) E(υkt | xkT ) = 0  
By construction yk (t−1)  is correlated with the fixed effect ηk and may also be correlated 
with the past, present and future values of the residuals υkt since these may be 
autocorrelated. 
A more general version of the partial adjustment model, however, is the specification 
employed by Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen (1995):
(3.9) ykt = λykt* + 1− λ( )ykt−1 +υkt
or equivalently
(3.10) ykt = ykt−1 + λ ykt* − ykt−1( ) +υkt
where λ is the speed of adjustment parameter, which shows how fast the dependent 
variable yt adjusts to its equilibrium value ykt* . The desired allocation ykt* may be specified 
as a function of explanatory variables xkt  as well as time and/or fixed effects δ t and ηk
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respectively. This model is adapted to analyse the adjustment of the local government 
expenditures and is presented in Section 5, while the results are discussed in Section 6. 
3.3. Random effects
If the unobserved effect ck in equation (3.1) is assumed uncorrelated with each 
explanatory variable in all time periods,
(3.11) Cov(xjkt,ck) = 0,  t = 1,2,…,T   j =1,2,…,J   k=1,2,...,K
where t represents time period, j is a subscript on an explanatory variable and k 
represents observation,
then using a fixed effects model results in inefficient estimators and the random effects 
method is preferable. However, if the ck are correlated with some explanatory variables, 
the fixed effects method is needed; if random effects is used, then the estimators are 
generally inconsistent (Wooldridge, 2002b:453).
A random effects model assumes ck to be a component in the composite error (vkt=ck+ukt) 
in each time period; the vkt are serially correlated across time. Generalised Least Squares 
(GLS) may be used to solve the serial correlation problem. In order for the procedure to 
have good properties, it must have a large cross-sectional dimension and relatively small 
time dimension  (Wooldridge, 2002b). 
A random effects model allows for explanatory variables that are constant over time, 
which is  an advantage of random effects over fixed effects. This  is possible because the 
unobserved effect is assumed to be uncorrelated with all explanatory variables, whether 
they are fixed over time or not (Wooldridge, 2002b:450).
3.4. A comparison of fixed and random effects 
In the fixed effects  approach one is typically interested in measuring the effect of 
regressors holding unobserved heterogeneity constant, while in the random effects 
approach the parameters of interest are those characterising the distribution of the error 
components (Arellano and Honoré, 2000:1).
The fixed effect model involves making inferences conditional on the effects that are in the 
sample. The random effect model is one where inference is unconditional or marginal with 
respect to the population of all effects. Thus, whether the conditional likelihood function or 
the marginal likelihood function is used depends on the context of data and the manner in 
which they were gathered (Hsiao, 1985). Hsiao (1985) provides an illustrative example 
where several technicians care for machines. If one wants to assess differences between 
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specific technicians, then the fixed effect model is more appropriate. However, if the 
technicians are randomly sampled from all employees, the effects of technicians may be 
assumed random. Similarly, if an experiment involves hundreds of individuals that are 
considered a random sample from some larger population, random effects are more 
appropriate. But if one is interested in analyzing just a few individuals, then fixed individual 
effects would be more relevant.
	 When individual units in the sample are of interest, the effects are more appropriately considered fixed. 
When inferences will be made about the characteristics of a population from which those in the data are 
considered to be a random sample, then the effects should be considered random (Hsiao, 1985:132). 
Hence, a fixed effect specification appears to be more appropriate to analysing the 
behaviour of local governments, which are viewed as the units of interest rather than a 
random sample of a larger population.
3.5. Random Coefficient Model
Beck (2006) suggests an alternative to the fixed and random effects models, namely a 
version of a random coefficient model (RCM). This model allows for cross-sectional unit 
heterogeneity, but also assumes that the various unit level coefficients are draws from a 
common (normal) distribution. Thus the RCM may be described by as
(3.12) ykt = xktβk + εkt ,    βk = α + zkχ + µ k
where βk is a vector of parameters, which are assumed to be random, composed of a 
vector of constants α , a vector of some exogenous variables zk ( χ is the vector of 
corresponding parameters) and a random effect µ k which has a normal distribution; k 
indexes the cross-sectional units and t  indexes time.
A feature of the above specification is that one can model the variation of the unit 
coefficients as a function of unit level variables (z). This allows us to move from saying for 
example that the effect of some variable is different in country A and country B  to this 
impact differs because of some institutional difference between the two nations (Beck, 
2006:9). While this model is often estimated by Bayesian methods, it is also feasible to 
estimate it via standard maximum likelihood as has been implemented by Pinheiro and 
Bates (2000).
In a classic paper, Hsiao (1975) discusses the estimation of a Random Coefficient Model, 
in which the random component is decomposed into a time and a cross-sectional 
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random effect. The coefficients of the explanatory variables are assumed to have 
common means, as well as some random components associated with the time and/or 
cross-section units. The model is specified in the following way:
(3.13) ykt = β jkt x jkt
j=1
J
∑ + εkt  ,  β jkt = β j + δ jk + γ jt , k = 1,...,K  and t = 1,...,T
where k indexes the individual units, for example municipalities, j represents an index of an 
explanatory variable such that xjkt is an exogenous variable j for municipality k for year t. 
And each exogenous variable xjkt is  assumed to have a random parameter β jkt , which 
consists of three components: a constant parameter β j for each xj , a cross-sectional 
random effect δ jk and a time random effect γ jt . The error term εkt and both of the 
random effects are assumed to have zero means and constant variances. The random 
effects are also assumed to be uncorrelated with one another, or with the error term. 
It may be noted that the Random Effects model is a special case of the RCM. The RCM is 
reduced to Random Effects if it is only the intercept which is a random parameter, that is:
(3.14) β jkt =
β j + δ jk + γ jt
β j
x jkt = 1
otherwise
Hsiao and Pesaran (2004) discuss a simplified variant of the above model, where in vector 
notation
(3.15) βkt = β + δ k    and   δ k ~ N 0,Δ( )
In other words, there are only individual-specific effects; these stay constant over time and 
are independently normally distributed over k with mean zero and covariance ∆.The error 
term has mean zero and a covariance matrix C. If the errors and δ k are normally 
distributed and the errors are independently distributed across k and over t, i.e. 
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(3.16) E ε 2kt( ) = σ 2k
where σ k
2  is the variance of the errors,
then the GLS estimator of β is  the maximum likelihood estimator of β conditional on ∆ 
and σ k
2 . Without knowledge of ∆ and σ k
2 , we can estimate β, ∆ and σ k2  for k = 1, ... ,K 
simultaneously by the maximum likelihood method, although computationally it can be 
tedious (Hsiao and Pesaran, 2004:9).
3.6. Balanced  vs. unbalanced panel
Wooldridge (2002a:250) defines a balanced panel as a panel where we have the same 
time periods, denoted t = 1, ... ,T for each cross sectional observation, i.e. the same time 
periods are available for all cross sectional units. Some panel data sets have missing 
years for at least some cross-sectional units in the sample. This is referred to as an 
unbalanced panel. The dummy variable fixed effects regression goes through in the same 
way as with a balanced panel. In the local government expenditure model, some of the 
municipalities have merged over the period 2001 to 2008. Provided that the reason the 
municipality leaves the sample is uncorrelated with the error term, the estimators will 
remain unbiased. This seems likely to hold in most cases of municipality mergers. 
However, a closer examination may be warranted (Wooldridge, 2002b:448).
Greene (2003) suggests that if a time effects estimation is theoretically justified and is 
performed (i.e. a full set of time dummies are added using the union of the dates 
represented in the full data set even though some of the dates have missing 
observations), then any missing data in any time period is accounted by a dummy variable 
for that time period. Thus the dummy variable regression with time effects automatically 
takes care of the unbalanced data set. 
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4. Model
4.1. Norwegian local government fiscal responsibilities and financing
In Norway municipalities play an important role in provision of public services. The 
services offered range from almost pure collective services such as administration, to 
'quasi private goods' such as care for the elderly. The differences in central government 
control over these services, varying from a regulated primary education sector to an 
almost unregulated infrastructure sector, are the result of a compromise between the wish 
for local democracy and the requirement of national standards. This is partly reflected in 
the variation in per capita spending between municipalities. The variation is less in the 
more heavily regulated sectors, such as primary schools, and much higher in other 
sectors. It is of interest to examine if this variation in spending is  a reflection of preferences 
(Rongen, 1995:254-255). 
Municipalities’ resources are largely concentrated on production of national welfare 
services. Child care, primary schools and social services (including care for the elderly) 
account for about 70 percent of the municipalities' gross operating expenses. 
Municipalities also have a local responsibility in water supply and sanitation, culture, 
economic development, planning and community development (NOU, 2005/18:66). 
The revenues of Norwegian municipalities consist primarily of:
- Fee income (user fees), which includes sales and rental income 
- Interest income, which includes interest on bank deposits and other receivables
- Tax revenue, consisting of taxes on income and wealth, property and other 
production taxes, as well as licensing fees
- Transfers from the state (general grants and earmarked grants) (NOU, 2005/18:68).
4.2. Baseline model description and specification
The model of municipality expenditures, referred to as KOMMODE, explains variations in 
spending per capita in various service sectors in which local governments have a 
responsibility to provide services to their constituencies. The model is designed such that 
the accounting relationships between revenues, expenses and net operating surplus are 
always maintained. The supply of funds is always equal to their use. For example, if a 
municipality receives 1 krone extra in income, this will be exactly offset by changes in 
expenditures and net operating surplus (Langørgen et al., forthcoming).
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The present research will consider an extended version of KOMMODE, which consists of 
12 service sectors:
1. Administration 
2. Primary schools 
3. Other education 
4. Child care 
5. Health care 
6. Social services 
7. Child protection 
8. Care for the elderly and disabled 
9. Culture 10. 
10. Municipal roads 
11. Water supply and sanitation 
12. Other infrastructure 
The analysis is conducted to determine how the minimum required expenditure 
(subsistence requirement) varies within the different sectors between municipalities based 
in part on demographic, social and geographic factors. Hypotheses about the variables 
that give rise to minimum required expenditures can be derived from knowledge of 
statutory responsibilities, minimum standards,  production conditions and other conditions 
for municipalities. 
Discretionary income shows economic freedom as measured by the revenues that the 
municipalities have at their disposal after the minimum required expenditures for all 
sectors are covered. The marginal budget shares show how the discretionary income is 
distributed among sectors, depending on local priorities. The marginal budget shares are 
assumed to vary from municipality to municipality depending on the local population's 
educational level, settlement density, and the political party composition of the council.
Based on these concepts, each municipality's  operating expenses by service sectors 
(sector i) may be decomposed as follows: 
(4.1)	Expenditure(i) = Minimum required expenditure(i) + Marginal budget share(i) * Discretionary income 
where the minimum required expenditure, marginal budget shares and discretionary 
income vary between municipalities as functions of observable characteristics. 
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There are thus three types of explanatory factors for municipality expenditures included in 
the model:
- Local income basis (given by tax rates, tax bases and transfers) 
- Factors that explain variations in minimum required expenditures
- Factors affecting local government priorities over and above the minimum required 
expenditures 
4.2.1. Outline of model derivation
In Aaberge and Langørgen (2003) and Pedersen (2008) a linear expenditure system is 
derived by constrained utility maximisation. The production function for sector i is 
assumed to be
(4.2) qi = fi xi ,zi( ),i = 1,...,12
where xi is  a vector of factor inputs and zi  is a vector of community characteristics that 
affect production opportunities.
Under constant returns to scale and cost minimisation, the cost function is given by
(4.3) Ci qi ,wi ,zi( ) = pi wi ,zi( )qi
where wi is a vector of factor prices and pi  is unit cost in sector i.
Local governments (municipalities) are treated as utility maximising agents. A Stone-Geary 
utility function is given by
(4.4) W u0 ,q1,q2 ,...,q12( ) = u0 −α0( )β0 qi − γ i( )βi
i=1
12
∏
where 
(4.5) βi
i=0
12
∑ = 1
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and 0 ≤ βi ≤ 1∀i , γ i ≤ qi , α0 ≤ u0 are assumed satisfied.
Equation (4.5) is the restriction which says that the marginal budget shares in all sectors 
must sum to 1.
The utility function (4.4) is maximised subject to a budget constraint 
(4.6) y = u0 + pi
i=1
12
∑ qi  
where y is  exogenous income inclusive of user fees, u0 is budget surplus, pi and qi are 
price and quantity in service sector i and ui = piqi ,i ≠ 0 is the expenditure on service 
sector i (Aaberge and Langørgen, 2003).
As Allers and Elhorst (2007) note, the Stone-Geary utility function presupposes that all 
public services are normal and all pairs of public services are net substitutes. These 
conditions are likely to be satisfied as long as local public services are categorised into a 
limited number of broad groups, as is indeed the case in KOMMODE. 
The resulting linear expenditure system is of the following form:
(4.7) ui = α i + βi y − α i
i=0
12
∑⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
   i = 0,1,...,12
where price variation is included in the α i = piγ i ,i ≠ 0
(4.8) α i
i=0
12
∑ = α0 + α i
i=1
12
∑ = α0 +α
and α is the minimum required expenditure on all services while α0 is the minimum 
savings parameter.
The following heterogeneity in the parameters  is introduced by translating the demand 
system in the sense described by Pollak and Wales (1981), whereby “translating can 
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sometimes be interpreted as allowing "necessary" or ‘subsistence’ parameters of a 
demand system to depend on the demographic variables” (Pollak and Wales, 
1981:1534-1535 ).
(4.9) α i = α i0 + α ij
j=1
k
∑ z j
(4.10) βi = βi0 + βij
j=1
m
∑ vj
Equation (4.9) insures that the minimum required expenditures per capita depend on 
production technology and cost structure captured by exogenous variables z1, z2, ... , zk, 
while (4.10) says that the marginal budget share parameters depend on local taste 
variables v1, ..., vm that affect the allocation of discretionary income (y – α) between 
sectors. 
Two additional restrictions are imposed such that (4.5) holds.
(4.11) βij
i=0
12
∑ = 0 j = 1,2,...,m  
(4.12)  βi0
i=0
12
∑ = 1
4.3. Practical issues
In creating a panel data set, data are available for the years 2001 – 2008. However, the 
number of municipalities under observation differs  slightly from year to year due to 
mergers of municipalities. This problem may be dealt with by selecting only those 
municipalities common to all the years. However, by taking all the municipalities in all the 
years, we are free to exclude the municipalities with missing data when performing the 
estimation, and hence both balanced and unbalanced panel estimation is possible. 

22
4.3.1. Outlier municipalities
In the previous estimations of KOMMODE certain municipalities were considered outliers 
and excluded from the estimation. An outlier is defined in Langørgen et al. (forthcoming) 
as a municipality that does not fit into the model. If such municipalities  are included in the 
model estimation, the estimates may be distorted. Thus, these outliers are excluded from 
estimation. 
Several grounds for exclusion are used. First, municipalities that have special 
characteristics  are considered outliers. Oslo municipality is excluded from estimation 
because it is both a municipality and a county government, and it is therefore not possible 
to distinguish completely between municipal and county expenditures in its accounts. If 
Oslo were included in the estimation, total expenditure would be overestimated. Other 
outliers  in this category are: rich municipalities  (Bykle, Eidfjord and Modalen), little 
municipalities (Utsira), very poor municipalities (Haram in 2002, Bø in 2006). Second, the 
municipalities that have particularly large residuals on initial estimation are excluded from 
the final model estimation. Third, Langørgen et al. (forthcoming) suggest that it is possible 
to determine which municipalities have an independent effect on the estimation results, 
that is whether there is  a significant difference in the estimated coefficients with and 
without a particular municipality. If a significant difference is observed, that municipality is 
considered an outlier and omitted from the model. Finally, municipalities that have 
negative or large positive per capita expenditures as well as large net operating surpluses 
are excluded from estimation. 
The outlier municipalities  differ somewhat from year to year and hence need to be 
combined in a meaningful way for the panel model. It is reasonable to exclude 
municipalities that are outliers in at least 1 year or in at least 2 years. Both formulations 
may be used to estimate different versions of the model. Table A.1 in Appendix A shows 
these municipalities as well as the total number of outliers in each year. 
4.4. Price and income indices
In order to remove the effect of inflation and make the coefficients comparable over the 
time period of consideration, the income and expenditure variables in the model may be 
adjusted by a price index such that all of these variables are measured at the base of a 
selected year, for example 2008. The price growth ( ΔP ) values are taken from the 
Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development (2009) report. The standard 
formula is used to calculate the price indices (PI), normalising 2008 to 1,
(4.13) PIt =
PIt+1
1+ ΔPt+1
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Thus the price indices are calculated recursively from 2008 back to 2001.
As an alternative deflator, an income index measure may be used. As one of the key 
reasons for increasing minimum expenditures is the income growth over time, deflating 
the income and expenditure variables by the average income growth is the method 
employed in this paper. Adjusting the expenditures and income in this way accounts for 
the part of time heterogeneity in the minimum required expenditures that is due to the fact 
that municipality incomes are growing over time and ensures that the estimates are 
comparable over time. While the price index may be more suitable in other contexts and 
may be used in further studies on the subject, the income index has a better theoretical 
basis in the present context, as we expect the change in the minimum required 
expenditures to result primarily from growing incomes rather than prices. 
The income index Rt is determined as the mean per capita income over all municipalities3 
in each period as a fraction of the mean per capita income in the base year 2008. Thus, 
Rt=1 in 2008.
(4.14) Rt =
yt
y8
where
(4.15) yt =
1
Kt
ykt
k=1
Kt
∑ ,   k = 1,...,Kt ,   t = 1,...,8.
yt  is  the mean per capita income in year t and Kt is the number of municipalities included 
in the estimation for a particular year. Calculations are shown in Tables A.2 – A.5 in 
Appendix A.
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3 The index is calculated for municipalities included in the estimation; hence different indices are used for 
different versions of the model.
Table 4.1. Price and income indices
year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
price growth 0.063 0.043 0.037 0.033 0.025 0.036 0.044 0.064
price index 0.759 0.791 0.821 0.848 0.869 0.900 0.940 1.000
income index (A) 0.656 0.683 0.730 0.764 0.803 0.895 0.939 1.000
income index (B) 0.655 0.682 0.733 0.765 0.802 0.896 0.939 1.000
income index (C) 0.654 0.683 0.731 0.765 0.804 0.895 0.939 1.000
income index (D) 0.654 0.683 0.733 0.765 0.803 0.896 0.940 1.000
(A)unbalanced panel, excluding municipalities that are outliers in at least 1 year
(B)unbalanced panel, excluding municipalities that are outliers in at least 2 years
(C)balanced panel4, excluding municipalities that are outliers in at least 1 year
(D)balanced panel, excluding municipalities that are outliers in at least 2 years
In addition to a close proximity between the price index and income index values, Table 
4.1 demonstrates an even closer relationship between the four different specifications of 
the income index. The income index is insensitive to the number of outliers excluded from 
estimation as well as the structure of the panel (balanced or unbalanced). It is  therefore 
expected that models with income growth adjusted expenditure and income, estimated 
using data specifications (A) – (D), will yield similar results. 
5. Panel data models for a system of equations
5.1. Time and municipality-constant effects on minimum required expenditures 
and marginal budget shares
In the context of panel data the linear expenditure system (4.7) may be written as:
(5.1) uit = α it + βit yt − α it
i=0
12
∑⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+ εit , i = 1,...,12  and t = 1,...,8
where the index for municipality is implicit and yt is total exogenous income. 
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4 In a balanced panel municipalities that have missing data in some of the years are excluded; these 
municipalities are given in Table A.6 in Appendix A.
The error terms in the sector equations are assumed to be correlated resulting in 
contemporaneous error correlation:
(5.2) Cov(εit ,ε jt )
i≠ j
≠ 0 ,  i, j = 1,...,12
Sspecification (5.2) is reasonable since the error terms for different expenditure categories 
are expected to reflect some common unobservable or omitted factors. 
Estimating the model given by (5.1), however, will lead to biased estimates. This is a result 
of the fact that the effects on minimum required expenditure (αi0 and αij , j=1,..,r) are 
assumed to be constant over time and to vary only by sector. However, based on intuitive 
understanding and past estimations done on cross-sectional data for the years 2001 to 
2007 documented in Pedersen (2008), it is known that the α’s are increasing over time, 
as prices and incomes are increasing over time. Secondly, we expect that there may be 
unobserved effects  that may account for the minimum expenditures increasing over time 
(so-called time effects) as well as unobserved municipality effects that may explain 
differences between municipalities that are not explained by the included explanatory 
variables. If these unobserved effects are correlated with at least some of the explanatory 
variables in the model, model (5.1) will suffer from omitted variable bias and the estimates 
will be biased and inconsistent. 
One approach to removing the time variation in the minimum required expenditure is to 
transform the data by the income index, thus accounting for time variation due to income 
growth. Model 1 is a benchmark model to which other more complex models can be 
compared. 
(Model 1)
 
uit = α it + βit yt − α it
i=0
12
∑⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+ εit
where
 
uit =
uit
Rt
, 
 
yt =
yt
Rt
,     Rt =
yt
y8
,     yt =
1
K yktk=1
K
∑ k = 1,...,K ,  t = 1,...,8 ,
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(5.3) α it = α i0 + α ij
j=1
r
∑ z jt
and
(5.4) βit = βi0 + βij
j=1
m
∑ vjt
The expenditure and income variables in Model 1 are adjusted for growth in income, 
putting the model into real instead of nominal terms. The index Rt  by which expenditures 
and income are deflated is determined as the mean income in each period as a fraction of 
the mean income in the base year 2008, as described in Section 4.4. The mean income is 
found as an average over K municipalities (indexed by k) included in the estimation in a 
given year. Rt is  expected to be less than one in the years 2001 – 2007 since incomes 
have increased from 2001 to 2008 ( yt ≤ y8  for all t) and is equal to 1 in 2008 by definition. 
Model 1 is consistent with the budget constraint uit
i=0
12
∑ = yt since 
1
Rt
uit
i=0
12
∑ = 1Rt
yt is 
consistent with the budget constraint and is by definition equal to 
 
uit
i=0
12
∑ = yt , which 
follows directly from Model 1.
5.2. Time variation in minimum required expenditures
To account for other unobserved heterogeneity due to factors other than income growth, 
an alternative model that accounts for variation over time is introduced (αi0 and αij, j=1,..,r, 
are assumed to vary over time and are specified as αi0t and αijt). Some of this variation is 
due to growing incomes and prices; the rest is due to any unobserved or omitted factors 
common to all municipalities in a given year. The effects on the marginal budget shares 
(βi0 and βij, j=1,..,m) are specified as time-invariant based on previous cross-sectional 
estimation where these parameters are found to be roughly constant throughout the years 
under consideration. The model is given by equation (5.5).
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(5.5)
 
uit = α it + βit yt − α it
i=0
12
∑⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+ εit
where 
(5.6)
 
α it = α i0t + α ijt
j=1
r
∑ z jt
and βit  is given by equation (5.4).
A potential problem with a model given by equations (5.5) and (5.6) is the large number of 
parameters to be estimated; with a separate minimum expenditure parameter for each 
sector and year. 
5.3. Multiplicative time effect
A time effect implies that expenditures change over time because of unobserved factors 
such as changes in regulatory or government policies. Using standard panel data 
methods for fixed effects, we can introduce a dummy variable for each time period (i.e. 
year) to account for the differences in αs over time. Since from (4.9) αi is a linear 
combination of parameters and exogenous variables z that explain the variation in the 
minimum required expenditure, we need to introduce the time dummies in a way that 
would account for differences over time in the constant term αi0 as well as the growth 
over time in the slope parameters αij. If the time dummies are introduced additively, the 
increase in minimum required expenditures over time is not fully internalised because the 
effect of increasing income on the slope parameters is  not accounted for. Thus, the time 
dummies need to be introduced multiplicatively. This results in Model 2, which is 
equivalent to model (5.5) with a specific time structure imposed on the αi0t and αijt, i.e. 
α i0t = α i0τ it  and α ijt = α ijτ it or equivalently  α it = α itτ it .
(Model 2) uit = α itτ it + βit yt − α itτ it
i=0
12
∑⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+ εit
where τ it  is the time effect.
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The model is  estimated by introducing dummy variables ht for each year such that for 
each sector i
ui = α i0τ itht
t=1
8
∑ + α ij
j=1
r
∑ τ it z jht
t=1
8
∑ + βi y − α i0τ itht
t=1
8
∑ + α ijτ it
j=1
r
∑ z jht
t=1
8
∑
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟i=0
12
∑
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
+ εi
where  ht =
1,
0,
year = t
otherwise
   t = 1,2,...,8
The model has 8  year intercepts α i0tτ it and may be estimated given the normalisation 
τ i8 = 1 , such that in 2001 the intercept for every sector i is α i0τ i1 , in 2002 it is α i0τ i2  , 
and in the base year 2008 α i0 . 
It may also be desirable to test whether the beta parameters  are indeed constant over 
time. If the betas are assumed to have time variation in the intercept parameters βi0t then 
Model 2 can be specified with an additive time effect γ it  as follows:
(Model 3) uit = α itτ it + βit + γ it( ) yt − α itτ it
i=0
12
∑⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+ εit
The model is  estimated by introducing dummy variables ht for each year such that for 
each sector i
ui = α i0τ itht
t=1
8
∑ + α ijτ it
j=1
r
∑ z jht
t=1
8
∑ + βi0 + γ itht + βijv j
j=1
m
∑
t=1
8
∑
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
y − α i0τ itht
t=1
8
∑ + α ij
j=1
r
∑ τ it z jht
t=1
8
∑
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟i=0
12
∑
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
+ εi
where γ i8 = 0 and τ i8 = 1 .
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5.4. Municipality fixed effect 
Although models 2 and 3  account for unobserved time effects, it may be desirable to test 
both municipality and time effects and/or combination of the two. In the context of the 
KOMMODE model, a fixed municipality effect implies that there exist some municipality-
specific characteristics that do not change over time and are correlated with the included 
explanatory variables. 
Before introducing the municipality effect, the expenditure and income variables are 
adjusted for growth in income (Rt), putting the model into real instead of nominal terms. 
Having accounted for time effects owing to income growth, municipality effects are 
included by introducing municipality dummy variables. Two specifications are proposed: 
(Model 4) 
 
uikt = α it +θik + βikt ykt − α it +θik( )
i=0
12
∑⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
+ εikt  i = 0,...,12 , k = 1,...,K , t = 1,...,8
(Model 5)
 
uikt = α itθik + βit ykt − α itθik
i=0
12
∑⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+ εikt    i = 0,...,12 , k = 1,...,K , t = 1,...,8
where k is an index for municipality, θik is the fixed municipality effect, and in Model 4 one 
base municipality  k is excluded to avoid the dummy variable trap, i.e.  θi k = 0 .
Model 4 is estimated by including municipality dummies additively, based on an 
assumption that only intercepts vary between municipalities. However, if there is also 
municipality variation in the slope parameters (the marginal effects of the exogenous z 
variables differ from municipality to municipality), the dummies should be included 
multiplicatively as in Model 5. However, it is reasonable to assume that any such effects 
are due to municipality characteristics already included in the model (e.g. municipality 
size: a unit increase in population for example may be expected to have a higher marginal 
effect on a smaller municipality’s expenditures than a larger municipality). 
As there are over 400 municipalities in the sample, there will be many variables in the 
model making estimation difficult. However, three solutions are proposed and 
implemented. First, first-differencing may be used to make the model more tractable. 
Model 4 then becomes:
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(Model 6)
 
uikt − uikt−1 = α ij
j=1
r
∑ z jkt − z jkt−1( ) + βit ykt − ykt−1 − α ij
j=1
r
∑ z jkt − z jkt−1( )
i=0
12
∑⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥ + εikt − εikt−1
Transforming Model 5 by first differencing does not decrease the number of explanatory 
variables. Other methods may be necessary if this model is to be estimated. 
There are, however, a number of problems facing first-difference estimation. First, 
differencing can greatly reduce the variation in the explanatory variables, which can in turn 
lead to large standard errors. However, the problem is reduced when a large cross 
section is available. Further, using longer differences over time is sometimes preferred to 
using year-to-year changes as this may help to mitigate the reduced cross-sectional 
variation in the explanatory variables since the variation becomes more pronounced over 
longer periods (Wooldridge, 2002b:423). Alternatively, a within-estimator may be used. In 
our case, however, only 8  years are available, which does not allow for taking longer time 
differences. Thus, when Model 6 is estimated using year on year differences, most of the 
cross-sectional variation is expected to be removed causing many of the estimates to 
have low t-values and signs that are not in line with theoretical expectations. Since each 
municipality effect in Model 6 is  estimated with 8  observations (one for each year), the 
poor performance of the model is not surprising (Beck, 2004). Moreover, by first-
differencing we lose the first time period for each cross-section (municipality). Thus care 
must be taken in implementing a differencing model. Provided that the panel is arranged 
by municipality (each municipality has T consecutive observations for the T time periods 
under observation), differences for observation numbers 1, T+1, 2T+1, 3T+1,...,(N-1)T+1 
must be set to missing as these observations correspond to the first time period for every 
cross section unit. Also, the explanatory variables (z and y) must be time-varying for at 
least some municipalities, otherwise these variables will fall away from the transformed 
model and their effect will not be estimated (Wooldridge, 2002a:280). In the KOMMODE 
model, many of the variables explaining the variation in the minimum required 
expenditures have only a small time variation. Correlation plots between the years 2001 
and 2008 values are presented in Appendix B. 
A second method of estimating Model 4 is  to isolate and include only the significant 
municipality effects, thus limiting the number of dummy variables in the model and making 
it possible to estimate. The significance of the unobserved municipality effects may be 
judged based on a number of criteria. While it is possible to use the t-statistic or the 
adjusted R-squared to judge the significance of a given dummy variable or the 
improvement of the model’s fit, respectively, this paper employs a criterion of economic 
rather than statistical significance. 
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If it is not possible to estimate the model from the general version (all municipality effects 
included) to specific (only the significant effects remain), the alternative would be to start 
by including one municipality and then carrying out an iterative estimation until all 
municipalities have been tested. The significance criterion used may be statistical or 
economic. Some researchers, such as Deirdre McCloskey, are proponents of economic 
significance. McCloskey and Ziliak (1996) caution against relying on statistical significance 
without reference to theoretical or policy importance, arguing that an effect can be 
statistically significant without being important for science or policy, and it can be 
economically significant without being statistically significant. This paper uses an 
economic relevance criterion, namely, a municipality effect is deemed significant if it is in 
absolute value at least as large as 50% of the relevant sector’s per median capita 
expenditure adjusted by the income index. The selection of relevant municipality effects is 
carried out in 3  steps. First, the model is  estimated 13  times (for sectors 0 to 13) for each 
municipality, including only one fixed effect at a time, while changing the service sector in 
which the fixed effect is included. After the significant fixed effects have been revealed, the 
second step is  to include all the significant fixed effects in the model. This yields a more 
general model that is controlling for significant fixed effects. The third step is to test all the 
fixed effects again by iteration, while controlling for the fixed effects included in the second 
step. A second version of step 1 can also be conducted, testing each municipality in all 
sectors simultaneously. The details and results of the iterative procedure are presented in 
Section 6.2 and Appendix D. 
Although the iteration procedure is instructive in isolating significant fixed effects, it is  not 
without problems. The most significant pitfall is that statistical properties of the iteration 
procedure are unknown and could be producing poor results. 
5.5. Economic region fixed effect
A third alternative specification is therefore proposed for the fixed effects model. In Model 
7, fixed effects are included as dummy variables for economic regions into which 
municipalities may be grouped rather than for individual municipalities. The regional 
classification is developed in Bhuller (2009) and is based on commuting patterns between 
municipalities in order to categorise municipalities by the labour market to which they 
belong. A municipality must have at least 10 percent of its working population commuting 
to a neighbouring region if it is to be added to that region. The list of the 46 regions is 
provided in Appendix E. 
(Model 7)
 
uit = α it + ρiR + βit yt − α it + ρiR( )
i=0
12
∑⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
+ εit  i = 0,...,12 , R = 1,..., 46 , t = 1,...,8
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where ρiR is the fixed region effect and one base region  R is  excluded to avoid the 
dummy variable trap, i.e.  ρi R = 0 .
5.6. Region and time effects
Once the region effects have been added, it is possible to test both fixed and time effects 
in one model. Adding region dummies to Model 2 and including an interaction term to 
account for any time variance in the region effects, Model 8  captures both municipality 
and time heterogeneity. 
(Model 8) uit = α it + ρiR( )τ it + βit yt − α it + ρiR( )τ it
i=0
12
∑⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
+ εit    τ i8 = 1 , ρi R = 0
This may be specified by introducing dummy variables in the following way: 
ui = α i0τ itht
t=1
8
∑ + α ijτ it
j=1
r
∑ z jht
t=1
8
∑ + ρiRτ ithtdR
t=1
8
∑
R=1
46
∑ + βi y − α i0τ itht
t=1
8
∑ + α ijτ it
j=1
r
∑ z jht
t=1
8
∑ + ρiRτ ithtdR
t=1
8
∑
R=1
46
∑
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟i=0
12
∑
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
+ εi
where  ht =
1,
0,
year = t
otherwise
    t = 1,...,8   and
            dR =
1,
0,
region = R
otherwise
    R = 1,..., 46 .
5.7. Partial adjustment model with time heterogeneity
While Model 8  accounts for time and municipality heterogeneity, it is only a quasi-dynamic 
model in a sense that it can describe changes in local government behaviour over time 
and between economic regions but does not say anything about the way in which these 
changes take place. Model 8  thus assumes that all spending allocations are optimised at 
any point in time. A partial adjustment model 9 of the form presented in Section 3.2.2. 
estimates how quickly the spending allocation adjusts to the desired allocation, while also 
taking into account time heterogeneity. Model 9 assumes existence of inertia in the 
adjustment of spending to its equilibrium level; that is, it takes time for municipalities to 
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adapt their spending behaviour to changes in income, expectations, government 
regulation and so on. Langørgen et al. (forthcoming) discuss a number of possible 
reasons for inertia in spending allocation. Restructuring costs may contribute to spending 
inertia because it is costly to adapt service production to a desired  level in the short term. 
These costs are a result of difficulty in terminating municipality workers, expensive 
resources required for faster restructuring and credit rationing (difficulty in obtaining funds 
needed for restructuring). Moreover, it takes time to free up resources and to adjust 
production of services to meet the changing needs of the service users or changes in the 
central government’s  policy. Thus, Model 9, which explicitly models the speed of 
adjustment of spending to its equilibrium level rather than assuming this adjustment to be 
instantaneous, may be an appropriate specification for local government spending.
(5.6) uit = λuit* + 1− λ( )
yt
yt−1
uit−1 + ν it
(5.7) uit* = α itτ it + βit yt − α itτ it
i=0
12
∑⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+ εit
Substituting (5.7) into (5.6) gives Model 9. 
(Model 9)
 
uit −
yt
yt−1
uit−1 = λ α itτ it + βit yt − α itτ it
i=0
12
∑⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
−
yt
yt−1
uit−1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+ εit ,  εit = λεit + vit   τ i8 = 1
where λ  is  the speed of adjustment parameter, which is assumed constant and equal for 
all service sectors – an assumption also made by Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen (1995). 
This assumption may be relaxed in future extensions of the model. When the speed of 
adjustment parameter is 1, adjustment is instantaneous and Model 9 reduces to the time 
effects Model 2. When the speed of adjustment parameter is 0, the expenditure in year t 
is simply equal to the previous year’s expenditure adjusted for income growth, 
represented by the yt
yt−1
term. 
Since the budget constraint holds by definition both out of and in equilibrium such that
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(5.8) uit
i=0
12
∑ = yt  for all t,  uit*
i=0
12
∑ = yt     and  hence
(5.9) λuit* + 1− λ( )
yt
yt−1
uit−1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟i=0
12
∑ = λyt + 1− λ( )yt = yt  
using the fact that uit−1
i=0
12
∑ = yt−1 , 
Model 9 is a logically consistent expenditure system that satisfies the budget constraint. 
While it is possible to specify Model 9 to also include municipality heterogeneity, for 
instance via regional effects, this more complex version is beyond the scope of this paper 
and is therefore left to future research. 
6. Empirical results
6.1. Data and variables
All models are based on KOSTRA5 data available from Statistics Norway. Expenditures 
(uit) are per capita expenditure in sector i. The expenditure in sector 4 (child care) excludes 
fee income from municipal kindergartens. Per capita income yt is  inclusive of user fees in 
all sectors except child care and exclusive of employer payroll taxes. 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 summarise the differences in sector-specific per capita public 
spending averaged over the years 2001 – 2008, while Table 6.3  and 6.4 present the 
average sector-specific per capita spending grouped by year. Tables 6.1 and 6.3  exclude 
outlier municipalities, while Table 6.2 and 6.4 report the summary statistics for all 
municipalities in the sample. In the case where outliers are not excluded, average 
spending is higher in all sectors and negative spending is observed in sectors 1, 10, 11 
and 12. This is reasonable since outlier municipalities include rich municipalities and those 
with negative spending. The largest expenditure component in all the years is care for the 
elderly and disabled, closely followed by primary education. Furthermore, average 
spending is  increasing in all sectors from the year 2001 to 2008, with the greatest 
increase observed in care for the elderly and disabled, primary schools and child care. 
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5 As of 2001 all municipalities report their expenses via KOSTRA (Kommune-Stat-Rapportering/ Municipal 
statistical reporting) to Statistics Norway.
There are also considerable differences in per capita public spending across municipalities 
in all service sectors.
Table 6.1. Public spending per capita on different services across municipalities
Per capita sector expenditure Mean Std Deviation Minimum Maximum
0. Net operating result 889 2033 -7988 12432
1. Administration 4076 2033 1121 17513
2. Primary schools 8890 1845 4831 19393
3. Other education 1024 374 145 3448
4. Child care 2867 1173 619 7749
5. Health care 1956 868 587 7788
6. Social services 1215 545 128 3705
7. Child protection 938 389 75 2685
8. Care for the elderly and disabled 12010 3784 4201 30660
9. Culture 1542 631 417 5851
10. Municipal roads 707 369 24 2879
11. Water supply and sanitation 1687 665 0 4767
12. Other infrastructure 2676 1290 286 10179
Note: all values are in Norwegian kroner. Municipalities considered outliers in at least 1 year are 
excluded.
Table 6.2. Public spending per capita on different services across municipalities
Per capita sector expenditure Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
0. Net operating result 1309 4507 -84104 79316
1. Administration 4677 2784 -1151 29311
2. Primary schools 9325 2219 4506 22361
3. Other education 1048 483 29 6548
4. Child care 2940 1214 615 11091
5. Health care 2192 1122 587 9329
6. Social services 1227 595 0 5039
7. Child protection 965 500 0 10741
8. Care for the elderly and disabled 12883 4572 4201 51371
9. Culture 1737 1278 365 30253
10. Municipal roads 795 571 -3589 7384
11. Water supply and sanitation 1773 833 -79 8961
12. Other infrastructure 3097 2412 -5156 34019
Note: all values are in Norwegian kroner. All municipalities are included.
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Table 6.3. Average public spending per capita on different services across municipalities by year 
Per capita sector expenditure 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0. Net operating result 632 118 341 760 1311 2648 1296 3
1. Administration 3798 3196 3861 3887 3927 4134 4611 5193
2. Primary schools 7422 7917 8449 8551 8877 9408 9943 10557
3. Other education 843 956 987 1008 1031 1050 1113 1201
4. Child care 1690 1976 2179 2475 2714 3364 3922 4616
5. Health care 1597 1747 1844 1872 1913 2036 2212 2430
6. Social services 1003 1104 1205 1189 1270 1279 1269 1401
7. Child protection 713 770 813 874 938 1026 1127 1246
8. Care for the elderly and disabled 9377 10389 10765 11320 11717 12892 14019 15605
9. Culture 1335 1406 1428 1460 1511 1600 1740 1859
10. Municipal roads 611 634 632 659 680 757 822 859
11. Water supply and sanitation 1466 1536 1576 1632 1680 1792 1834 1979
12. Other infrastructure 2350 2424 2473 2550 2607 2807 3069 3130
Number of municipalities 332 331 331 331 331 330 330 330
Note: all values are in Norwegian kroner. Municipalities considered outliers in at least 1 year are 
excluded.
Table 6.4. Average public spending per capita on different services across municipalities by year 
Per capita sector expenditure 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0. Net operating result 1035 429 713 1039 1948 3427 1604 280
1. Administration 4336 3686 4408 4471 4501 4749 5279 5997
2. Primary schools 7787 8315 8857 8984 9297 9859 10428 11090
3. Other education 871 980 1007 1026 1053 1075 1136 1237
4. Child care 1803 2085 2282 2564 2778 3408 3961 4660
5. Health care 1769 1934 2057 2106 2155 2306 2490 2724
6. Social services 1016 1112 1213 1203 1278 1294 1285 1414
7. Child protection 737 800 838 891 961 1046 1151 1305
8. Care for the elderly and disabled 10071 11150 11565 12175 12570 13804 15035 16734
9. Culture 1478 1564 1614 1685 1690 1815 1966 2090
10. Municipal roads 675 716 720 753 754 847 937 958
11. Water supply and sanitation 1522 1595 1658 1718 1771 1882 1939 2102
12. Other infrastructure 2720 2789 2863 2904 3039 3217 3593 3654
Number of municipalities 435 434 434 434 433 431 431 430
Note: all values are in Norwegian kroner. All municipalities are included.
6.1.1. Factors that explain variation in the minimum required expenditures
Langørgen et al. (forthcoming) select the variables in Table 6.5 as significant factors 
affecting minimum required expenditures in the KOMMODE model, which the authors 
estimate for the years 2001 to 2008. The minimum quantity of service which must be 
provided in a given sector is assumed to depend on the size of the target groups for the 
services in that sector, while other factors affect the unit costs of providing the service. 
The target group variables and the variables affecting the unit costs of service provision 
are shown in Table 6.5 together with the sectors in which each variable is relevant. 
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Population age group variables6 are included in sectors 2, 4 and 8  and are calculated as 
the number of municipality residents in a specified age group as a share of that 
municipality’s total population. Since primary education, child care and care for the elderly 
and disabled are directed towards specific target groups, the age composition of the 
population is assumed to affect the demand for these services. Parameter estimates of 
these variables show the increase in minimum quantity when the target group is increased 
by one person. 
Table 6.5. Variables that affect minimum required expenditures found to be significant in the 
cross-sectional analysis
  (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Population 1-5 years of age X
Population 6-12 years of age X
Population 13-15 years of age X
Population 67-79 years of age X
Population 80-89 years of age X
Population 90 years and above X
Children 0-15 years with single 
mother/ father X
Fulltime working women 20-44 years 
share of total population X X
Refugees with integration grants * X X
Refugees without integration grants X
Divorced/ separated 16-59 years X
Unemployed 16-59 years X
Number of poor X X
Disablement pensioners 18-49 years X
Mentally disabled 16 years and above 
without grants X
Mentally disabled 16 years and above 
with grants X
High-cost recipients X
Kilometers of municipal roads X
Amount of snowfall X
Capacity of advanced purification X
Index of farming industry X
Distance to centre of municipal sub-
district ** X X X X
Inverse population size X X X X X X X X
Growth in municipality incomes X
Note: All age-group variables are measured as shares of the total population. X shows the sector/s for 
which a variable is included in the minimum required expenditure.
Sector 0: Budget surplus" " Sector 5: Health  care" " Sector 10: Municipal roads
Sector 1: Administration" " Sector 6: Social services" " Sector 11: Water supply and sanitation
Sector 2: Primary schools" " Sector 7: Child protection" " Sector 12: Other infrastructure
Sector 3: Other education" " Sector 8: Care for the elderly and disabled
Sector 4: Child care"" " Sector 9: Culture
* total number of refugees for whom a given municipality has received integration grants throughout a 
particular year.
** in Norwegian miles (1 mile=10 km)
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6 All population variables are measured as of 1 January of the relevant year and sourced from Statistics 
Norway Section for Population statistics (320).
6.2. Results 
The models developed in Section 5 are summarised in Table 6.6. Four versions of each 
model are estimated. Version A excludes municipalities which are considered outliers in at 
least 1 year, while version B excludes municipalities which are considered outliers in at 
least 2 years. The procedure for classifying a municipality as an outlier is explained in 
Section 4.3.1. Versions C and D are parallel to A and B  in their treatment of outliers; 
however, specifications C and D are estimated on a balanced panel, i.e. additional 
municipalities are removed which have missing values for some of the years. All 4 
versions, however, yield similar results and only version A is  reported here. The models’ 
residual plots are reported in Appendix C. The residuals are well-behaved and 
approximately normally distributed, satisfying the critical assumption of residual normality 
of FIML estimation. Adjusted R-Squared values are presented in Table 6.7. These 
statistics show a reasonable to good fit in all service sectors. The values for the R-
Squared in Model 6 (first-difference model) are not reported as these are not meaningful in 
a first-difference model where the constant is differenced away. Model 9  has relatively low 
adjusted R-Square values, particularly in sector 11. However, this model is specified with 
the difference between sector expenditure and income growth adjusted lagged sector 
expenditure as the dependent variable. Thus, adjusted R-squared values are not 
comparable to the adjusted R-squared values of the other models. 
Table 6.6. Summary of  estimated models
Model name Model number 
Adjusted by 
income index Time effects
Municipality 
or regional 
fixed effects
Baseline Model 1 Yes No No
Time effects Model 2 No Yes No
Time effects with time 
heterogeneity in the budget shares
Model 3 No Yes No
Municipality fixed effects Model 4 Yes No Yes
First difference Model 6 Yes No No*
Regional effects Model 7 Yes No Yes
Time and regional effects Model 8 No Yes Yes
Partial adjustment ** Model 9 No Yes No
*Municipality effects are differenced away
** Estimates the sector expenditures as a weighted average of the desired allocation and the 
expenditure in the previous period multiplied by income growth. The weight is the speed of 
adjustment parameter estimated to be 0.169. 
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Table 6.7. Adjusted R-Squared
Sector Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4* Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
1. Administration 0.84 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.89 0.45
2. Primary schools 0.79 0.86 0.86 0.78 0.82 0.88 0.39
3. Other education 0.35 0.40 0.40 0.57 0.45 0.49 0.20
4. Child care 0.35 0.86 0.87 0.39 0.46 0.88 0.30
5. Health care 0.72 0.75 0.75 0.82 0.79 0.81 0.17
6. Social assistance 0.57 0.59 0.59 0.70 0.64 0.66 0.21
7. Child protection 0.23 0.37 0.37 0.45 0.35 0.46 0.13
8. Care for the elderly and disabled 0.87 0.91 0.91 0.86 0.90 0.93 0.38
9. Culture 0.61 0.65 0.65 0.74 0.67 0.70 0.15
10. Municipal roads 0.63 0.66 0.66 0.78 0.72 0.74 0.14
11. Water supply and sanitation 0.23 0.27 0.27 0.55 0.44 0.46 0.08
12. Other infrastructure 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.73 0.65 0.68 0.12
Log likelihood -28811 -20450 -20255 -23691 -25532 -17037 -3505
*Significant municipality effects are included in 12 service sectors
Model 1 is useful as a point of departure and comparison. The expenditures and income 
are adjusted by the income growth index, effectively removing time variation in the 
minimum required expenditures due to the increasing municipality incomes. However, any 
variation due to unobserved or omitted time-invariant factors is not accounted for in this 
model. As evident from the significant time effect estimates in Model 2, there is indeed 
strong justification to explicitly model minimum required expenditures as different for 
different years. Model 3  is  estimated but not reported as the estimates are similar to 
Model 2 and most of the time-effects imposed on the budget shares are not significant 
(with the exception of child care and other education where the marginal budget share 
time effects are significant in 2001 – 2005) as shown in Table 6.8. Model 2 is  therefore 
preferred to Model 3. Following the methodology employed by Langørgen et al. 
(forthcoming), models 1 and 2 are calibrated such that discretionary income7  is 
approximately zero for the municipality with the lowest discretionary income. In Model 1, 
this is  achieved by imposing a restriction on the sum of the constant terms in the 
minimum required expenditure in each sector8  to ensure that discretionary income is 
approximately zero for municipality 0228  (Rælingen). Model 2 is similarly calibrated for 
municipality 1089 (Songdalen) by imposing a restriction on the constant term in the 
residual sector’s minimum required expenditure9. 
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7 Discretionary income is given by difference between total income and the sum of minimum required 
expenditures in all sectors, including the residual sector, that is y − α ikt
i=0
12
∑ .
8 α i0
i=0
12
∑ = 10,72
9 α00 = −1,841
Table 6.8. Additive time effects in the marginal budget shares in Model 3 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Administration -0.017 -0.038 -0.010 -0.014 -0.016 -0.023 -0.014 0
(1.66) (4.18) (1.09) (1.80) (2.10) (2.86) (2.11)  -
Primary schools -0.013 -0.002 -0.000 -0.008 -0.006 -0.010 -0.011 0
(1.50) (0.26) (0.06) (1.03) (0.88) (1.74) (2.09)  -
Other education 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.002 0.002 0
(2.54) (3.16) (2.29) (2.52) (2.12) (0.72) (0.64)  -
Child care 0.040 0.043 0.029 0.021 0.010 -0.006 -0.003 0
(6.62) (8.46) (5.19) (4.09) (2.26) (1.78) (1.06)  -
Health care -0.002 0.012 0.006 0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 0
(0.23) (2.12) (1.05) (0.18) (0.96) (1.10) (0.32)  -
Social services 0.000 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 0
(0.11) (0.65) (1.32) (0.56) (0.39) (1.24) (1.03)  -
Child protection -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 0.001 -0.000 0
(0.61) (1.23) (1.61) (1.06) (0.58) (0.50) (0.15)  -
Care for the elderly and 
disabled -0.013 0.006 0.006 0.018 0.009 -0.004 -0.011 0
(0.69) (0.35) (0.39) (1.28) (0.67) (0.29) (1.00)  -
Culture 0.009 0.013 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.007 0.002 0
(1.31) (1.82) (1.87) (2.30) (1.86) (1.59) (0.70)  -
Municipal roads -0.005 -0.007 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0
(1.39) (2.17) (0.65) (0.88) (0.61) (0.79) (1.56)  -
Water supply and sanitation -0.013 -0.009 -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 0
(1.70) (1.15) (0.37) (0.96) (0.70) (0.42) (0.52)  -
Other infrastructure 0.028 0.032 0.018 0.006 -0.010 0.007 -0.008 0
(2.49) (2.91) (1.69) (0.68) (1.06) (0.79) (1.10)  -
It was not possible to estimate Model 4 with all municipality effects  included (removing 
one to avoid perfect collinearity) using the SAS proc model procedure. A possible reason 
is the large number of parameters to be estimated and hence the large memory allocation 
required by SAS. However, the error10 encountered in trying to estimate this  model points 
to a problem with the SAS software and it may be possible to estimate the model using a 
different econometric package, or a different version of the SAS software. This may be of 
interest to future research. Model 4 is therefore estimated including only significant 
municipality effects. The estimation is conducted in three steps using an economic 
relevance criterion to determine which municipality effects are significant; namely, a 
municipality effect is deemed significant if it is in absolute value at least as large as 50% of 
the relevant sector’s per median capita expenditure adjusted by the income index. These 
values, together with the mean expenditures are given in Table 6.9. The median and the 
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10 A segmentation violation in task [Model] . SAS version used is 9.2.
mean values are fairly similar in magnitude, with the median values slightly lower. There is 
thus a higher probability of the effect being significant when the median is used as the 
critical value. Model 4 is calibrated in the way described above for municipality 1928 
(Torsken) from step 2 onwards.
Table 6.9  Mean and median values of per capita income index adjusted expenditure, by service 
sector
Adjusted per capita expenditure by sector * Median Mean
0. Discretionary income 0.890 1.072
1. Administration 4.316 5.057
2. Primary schools 10.816 11.048
3. Other education 1.218 1.275
4. Child care 3.318 3.453
5. Health care 2.117 2.426
6. Social services 1.440 1.514
7. Child protection 1.117 1.154
8. Care for the elderly and disabled 14.293 14.825
9. Culture 1.761 1.918
10. Municipal roads 0.775 0.877
11. Water supply and sanitation 2.105 2.101
12. Other infrastructure 2.924 3.330
*The expenditures are are calculated for the sample of 336 municipalities, where municipalities 
considered outliers in at least one of the eight years are excluded. Expenditures are divided by 
the income growth index given by equation (18), described in Section 4.4. 
We find that when sector zero effects are tested in step 1, 215 significant fixed effects are 
revealed based on the median expenditure criterion. This is not surprising, however, as 
the net operating surplus can take on both positive and negative values, leading to the 
median being a poor criterium of significance. Instead we develop 2 additional versions of 
step1. First, only those sector 0 effects whose t-value exceeds a generous critical value of 
1,5 are included in step 2 together with the significant effects in other sectors whose 
significance is  based on the median criterion. In the second variant all fixed effects are 
evaluated based on their t-values. Estimation results are reported in Appendix D. The final 
version of model 4 was estimated based on the effects revealed in step 2 with the 
additional effects revealed to be significant in step 3. The effects revealed significant in 
step 3  are presented in Table D.10 in Appendix D. The parameters of interest are reported 
in Tables D.11 and D.12 in Appendix D. Most of the estimates are comparable to those of 
Model 7 or 8  where region effects are included, suggesting that economic regions are a 
good approximation of the municipality-specific effects. As in other models without time 
effects, the effect of the share of children on the minimum required child care expenditure 
is biased downwards, and is not significant. In the social services sector the effect of 
refugees without integration grants is underestimated. One reason for this is that there 
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may be some municipalities whose effects are significant but that are not included in this 
sector. The small number of significant fixed effects in the sector care for the elderly and 
disabled results in most of the estimates being closer in magnitude to those of the 
baseline model than to the region effects model.
Since many of the variables explaining the variation in the minimum required expenditures 
have only a small time variation, the first difference model (Model 6) produces biased 
results. Although these near time-invariant variables remain in the model, their estimates 
have inflated standard errors and hence low t-values. Correlation plots of these variables 
for the years 2001 and 2008  and selected estimates with standard errors are presented in 
Appendix B.
Model 7 was first estimated with 45 regional dummy variables, omitting region 12 (Oslo) 
as the base category. The results with regards to the effects of the factors influencing 
minimum required expenditures were generally consistent with model 24. However, the 
estimate of the marginal effect of the share of children (1 – 5 years of age) on the 
minimum required expenditure in the child care sector was negative and significant (–
7.291). The negative sign is not consistent with theoretical expectations as an additional 
child is expected to increase, not decrease, the minimum required expenditure on child 
care. Model 7, therefore, appears to produce biased results, possibly due to the fact that 
time effects are not accounted for in this  model’s specification. The estimate of the effect 
of small children on child care’s minimum spending may then be capturing unobserved 
time heterogeneity, which is not accounted for in this model. The problem of the negative 
effect of small children in the child care sector is also encountered by Borge, Rattsø and 
Sørensen (1995). Similarly to Model 7, their study does not account for time 
heterogeneity; although a partial adjustment model is assumed, Borge, Rattsø and 
Sørensen (1995) do not explicitly model time effects. 
Furthermore, the standard errors  on the region 23  (Lillehammer) estimates are inflated in 
every service sector in Model 7, suggesting a problem with this region’s inclusion in the 
model. On closer examination, it was found that only one of the three municipalities in this 
region was included in the data used for model estimation (municipality 0522), since the 
other two municipalities (0501 and 0521) were removed as outliers. Hence the dummy 
variable for region 23  had a value zero for all but 8  observations and was therefore 
approximately constant across observations leading to inflated standard errors. An 
alternate version of the model was therefore estimated, with municipalities 0501 and 0521 
included in the sample. The regional effects are reported in Table E.3. in Appendix E and 
summarised in Table 6.10. The remaining parameters  are reported in Tables 6.15 – 6.27. 
These are mostly very close in magnitude to the estimates in Model 1, where no regional 
effects are included. This finding, combined with the fact that few regional effects are 
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significant, suggests that a model with time effects, such as Model 2, is more appropriate 
than a model without time effects. The regions that have statistically significant effects on 
the minimum required expenditures in more than one service sector are: 34, 35 and 36 
(Southern Norway), 44 (Bergen), 63  (Namsos), 72, 75, 76, 82 and 83  (Northern Norway). 
It is indeed plausible that the minimum required expenditures in these regions are on 
average different from those in the Oslo region.
Table 6.10 Significant region effects by service sector in model 7
Economic region Number of sectors with significant effect
Service sectors with significant 
effect
23. Lillehamer 1 6
34. Arendal 2 1 and 5
35. Kristiansand 4 4, 6, 9 and 11
36. Lister 13 All sectors
44. Bergen 3 0, 7 and 11
51. Sunnfjord (Førde/ Florø) 1 6
53. Nordfjord 1 7
55. Ålesund 1 7
61. Trondheim 1 7
63. Namsos 2 0 and 7
71. Bodø 1 11
72. Narvik 2 0 and 7
75. Harstad 10 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9,10 and 11
76. Midt-Troms 4 2, 4, 10 and 11
81. Alta 1 0
82. Hammerfest 2 4 and 6
83. Vadsø 10 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 11
The effects are statistically significant at 10% significance level
In order to account for possible interaction between time and regional heterogeneity, 
Model 8  is estimated. Regional and time effects are included in all 13  sectors. The effects 
on the minimum required expenditures are reported in Section 6.2.1 and the marginal 

44
budget shares in Section 6.2.2. Importantly, the effect of the 1 – 5 year old children on the 
minimum expenditure in the child care sector is no longer negative as in Model 7, and is 
statistically significant. We observe an increase of NOK 58154 in the minimum required 
child care expenditure for an additional 1 – 5 year old child in 2008. The regional effects 
are reported in Table E.4. in Appendix E. Table 6.11 summarises statistically significant 
regions and the service sectors in which these effects apply.
Table 6.11. Significant region effects by service sector in model 8
Labour market region Region number Number of sectors with significant effect
Service sectors with 
significant effect
Eastern Norway
Sør-Østfold 11 1 6
Oslo 12 base region
Vestfold 13 2 6, 11
Kongsberg 14 2 3, 7
Hallingdal 15 5 1, 5, 7, 11, 12
Valdres 21 3 3, 6, 11
Gudbrandsdalen 22 6 1, 4, 7, 8, 10, 12
Lillehammer 23 0 none
Gjøvik 24 1 6
Hamar 25 1 6
Kongsvinger 26 2 6, 7
Elverum 27 3 6, 7, 10
Tynset/Røros 28 8 0, 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10
Southern Norway
Nordvest-Telemark 31 4 0, 1, 8, 10
Øst-Telemark 32 0 none
Sør-Telemark 33 2 3, 6
Arendal 34 3 5, 6, 11
Kristiansand 35 9 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12
Lister 36 3 4, 7, 8
West Norway
Stavanger 41 3 3, 6, 9
Haugesund 42 9 0, 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12
Sunnhordland 43 1 4
Bergen 44 6 0, 1, 4, 6, 7, 11
Sunnfjord (Førde/Florø) 51 4 0, 1, 6, 10
Sognefjord (Sogndal/Årdal) 52 7 0, 1, 3, 4, 9, 10, 12
Nordfjord 53 2 7, 11
Søndre Sunnmøre 54 6 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10
Ålesund 55 4 0, 1, 4, 7
Molde 56 1 7
Nordmøre 57 5 0, 1, 5, 6, 10
Kristiansund 58 0 none
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Labour market region Region number Number of sectors with significant effect
Service sectors with 
significant effect
Mid-Norway
Trondheim 61 6 0, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11
Midt-Trøndelag 62 1 11
Namsos 63 6 0, 1, 3, 7, 10, 11
Ytre Helgeland 64 6 0, 1, 6, 10, 11, 12
Indre Helgeland 65 0 none
Northern Norway
Bodø 71 5 0, 1, 2, 6, 11
Narvik 72 2 0, 7
Vesterålen 73 0 none
Lofoten 74 1 11
Harstad 75 4 2, 3, 8, 10
Midt-Troms 76 5 0, 6, 7, 10, 12
Tromsø 77 6 0, 2, 7, 8, 9, 11
Alta 81 3 3, 9, 12
Hammerfest 82 6 0, 4, 7, 8, 9, 12
Vadsø 83 5 0, 4, 9, 10, 12
The effects are statistically significant at 10% significance level
Finally, the partial adjustment model (Model 9) explicitly estimates the dynamics of 
adjustment of municipality expenditures to their equilibrium values. To facilitate 
convergence of the model’s parameters, a restriction is imposed on the constant term α00 
in the residual sector’s minimum required expenditure (minimum savings). Although this 
parameter may be given different values, it is set to zero in Model 9.
Aaberge and Langørgen (2003) provide a detailed discussion of the meaning and 
expected sign of the parameters in sector 0’s minimum required expenditure α0. In 
KOMMODE and also in the models presented in this paper, α0 is composed of a constant 
term α00 and a change in real exogenous income from the previous year. Hence –α0 is the 
present value of changes in future exogenous income. The negative of the constant term -
α00 captures the present value of a long-term growth trend in exogenous income. 
Historically this trend is positive in Norway, implying that α00 < 0. However, the Local 
Government Act contains a balanced budget rule that prohibits local governments to plan 
for persistent deficits, although temporary deficits are allowed and observed in practice 
(Langørgen and Aaberge, 2003). Thus, although α00 < 0 may be an accurate description 
of the local governments’ saving behaviour at a point in time, in the long run equilibrium 
the balanced budget rule can be seen to restrict α00 to be non-negative. Since in Model 9 
this parameter describes the long-run growth trend of the desired/ equilibrium spending 
uit*, it is  reasonable for it to be set to zero. Nevertheless, other specifications are possible 
and may be explored in future studies. 
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The adjusted R-Squared reported in Table 6.7 indicate that explanatory power of the 
model is fairly low, and hence conclusions should be drawn with care. It may be possible 
to improve the fit of the model by introducing municipality or region fixed effects in the 
desired expenditure. This is left to future work. The speed of adjustment parameter λ is 
estimated to be 0.16911, which implies a fairly slow adjustment to the equilibrium 
allocation. The effects on the equilibrium minimum required expenditures and marginal 
budget shares are reported in Tables 6.15 – 6.27. Time effects are found in Table 6.14.
6.2.1. Effects on minimum required expenditures
Time effects estimated in models 2, 8  and 9 are reported in Tables 6.12 – 6.15. The 
marginal effects on the minimum required expenditures for the base year 2008, when the 
time effect is normalised to 1, are reported in Tables  6.15 – 6.27. The marginal effects on 
the minimum required expenditures for the years 2001 – 2007 may be calculated by 
multiplying the 2008  parameter values found in Tables 6.15 – 6.27 by the time effect in the 
corresponding year found in Tables 6-12 – 6.14. All estimate values are in 1000s 
Norwegian kroner, and all values in parentheses are t-statistics in absolute value.
Table 6.12 Time effects in the time effect model (Model 2)
Service sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
0. Net operating result 0.605 0.881 1.006 0.682 0.550 0.958 0.498
(9.20) (13.42) (10.37) (9.11) (7.61) (11.33) (9.08)
1. Administration 0.506 0.371 0.522 0.587 0.594 0.558 0.728
(19.41) (14.55) (19.95) (26.53) (28.59) (27.29) (36.40)
2. Primary schools 0.640 0.689 0.732 0.754 0.785 0.811 0.888
(58.90) (69.05) (67.17) (78.81) (86.87) (93.00) (96.96)
3. Other education 0.675 0.751 0.759 0.802 0.816 0.792 0.876
(28.52) (33.04) (33.57) (36.98) (39.18) (35.67) (38.69)
4. Child care 0.237 0.306 0.358 0.456 0.518 0.640 0.805
(21.07) (27.40) (27.82) (39.85) (46.13) (66.33) (77.60)
5. Health care 0.416 0.513 0.560 0.628 0.644 0.604 0.755
(13.28) (17.21) (18.21) (22.61) (26.05) (24.60) (31.17)
6. Social services 0.619 0.631 0.630 0.635 0.706 0.767 0.846
(35.77) (40.75) (40.46) (41.44) (43.98) (44.34) (47.76)
7. Child protection 0.529 0.590 0.598 0.660 0.703 0.747 0.857
(21.19) (23.83) (24.68) (30.40) (33.76) (36.22) (42.13)
8. Care for the elderly and disabled 0.526 0.610 0.633 0.690 0.711 0.758 0.849
(38.22) (48.36) (47.42) (58.60) (65.87) (75.25) (84.31)
9. Culture 0.405 0.497 0.462 0.577 0.585 0.436 0.658
(7.01) (9.44) (7.67) (11.28) (12.41) (8.72) (13.11)
10. Municipal roads 0.545 0.608 0.581 0.660 0.710 0.761 0.841
(18.19) (20.05) (19.58) (23.58) (27.61) (28.68) (35.67)
11. Water supply and sanitation 0.618 0.679 0.684 0.756 0.766 0.759 0.820
(16.21) (18.65) (19.39) (22.28) (23.80) (23.66) (25.84)
12. Other infrastructure 0.501 0.560 0.529 0.647 0.629 0.498 0.744
(8.24) (8.85) (8.23) (11.32) (10.92) (8.76) (13.20)
The 2008 time effects in all service sectors are normalised to 1. 
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11 The estimate is statistically significant with the t-value = 66.71.
Table 6.13 Time effects in the time and region effects model (Model 8)
Service sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
0. Net operating result 0.594 0.720 0.731 0.698 0.621 0.573 0.654
(19.94) (23.35) (22.80) (22.88) (19.37) (15.35) (22.48)
1. Administration 0.633 0.442 0.639 0.656 0.667 0.699 0.809
(30.74) (20.46) (37.69) (36.80) (38.68) (37.39) (48.11)
2. Primary schools 0.684 0.731 0.782 0.787 0.822 0.871 0.924
(80.19) (89.89) (99.67) (101.60) (109.23) (120.77) (140.11)
3. Other education 0.770 0.859 0.870 0.894 0.905 0.894 0.941
(23.53) (25.61) (26.67) (27.51) (28.66) (30.92) (32.90)
4. Child care 0.184 0.258 0.322 0.419 0.495 0.669 0.825
(12.69) (18.69) (23.18) (33.51) (42.25) (71.74) (93.31)
5. Health care 0.500 0.604 0.680 0.695 0.724 0.766 0.853
(16.08) (21.97) (25.65) (27.25) (29.17) (32.61) (41.17)
6. Social services 0.666 0.669 0.665 0.659 0.735 0.816 0.878
(29.69) (31.67) (29.80) (30.45) (32.03) (37.61) (42.09)
7. Child protection 0.546 0.605 0.629 0.681 0.733 0.803 0.887
(18.89) (21.90) (22.52) (27.61) (30.71) (33.95) (38.04)
8. Care for the elderly and disabled 0.552 0.640 0.673 0.713 0.737 0.817 0.880
(45.30) (58.97) (63.47) (68.94) (76.78) (86.24) (100.31)
9. Culture 0.512 0.614 0.637 0.674 0.645 0.662 0.801
(6.41) (7.82) (8.72) (9.40) (8.74) (9.20) (12.37)
10. Municipal roads 0.652 0.706 0.700 0.743 0.809 0.936 0.948
(16.19) (19.75) (20.10) (23.22) (23.90) (24.30) (32.29)
11. Water supply and sanitation 0.686 0.754 0.780 0.823 0.846 0.904 0.896
(18.30) (21.76) (21.50) (23.05) (23.52) (26.20) (27.94)
12. Other infrastructure 0.735 0.791 0.895 0.753 0.887 0.804 0.832
(10.19) (10.52) (10.80) (9.58) (10.81) (9.02) (10.31)
The 2008 time effects in all service sectors are normalised to 1. 
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Table 6.14 Time effects in the partial adjustment model (Model 9)
Service sector 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
0. Net operating result 0.648 0.870 0.761 1.092 1.166 0.702
(9.21) (7.09) (7.91) (9.57) (11.17) (7.68)
1. Administration -0.009 0.687 0.380 0.413 0.558 0.784
(0.33) (23.51) (14.03) (14.97) (15.27) (28.48)
2. Primary schools 0.664 0.636 0.534 0.656 0.713 0.871
(25.01) (26.43) (21.39) (24.85) (25.14) (35.21)
3. Other education 0.878 0.535 0.600 0.629 0.519 0.872
(16.31) (12.63) (12.74) (16.57) (11.58) (17.31)
4. Child care 0.395 0.357 0.481 0.475 0.760 0.870
(19.09) (21.49) (24.24) (26.09) (47.09) (54.15)
5. Health care 0.572 0.482 0.433 0.498 0.634 0.799
(19.52) (17.98) (15.14) (17.40) (18.81) (26.14)
6. Social services 0.674 0.587 0.375 0.641 0.402 0.552
(16.90) (15.45) (11.96) (18.18) (10.33) (13.17)
7. Child protection 0.528 0.455 0.555 0.598 0.666 0.851
(10.92) (9.63) (12.65) (13.48) (17.86) (20.89)
8. Care for the elderly and disabled 0.613 0.432 0.528 0.524 0.707 0.812
(28.00) (20.92) (22.34) (24.39) (30.95) (38.06)
9. Culture 0.545 0.401 0.459 0.554 0.728 0.861
(12.13) (9.91) (10.27) (12.37) (13.92) (20.48)
10. Municipal roads 0.650 0.435 0.640 0.669 0.960 1.039
(10.58) (7.58) (10.96) (11.94) (15.70) (20.13)
11. Water supply and sanitation 0.571 0.451 0.546 0.561 0.712 0.693
(12.19) (10.61) (11.07) (11.29) (14.14) (16.05)
12. Other infrastructure 0.676 0.576 0.699 0.700 0.958 1.202
(7.80) (6.17) (8.63) (8.40) (11.14) (12.27)
The 2008 time effects in all service sectors are normalised to 1. Time effects in 2001 are 0 as 
this year is effectively removed from estimation since lagged expenditure and income are not 
defined in 2001.
Most of the time effects are increasing as expected from 2001 to 2008. When a decrease 
in the time effect is observed, it may occur in different years in models 2 and 8. The 
decreases in time effects that are common to both models are: a small decrease in 2002 
in the administration sector and a decrease in the other education sector in 2006, 
implying that the effects on the minimum required expenditures are smaller in these years. 
The culture sector exhibits decreasing time effects in 2005 (Model 8) and in 2003  and 
2006 (Model 2). The other infrastructure sector shows a small decrease in 2006. The 
partial adjustment model shows decreasing time effects in the primary schools sector for 
the years 2002 – 2004. The increase in the primary schools minimum required 
expenditures from 2005 onwards could be a result of education policies  of the newly 
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elected central government, Stoltenberg II12, which came into power in October 2005. 
The time effects are increasing in the child care sector and also increasing from 2006 in 
the care for the elderly and disabled sector. Other infrastructure and municipal roads 
sectors have higher time effects in 2007 than in 2008. 
The estimated marginal effects on minimum required expenditures are mostly reasonable. 
However, time effects in Model 2 appear to indicate a decrease in minimum fiscal surplus 
for the years 2004 to 2005 and in 2007. Model 8  shows decreasing time effects from 
2004 to 2006. These results are unexpected and warrant further investigation. One 
possibility is that interactive time effects are not a good description of the dynamics in this 
sector. Some dynamic adjustment may be present in the net operating result, meaning 
that there may be some residual effects from the year before on the current year’s net 
operating result. If this is indeed the case, then the time effect for a specific year may be 
capturing some effects  from the years before. The partial adjustment model (Model 9) 
shows that the speed of adjustment of the sector expenditures to their respective desired 
values is indeed relatively small (0.169), suggesting a fairly slow adjustment. However, 
another possible explanation for the decrease in minimum savings is a change in 
municipalities’ expectations. As the Stoltenberg II government came into power in Norway 
in 2005, municipality incomes saw a substantial increase and it is reasonable to suppose 
that the municipalities expected further income increases in the future, leading to higher 
spending on service provision and lower savings13. This is confirmed by the fact that 
growth in incomes has a positive and significant effect on the minimum savings in all 
models estimated; anticipating higher incomes in the future, municipalities can decrease 
their savings in the current period, knowing that they will be able to finance higher savings 
in the future. 
The effect of income growth on equilibrium savings is 5.014 in the partial adjustment 
model, implying that a 1 kroner increase in real income will increase savings by 5.014 
kroners in the long-run. However, the short-run effect, comparable to the static models, is 
0.847 (5.014 multiplied by the adjustment coefficient 0.169). That is each year 
municipalities allocate 84.7% of additional income to savings, with the long-run 
equilibrium reached after approximately 6 years14. 
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12 Stoltenberg II, or Stoltenbergʼs Second Cabinet, is the current government of Norway appointed on 17 
October 2005. It is a coalition between the Labour Party, the Socialist Left Party and the Centre Party. 
Stoltenberg I was the first cabinet of Jens Stoltenberg, which was in power from 2000 to 2001.
13 An increase of NOK 5.4 billion in non-earmarked funds provided to municipalities in 2006 was promised 
by Jens Stoltenberg during his inaugural address (19 October 2005).
14 The number of time periods it takes to reach equilibrium is given by the inverse of the speed of 
adjustment (1/0.169) since the adjustment is implicitly assumed to be uniform. Actual spending is assumed 
to approach the long-run equilibrium asymptotically, closing the gap by a fixed percentage (16.9%) each 
period.
Table 6.15 Sector 0  Net budget surplus: effects on minimum required expenditure
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects
Time and 
regional effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant -0.977 -1.841 - -11.839 -3.549 0.000
 - - - - (8.47) -
Growth in municipality 
incomes 0.533 0.595 0.516 0.553 0.567 5.014
(29.33) (20.09) (20.23) (24.59) (17.30) (11.04)
In the administration sector, both the inverse population size and the index of farming 
industry have positive and significant effects on the minimum required expenditure. 
Minimum required expenditure on administration is  higher for smaller municipalities, as 
they use a larger share of resources on administration, suggesting that economies of 
scale play a significant role in this sector. The minimum required expenditures are 
increasing over time as expected, with the exception of a decrease in 2002. Both the 
effect of the inverse population size and index of farming industry are higher in model 2 
and 8  than in the baseline model, suggesting that the baseline model underestimates 
these effects due to unobserved time variation in the minimum required expenditure. 
However, when compared to the cross-sectional estimates15  for the year 2008, the 
baseline model estimates are lower. The cross-sectional estimates of the effect of inverse 
population size and index of farming industry are 4.43 and 4.88 respectively. 
Table 6.16. Sector 1  Administration: effects on minimum required expenditure
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baseline model
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant 2.058 1.968 - -5.099 1.253 6.080
(31.47) (17.99) - (1.25) (5.84) (16.37)
Inverse population size 4.102 5.255 4.603 4.589 5.073 8.172
(34.31) (44.93) (2.08) (30.77) (34.82) (18.70)
Index of farming industry 3.634 4.997 -18.133 3.650 5.772 15.493
(5.46) (6.35) (1.49) (3.60) (4.82) (6.91)
Primary schools are compulsory for children 6 – 15 years of age. Population shares of 
children of the primary school-going age have a positive and significant effect on the 
minimum required expenditure on primary schools, implying that service provision 
increases as a function of the number of children in this age group. Children aged 6 – 12 
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15 The latest cross-sectional estimates are presented in Langørgen et al. (forthcoming). All comparisons 
between cross-sectional estimates and those of the panel data models are based on the base year 2008, 
unless otherwise stated.
years receive less services than children aged 13  – 15 years. This difference is due to the 
fact that the latter group faces more extensive and demanding lessons, which requires 
teachers with higher qualifications. Table 6.16 shows that the estimate of the effect of 
population share of 6  – 12 year old children is in fact lower than that of the 13  – 15 year 
olds. This difference is most pronounced in the model with both time and regional effects. 
Compared to the cross-sectional estimates, the baseline, time effects  and time and 
regional effects models  predict a smaller effect of the 6  – 12 year olds, but the effect of 
the 13 – 15 year old children is larger than the cross-sectional estimate.
An extra kilometer to the municipal subdistrict increases the minimum required 
expenditure due to the fact that municipalities that are further from the district centre are 
more likely to have more schools locally (a decentralised school structure with relatively 
few pupils per school and small class sizes) so that pupils are not forced to travel long 
distances to school. The increase is NOK 1346 in the baseline model, marginally higher at 
NOK 1365 in the time effects model and only NOK 991 in the time and region effect 
model. The relatively lower effect of distance to centre of municipal subdistrict in models 7 
and 8  may suggest that region effects are correlated with the distance variable and 
therefore account for some of the distance effect. Again economies of scale are present in 
this sector since class sizes are in general smaller in smaller municipalities, implying more 
teachers per student and therefore higher costs. Minimum required expenditures are 
increasing from 2001 to 2008  as expected. The effects of the inverse population size are 
only marginally higher in models 1, 2 and 8  than in the cross-sectional estimation. 
However, the effect of the 13  – 15 year old children is higher in all three models than the 
cross-sectional estimates, suggesting that the panel data models are able to capture 
more variation between these two effects. 
Table 6.17. Sector 2  Primary schools: effects on minimum required expenditure
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant 0.348 -0.676 - -5.777 -0.407 1.270
(1.61) (2.69) - (1.75) (1.04) (1.40)
Population 6-12 years of 
age 52.391 50.451 30.324 54.294 44.327 82.177
(22.92) (21.19) (9.65) (18.31) (14.58) (8.87)
Population 13-15 years of 
age 64.720 86.446 19.465 68.390 78.142 67.213
(14.84) (19.75) (5.98) (12.88) (15.01) (4.01)
Distance to centre of 
municipal sub-district 1.346 1.365 0.114 1.030 0.991 1.297
(30.48) (31.95) (0.57) (16.24) (14.99) (8.19)
Inverse population size 2.395 2.461 4.435 2.414 2.205 3.712
(19.63) (23.06) (3.93) (16.01) (15.97) (11.44)
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The service sector other education includes day care facilities for schoolchildren, music 
schools, special schools and adult education. Except for adult education, the relevant 
group that benefits from other education is the age group 6 – 15 years. Adult education is 
particularly directed toward recently domiciled refugees in the age group 20 – 59 years. 
Recently domiciled refugees include refugees who have resided in Norway less than five 
years.
Table 6.18  shows that the minimum required expenditure for other education is positively 
and significantly affected by the number of full-time working women and refugees with 
integration grants. Both effects are increasing from 2001 to 2008. In the time effects 
model an extra full-time working woman in the municipality’s population increases the 
minimum expenditure in the other education service sector by NOK 5680 in 2008. In the 
cross-sectional model this effect is significantly smaller: NOK 3570; and only slightly 
smaller in the time and regional effects model. The cross-sectional effect of the share of 
refugees is also smaller than in models 1, 2 and 7 (an additional refugee increases 
minimum required expenditure on other education by NOK 3237).
Table 6.18. Sector 3  Other education: effects on minimum required expenditure
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant 0.478 0.445 - -0.677 0.306 0.762
(10.44) (9.34) - (1.02) (3.35) (5.03)
Full-time working women 
20-44 years 5.983 5.680 -0.889 5.213 5.276 7.261
(9.14) (8.67) (0.75) (5.22) (5.37) (3.22)
Refugees with integration 
grants 38.131 35.992 17.773 38.318 30.745 51.658
(27.60) (21.97) (10.69) (19.34) (13.04) (10.15)
In the child care sector the service provision increases in the population share of children 
in pre-school age (1 – 5 years) but only in the models where time effects are included. The 
time effects model predicts that an extra child of age 1 – 5 years will increase the child 
care minimum expenditure by NOK 57137 in 2008, while in 2001 the increase is a much 
smaller one of NOK 13541 (calculated by multiplying 57137 by the 2001 time effect found 
in Table 6.12). The effects are NOK 58154 in 2008  and NOK 10700 (calculated by 
multiplying 58154 by the 2001 time effect found in Table 6.13) in 2001 when both time 
and region effects are included. The cross-sectional estimate is a marginal increase of 
NOK 60310 in 2008  and NOK 13880 in 2001. Thus, there is a large increase from 2001 
to 2008  in the minimum required expenditures in the child care sector. This is suggestive 
of an increased priority placed on the child care sector during these 8  years. Model 1, 6 
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and 7 have poor explanatory power for this  sector as both predict a negative (albeit not 
significant in Model 1) marginal effect of the population share of small children. Although 
all three models account for income growth, and models 6 and 7 account for municipality 
effects, they fails to explain the time effects, which seem to be important for this sector. 
Full-time working young women have a positive significant effect on the minimum child 
care expenditure since they are likely to require more child care such as kindergarten 
places for their children.
Table 6.19. Sector 4  Child care: effects on minimum required expenditure
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant 1.374 -1.331 - -1.236 -1.914 -0.239
(9.25) (11.53) - (0.80) (9.30) (0.71)
Population 1-5 years of 
age -2.750 57.137 -14.335 -7.621 58.154 94.687
(1.17) (31.03) (4.58) (2.43) (20.91) (13.64)
Full-time working women 
20-44 years 25.818 29.149 20.317 28.678 28.197 26.022
(19.12) (24.41) (11.62) (13.74) (14.23) (6.16)
Diseconomies of scale are present in the health sector as both the effect of the distance 
to the centre of municipal sub-district and the inverse population size have positive effects 
on the minimum required expenditure; that is the more dispersed the municipality’s 
settlement pattern and the smaller the population, the larger the minimum required 
expenditure on health care. A possible explanation is that patients in primary health care 
are entitled to have a physician within reasonable travelling distance, which increases the 
cost of providing health care in smaller municipalities. Similarly, to maintain a basic 
capacity of primary physicians in smaller municipalities the physician-patient ratio 
becomes relatively large, which increases the unit cost. The time effect as well as the time 
and regional effect models provide smaller estimates of economies of scale than does 
cross-sectional estimation, indicating that the latter may be capturing additional effects of 
unobserved time heterogeneity, which is accounted for in models 2 and 8  through time 
effects. 
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Table 6.20. Sector 5 Health care: effects on minimum required expenditure
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant 1.076 1.023 - -1.906 0.770 2.855
(27.60) (17.39) - (1.09) (6.52) (16.98)
Distance to centre of 
municipal sub-district 0.230 0.269 0.019 0.123 0.104 0.403
(8.40) (8.05) (0.26) (3.26) (2.20) (4.81)
Inverse population size 1.508 1.841 3.858 1.454 1.514 3.222
(22.29) (27.67) (7.96) (18.91) (16.44) (18.17)
A large share of spending in the social assistance sector is cash transfers  to support 
families  with insufficient means from other sources of income. The sector also includes in-
kind benefits that aim to prevent alcohol and drugs abuse and other social problems. The 
potential recipients are either poor, unemployed, refugees or divorced/separated, or 
possess different combinations of those characteristics. 
The number of refugees both with and without integration grants have a significant and 
positive effect on minimum social assistance expenditure. As expected, a refugee who 
has lived in Norway for less than 5 years and for whom, therefore, the central government 
will pay an integration grant to the municipality, increases the minimum required 
expenditure by a larger amount (NOK 62154 in the time effect model and NOK 56033  in 
the time and region effect model) than a refugee without a grant (NOK 11038  and NOK 
11129 respectively). This is a reasonable result since the refugees qualifying for an 
integration grant are likely to require more social assistance from the local government. 
This difference is even more pronounced in the cross-sectional estimates. Other target 
groups of social assistance, such as the divorced and separated, unemployed, poor and 
disablement pensioners all have significant positive effects on the minimum required 
expenditure in this sector, with the unemployed having a relatively larger effect, and the 
poor relatively smaller. In models 7 and 8, however, disablement pensioners have a 
relatively small effect, which is not statistically significant. Thus, when the regional variation 
is taken into account, the share of disablement pensioners appears to be less important 
for determining minimum required expenditure in social assistance. 
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Table 6.21. Sector 6  Social assistance: effects on minimum required expenditure
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant -0.325 -0.503 - -1.181 -0.718 -0.606
(5.23) (7.28) - (2.68) (4.84) (2.43)
Refugees with integration 
grants 54.507 62.154 24.131 53.241 56.033 92.381
(32.91) (30.40) (11.96) (23.88) (19.44) (10.64)
Refugees without 
integration grants 10.791 11.038 65.349 12.870 11.129 9.494
(8.04) (7.63) (2.22) (7.63) (6.49) (1.66)
Divorced/ separated 16-59 
years 10.567 11.955 1.227 13.048 13.486 22.284
(11.66) (11.91) (0.59) (8.49) (8.09) (5.86)
Unemployed 16-59 years 18.421 25.922 13.689 19.542 28.412 33.785
(11.22) (10.74) (8.56) (8.80) (7.48) (4.57)
Number of poor 7.037 8.192 3.220 5.210 5.985 7.715
(6.78) (7.18) (3.99) (3.96) (4.03) (1.78)
Disablement pensioners 
18-49 years 10.968 13.303 -6.776 3.187 4.817 5.494
(6.46) (6.87) (1.80) (1.01) (1.38) (0.71)
The child protection sector includes investigation of alleged child abuse, orphan homes, 
foster care, adoption services, and services aimed at supporting at-risk families so they 
can remain intact. Children less than 16 years of age are the primary target group for child 
protection. As expected children with a single parent have a positive marginal effect on 
the minimum expenditure, as do the poor. The models with time effects estimate that both 
effects are increasing over time. In contrast and somewhat surprisingly, cross-sectional 
estimations show a decrease in the marginal effect of share of children with a single 
parent, from 2007 to 2008. The downward bias in the 2008  estimate may be a 
consequence of unobserved time heterogeneity, which is taken into account by including 
time effects in the panel data models. Similarly, the share of poor estimate is much lower 
in the region effects model (Model 7), albeit not significant. It is also relatively low in model 
8, and significant, suggesting that regional variation is accounting for what was previously 
supposed to be the effect of the poor on minimum expenditure in this sector. 
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Table 6.22. Sector 7 Child protection: effects on minimum required expenditure
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant 0.312 0.291 - -0.133 0.476 0.935
(7.75) (6.23) - (0.34) (4.90) (5.97)
Children 0-15 years with 
single mother/ father 15.988 17.358 4.506 17.317 17.840 21.412
(14.76) (13.12) (2.53) (10.02) (8.59) (6.05)
Number of poor 5.472 7.053 -0.773 1.787 2.521 6.996
(7.57) (8.62) (1.29) (1.90) (2.20) (2.45)
Care for the elderly and disabled includes nursing homes, ambulant nurses and home 
care. Since elderly people have a higher probability of becoming recipients of long-term 
care, spending needs are higher for the elderly than for younger people. Subsistence 
output is increasing with age, and is  highest for the elderly 90 years and above, with an 
additional person over the age of 90 increasing minimum expenditure by NOK 170567 in 
2008  in the time and region effects model, while the increase for a marginal person of 67 
– 79 years is significantly smaller (NOK 41659). However, the group of mentally disabled, 
which by and large is a subgroup of the age group 0 – 66 years, is included to account 
for the additional cost from being mentally disabled. The cost is higher for those mentally 
disabled persons with intergovernmental grants than without; with model 8  showing the 
greatest variation between the effects of mentally disabled with and without grants. High 
cost recipients have a very large effect in panel data and cross-sectional models. More 
dispersed municipalities and smaller municipalities face larger minimum required 
expenditure in this sector (diseconomies of scale are present). This effect, however, is 
smaller than in the cross-sectional model.
  57
Table 6.23. Sector 8  Care for the elderly and disabled: effects on minimum required 
expenditure
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant 2.545 1.615 - -9.911 0.302 7.059
(12.85) (5.55) - (1.51) (0.68) (6.98)
Population 67-79 years of 
age 32.120 43.453 30.424 38.273 41.659 74.510
(10.78) (12.64) (5.35) (9.31) (8.77) (7.75)
Population 80-89 years of 
age 65.407 69.540 23.296 62.307 67.917 55.329
(13.39) (12.98) (2.73) (9.55) (9.22) (3.48)
Population 90 years and 
above 182.429 179.428 75.810 179.381 170.567 236.207
(13.18) (12.23) (5.15) (9.42) (7.74) (5.27)
High-cost recipients 692.089 768.367 400.545 677.446 685.275 1293.278
(13.52) (15.85) (7.81) (10.27) (10.50) (8.37)
Mentally disabled 16 years 
and above without grant 196.699 219.148 15.133 166.918 163.363 339.278
(10.96) (12.01) (0.67) (6.59) (5.89) (5.66)
Mentally disabled 16 years 
and above with grant 547.640 618.183 -115.539 571.485 634.630 518.110
(18.15) (17.94) (0.32) (12.13) (11.74) (4.82)
Distance to centre of 
municipal sub-district 0.429 0.542 0.295 0.277 0.245 1.400
(5.09) (5.76) (0.95) (2.26) (1.63) (5.07)
Inverse population size 2.096 1.990 7.799 2.314 1.894 3.313
(10.99) (10.01) (4.19) (9.02) (6.75) (5.11)
The culture sector includes sports, arts, museums, libraries, cinemas and churches. 
According to the time effects model the minimum required expenditures in this sector 
have been increasing over the years 2001 – 2002 and 2004 – 2005, decreasing in 2006 
and increasing again in 2007. The relatively smaller effect in 2006 is also found in the 
cross-sectional estimation. However, when region effects are also included, a decrease in 
minimum required expenditure is observed from 2004 to 2006, with an increase in 2007. 
Both models therefore seem to indicate that the sector was prioritised starting in 2007. 
Evidence of economies of scale is also found in this sector, with an additional person 
decreasing the unit costs of providing cultural services. 
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Table 6.24. Sector 9  Culture: effects on minimum required expenditure
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant 0.925 0.877 - -3.649 0.115 2.917
(27.98) (16.63) - (1.47) (0.81) (17.97)
Inverse population size 0.383 0.473 -0.004 0.410 0.455 0.793
(7.71) (9.72) (0.01) (5.91) (6.59) (5.11)
The minimum expenditure on municipal roads is increasing with the amount of snowfall 
due to the costs linked to the snow clearing and road maintenance, and is also positively 
related to the length of municipal roads. All the models  estimated, with the exception of 
the first-difference model, provide estimates that are similar in magnitude. 
Table 6.25. Sector 10  Municipal roads: effects on minimum required expenditure
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant 0.115 0.012 - -1.145 -0.070 0.289
(5.99) (0.45) - (1.58) (1.51) (3.22)
Amount of snowfall 0.079 0.088 0.023 0.053 0.056 0.130
(16.57) (15.86) (6.12) (7.93) (7.76) (6.72)
Kilometers of municipal 
roads 21.130 24.238 -6.157 22.732 22.373 31.334
(32.13) (31.24) (1.38) (24.98) (21.17) (13.79)
The water supply and sanitation minimum required expenditure is positively affected by 
the capacity for advanced purification and is subject to diseconomies of scale (smaller 
municipalities have higher minimum expenditures in this  sector). Advanced purification 
refers to purification using chemical or biological methods, or a combination of the two. 
Both effects  are lower in the time effects model than in cross-sectional estimations, and 
lower still in the model with both time and region effects. The minimum expenditures 
appear to be increasing over time.
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Table 6.26. Sector 11  Water supply and sanitation: effects on minimum required expenditure
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant 1.264 1.100 - -0.642 1.098 2.452
(28.88) (20.83) - (0.53) (9.40) (11.77)
Capacity of advanced 
purification 0.580 0.642 0.039 0.243 0.241 0.870
(16.58) (15.99) (0.62) (3.62) (3.64) (6.91)
Inverse population size 0.191 0.248 1.124 0.193 0.012 0.769
(2.29) (3.11) (1.16) (1.90) (0.11) (3.40)
The other infrastructure sector includes residential and commercial infrastructure, land-
use planning, environmental management and fire protection. Larger municipalities have 
smaller minimum expenditures in this sector as a significant positive effect of inverse 
population size indicates evidence of economies of scale. This effect is relatively larger in 
the models with time effects than the cross-sectional estimates. The first-difference model 
has a large downward bias predicting a significant negative effect of inverse population 
size.
Table 6.27. Sector 12  Other infrastructure: effects on minimum required expenditure
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index Yes No Yes Yes No No
Constant 1.526 1.356 - -7.264 -0.079 3.335
(22.60) (13.44) - (1.52) (0.36) (10.22)
Inverse population size 1.037 1.112 -2.824 1.155 1.077 1.441
(8.31) (9.45) (2.06) (7.36) (6.83) (5.32)
6.2.2. Effects on marginal budget shares
The marginal budget shares are posited to depend on three factors common to all 
sectors: average education level, share of socialist politicians in the municipal 
government, and the share of residents in the densely populated areas. 
Average education is found to have a positive effect on the budget shares of other 
education, child care, social services, child protection, culture, other infrastructure and net 
operating result (saving). The effect is negative for primary schools. This is surprising as 
one expects municipalities with higher average education level to prioritise education. This 
is indeed the case for other education with a positive marginal budget share in this sector 
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in all model versions. The partial adjustment model gives the opposite prediction: the 
effect on the primary schools marginal budget share is positive, and negative for other 
education. Neither of these are significant, however. The effect is also negative for the 
administration sector, indicating that this sector is under-prioritised in municipalities with 
higher average level of education. These conclusions are consistent with those based on 
the cross-sectional estimation. This  is expected as marginal budget shares are assumed 
to be constant over time; and the time effects on the marginal budget share parameters in 
Model 3  are found to be mostly insignificant with the exception of the child care service 
sector. 
Table 6.28. Effects of the average education level on the marginal budget shares
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index Yes No Yes Yes No No
Administration -0.048 -0.039 0.050 -0.005 -0.016 -0.000
(14.64) (13.31) (2.38) (1.99) (5.67) (0.03)
Primary schools -0.032 -0.012 0.048 -0.008 -0.006 0.012
(10.33) (4.56) (3.42) (2.02) (1.96) (1.27)
Other education 0.010 0.012 0.004 0.002 0.011 -0.004
(6.86) (8.78) (0.69) (1.94) (7.75) (1.24)
Child care 0.047 0.011 -0.001 0.012 0.008 -0.011
(13.67) (6.03) (0.12) (2.09) (5.22) (2.03)
Health care -0.009 -0.008 -0.001 -0.000 -0.004 0.005
(4.65) (4.52) (0.20) (0.63) (2.36) (0.93)
Social services 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.001 0.007 -0.003
(5.17) (6.32) (0.81) (1.67) (4.99) (0.77)
Child protection 0.003 0.002 -0.004 0.000 -0.000 0.004
(2.44) (1.48) (0.70) (0.13) (0.29) (0.94)
Care for the elderly and disabled -0.032 -0.029 0.010 -0.002 -0.013 0.022
(5.54) (5.17) (0.43) (0.95) (2.59) (1.38)
Culture 0.008 0.009 0.017 -0.000 0.005 -0.007
(5.18) (6.29) (2.42) (0.63) (4.04) (1.46)
Municipal roads -0.002 -0.001 -0.010 -0.000 0.000 -0.002
(2.81) (1.57) (2.19) (0.49) (0.46) (0.78)
Water supply and sanitation -0.006 -0.000 -0.027 -0.001 -0.002 0.007
(1.99) (0.09) (2.63) (1.41) (0.99) (1.16)
Other infrastructure 0.025 0.024 0.055 -0.001 0.006 0.004
(7.37) (7.78) (2.68) (1.01) (1.90) (0.29)
Net operating surplus 0.025 0.024 -0.147 0.002 0.004 -0.026
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In agreement with Borge (1995) we expect the socialist parties to prefer a larger local 
public sector, which would imply a lower share of income allocated to savings. This  is 
indeed the case in models 1, 2 and 8  where the effect of the socialist share on the 
marginal budget share of net operating surplus is negative. The effect is also negative in 
the primary schools sector, child care, culture, municipal roads and water supply and 
sanitation. However the effects on primary schools and culture are not statistically 
significant at 5% significance level. The effect on health care is  positive in the baseline and 
time effects models but becomes negative when region effects are introduced. The effect 
on the care for the elderly and disables is relatively large and significant in all models 
except model 9, implying that the socialist parties place a high priority on care for the 
elderly.
Table 6.29. Effects of the socialist share on the marginal budget shares
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index Yes No Yes Yes No No
Administration 0.007 0.004 -0.029 0.001 0.004 0.016
(0.95) (0.66) (0.58) (0.21) (0.54) (0.61)
Primary schools -0.016 -0.006 0.042 -0.001 -0.011 0.004
(2.05) (0.97) (1.41) (0.49) (1.64) (0.17)
Other education 0.005 0.006 -0.002 0.002 0.005 0.012
(1.49) (2.24) (0.16) (1.39) (1.77) (1.33)
Child care -0.021 -0.011 0.112 -0.007 -0.014 0.040
(2.25) (3.11) (3.81) (1.69) (3.32) (3.07)
Health care 0.003 0.002 0.004 -0.004 -0.017 -0.020
(0.75) (0.40) (0.26) (1.68) (4.19) (1.90)
Social services 0.022 0.018 0.039 -0.001 -0.001 -0.021
(5.16) (5.62) (2.10) (0.86) (0.13) (1.87)
Child protection 0.004 0.002 0.019 0.001 0.001 0.002
(1.26) (0.78) (1.35) (0.58) (0.39) (0.26)
Care for the elderly and disabled 0.029 0.012 0.197 0.007 0.025 -0.023
(2.16) (1.12) (3.80) (1.32) (2.17) (0.60)
Culture -0.003 -0.003 0.041 -0.001 -0.001 -0.011
(0.72) (0.83) (2.42) (0.89) (0.13) (0.84)
Municipal roads -0.008 -0.007 -0.019 0.001 0.000 -0.009
(4.13) (4.09) (1.65) (1.39) (0.26) (1.15)
Water supply and sanitation -0.032 -0.024 -0.036 -0.005 -0.013 -0.009
(4.46) (4.31) (1.47) (1.65) (2.13) (0.58)
Other infrastructure 0.040 0.031 0.118 0.004 0.028 0.018
(5.79) (5.09) (2.14) (1.26) (4.41) (0.51)
Net operating surplus -0.031 -0.025 -0.487 0.005 -0.008 0.000
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Densely populated municipalities appear to prioritise other education, social services, 
child protection, culture, municipal roads and water supply and sanitation. However, 
administration, primary schools, child care, care for the elderly and disabled and other 
infrastructure receive a smaller priority in densely populated areas. Health care appears to 
be prioritised in densely populated areas when only time heterogeneity is assumed. 
However, in the presence of regional differences, health care is seen to be under-
prioritised in densely populated areas.
Table 6.30. Effects of the share of residents in densely populated areas on the marginal budget 
shares
Model number (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model name Baselinemodel
Time 
effects
First 
difference
Regional 
effects
Time and 
regional 
effects
Partial 
adjustment
Time effects No Yes No No Yes Yes
Municipality or region effects No No No Yes Yes No
Adjusted by income index Yes No Yes Yes No No
Administration -0.013 -0.007 -0.008 -0.001 -0.001 -0.042
(2.39) (1.59) (0.26) (0.31) (0.27) (2.17)
Primary schools -0.002 -0.007 -0.032 -0.002 -0.028 -0.008
(0.39) (1.78) (1.67) (0.82) (5.44) (0.52)
Other education 0.008 0.005 -0.013 0.002 0.001 -0.002
(2.95) (2.53) (1.33) (1.70) (0.59) (0.32)
Child care -0.013 -0.008 -0.032 -0.009 -0.001 -0.023
(2.12) (3.41) (1.56) (1.95) (0.19) (2.67)
Health care 0.005 0.003 -0.007 -0.002 -0.007 -0.022
(1.59) (1.06) (0.76) (1.54) (2.05) (3.13)
Social services 0.010 0.005 -0.025 0.002 0.006 0.013
(3.48) (2.17) (2.30) (1.49) (2.04) (1.91)
Child protection 0.016 0.014 -0.009 0.003 0.009 0.004
(7.77) (7.89) (1.00) (1.89) (4.24) (0.63)
Care for the elderly and disabled -0.003 -0.001 -0.187 0.002 -0.006 -0.126
(0.30) (0.16) (5.42) (0.71) (0.73) (4.66)
Culture 0.024 0.017 -0.054 0.005 0.013 -0.005
(8.13) (7.22) (5.57) (1.99) (4.80) (0.70)
Municipal roads 0.012 0.011 -0.004 0.002 0.005 -0.010
(9.19) (9.57) (0.50) (1.93) (3.51) (2.06)
Water supply and sanitation 0.035 0.026 0.009 0.007 0.013 -0.001
(7.03) (6.59) (0.60) (1.97) (3.00) (0.10)
Other infrastructure -0.060 -0.049 -0.074 -0.002 -0.011 0.006
(11.47) (10.98) (2.50) (0.96) (2.23) (0.26)
Net operating surplus -0.018 -0.008 0.435 -0.008 0.007 0.218
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It may also be of interest to examine the changes over time in the average minimum 
required expenditures and average marginal budget shares. The average marginal budget 
shares are calculated using the parameter estimates from Tables 6.28  – 6.30 and the 
intercept parameters not reported here, such that βit is the average marginal budget 
share in sector i and year t given by: 
(6.1) βit =
1
Kt
βi0 + βijv jkt
j=1
3
∑
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟k=1
Kt
∑
where v1kt is average education in municipality k in year t, v2kt is the socialists share in 
municipality k in year t and v3kt is the share of residents in densely populated areas in 
municipality k in year t. Kt is the number of municipalities in the sample for year t. 
Table 6.31 summarises the average budget shares based on the time effects Model 2 
estimation. Although the budget shares are relatively stable over time, the administration, 
primary schools, health care and care for the elderly and disabled sectors show a slight 
decrease in their respective budget shares over time. However, other education, social 
assistance, culture and other infrastructure appear to have received a higher priority in the 
later years. Child protection, municipal roads and water supply and sanitation have very 
stable budget shares with no or slight change over time. Model 8  gives similar 
conclusions but with even smaller variation in the average budget shares over time. The 
other infrastructure average marginal budget share is almost constant over time in Model 
8.
Table 6.31. Model 2: average marginal budget shares by year and service sector
Sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Net operating surplus 0.145 0.146 0.148 0.149 0.150 0.152 0.153 0.157
Administration 0.142 0.140 0.138 0.135 0.132 0.130 0.127 0.123
Primary schools 0.110 0.109 0.109 0.108 0.107 0.106 0.105 0.104
Other education 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.019
Child care 0.050 0.051 0.052 0.052 0.053 0.054 0.054 0.056
Health care 0.066 0.065 0.065 0.064 0.064 0.063 0.063 0.062
Social assistance 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.013
Child protection 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013
Care for the elderly and disabled 0.200 0.198 0.196 0.195 0.193 0.191 0.189 0.186
Culture 0.071 0.072 0.073 0.073 0.074 0.074 0.075 0.076
Municipal roads 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023
Water supply and sanitation 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.044
Other infrastructure 0.116 0.117 0.118 0.120 0.122 0.123 0.125 0.126
Number of observations 332 331 331 331 331 330 330 330
Sum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
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Table 6.32. Model 8: average marginal budget shares by year and service sector
Sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Net operating surplus 0.207 0.207 0.208 0.208 0.208 0.209 0.209 0.210
Administration 0.112 0.111 0.110 0.109 0.108 0.107 0.106 0.104
Primary schools 0.087 0.086 0.086 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.084 0.084
Other education 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.019
Child care 0.057 0.057 0.058 0.058 0.059 0.059 0.060 0.061
Health care 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.051 0.051 0.050 0.050 0.050
Social assistance 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013
Child protection 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
Care for the elderly and disabled 0.192 0.191 0.190 0.190 0.189 0.188 0.187 0.185
Culture 0.071 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.074
Municipal roads 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022
Water supply and sanitation 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036
Other infrastructure 0.130 0.130 0.131 0.131 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.132
Number of observations 332 331 331 331 331 330 330 330
Sum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
The average minimum required expenditures are calculated using the parameter 
estimates from Tables 6.12 – 6.27 such that in Model 8  α iRt is the average minimum 
required expenditure in sector i, region R and year t given by: 
(6.2) α iRt =
1
KRt
α i0 + α ij z jkt + ρiR
j=1
r
∑
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟k=1
KRt
∑ τ it   ρi12 = 0  
and  in Model 2 the average minimum required expenditure for sector i and year t is
(6.3) α it =
1
Kt
α i0 + α ij z jkt
j=1
r
∑
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟k=1
Kt
∑ τ it
where zjkt (j=1,...,r) are the variables assumed to affect the minimum required expenditures 
in a particular service sector for municipality k in year t,ρiR is  the marginal effect of region 
R compared to region 12 on the minimum required expenditure in sector i, KRt is the 
number of municipalities in region R in year t, Kt is the number of municipalities in the 
sample for year t, and τ it is  the year t time effect on the minimum required expenditure in 
sector i .
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In order to see the changes in the minimum required expenditures in all regions, the 
average minimum required expenditure  

α it  is calculated over all municipalities:
(6.4)
 

α it =
1
Kt
α i0 + α ij z jkt + ρiR
j=1
r
∑
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟k=1
Kt
∑ τ it  ρi12 = 0
where Kt is the total number of municipalities in year t.
However, these values are not meaningful as minimum required expenditures exhibit 
significant regional differences. The average minimum required expenditure on other 
infrastructure is negative for all the years as a result of the fact that minimum required 
expenditures in some regions are higher and some lower than the expenditures in the 
Oslo region. Since the average minimum required expenditure on other infrastructure is 
fairly low in the Oslo region, regions that have even lower minimum spending are 
predicted to have negative spending. However, it is the relative and not absolute 
magnitudes of minimum required expenditures between regions that are of interest. 
The average minimum required expenditures are increasing over time as a result of the 
significant time effects as well as increasing income, with child care and care for the 
elderly and disabled showing particularly high increases. The average minimum required 
expenditure in the culture service sector has increased significantly from 2001 to 2008, as 
well as from 2007 to 2008 showing an increased priority placed on culture. 
Table 6.33. Model 2: average minimum required expenditures by year and service sector
Sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Net operating surplus -1.254 -1.573 -1.572 -0.898 -0.642 -0.166 -0.997 -1.442
Administration 1.876 1.379 1.944 2.204 2.231 2.095 2.742 3.766
Primary schools 5.948 6.487 6.969 7.221 7.519 7.756 8.417 9.362
Other education 0.676 0.782 0.795 0.826 0.839 0.803 0.867 0.992
Child care 1.016 1.306 1.480 1.835 2.051 2.554 3.139 3.976
Health care 0.718 0.888 0.968 1.087 1.116 1.048 1.308 1.731
Social assistance 0.887 0.987 1.084 1.067 1.143 1.106 1.098 1.243
Child protection 0.567 0.628 0.660 0.732 0.783 0.835 0.950 1.102
Care for the elderly and disabled 6.743 7.840 8.123 8.905 9.270 9.917 11.287 13.447
Culture 0.408 0.501 0.466 0.582 0.590 0.439 0.665 1.010
Municipal roads 0.317 0.354 0.328 0.391 0.394 0.409 0.497 0.606
Water supply and sanitation 0.913 1.006 1.011 1.126 1.143 1.127 1.227 1.501
Other infrastructure 0.829 0.929 0.878 1.077 1.047 0.829 1.240 1.667
Number of observations 332 331 331 331 331 330 330 330
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Table 6.34. Model 8 Average minimum required expenditures by year and service sector for the 
Oslo region
Sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Net operating surplus -2.136 -2.355 -2.222 -1.997 -1.787 -1.196 -2.181 -2.848
Administration 1.275 0.888 1.281 1.313 1.332 1.393 1.606 1.974
Primary schools 5.202 5.644 6.131 6.262 6.570 6.936 7.274 7.737
Other education 0.658 0.766 0.790 0.804 0.818 0.816 0.847 0.894
Child care 0.808 1.124 1.369 1.723 2.010 2.758 3.382 4.174
Health care 0.495 0.598 0.672 0.686 0.714 0.754 0.839 0.981
Social assistance 0.775 0.896 1.003 0.997 1.080 1.110 1.070 1.152
Child protection 0.635 0.701 0.737 0.806 0.873 0.960 1.053 1.184
Care for the elderly and disabled 4.605 5.357 5.589 5.960 6.206 6.863 7.476 8.649
Culture 0.087 0.104 0.108 0.114 0.109 0.111 0.134 0.167
Municipal roads 0.114 0.141 0.113 0.136 0.103 0.163 0.159 0.201
Water supply and sanitation 0.916 1.002 1.025 1.091 1.124 1.211 1.200 1.339
Other infrastructure 0.037 0.039 0.043 0.036 0.042 0.037 0.038 0.044
Number of observations 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Table 6.35. Model 8 Average minimum required expenditures by year and service sector
Sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Net operating surplus -3.260 -3.748 -3.648 -3.328 -2.869 -2.095 -3.536 -4.868
Administration 1.656 1.161 1.685 1.741 1.780 1.863 2.165 2.677
Primary schools 5.785 6.258 6.767 6.856 7.161 7.585 7.984 8.534
Other education 0.592 0.689 0.702 0.707 0.715 0.699 0.717 0.765
Child care 0.641 0.891 1.074 1.346 1.560 2.126 2.547 3.162
Health care 0.617 0.746 0.841 0.861 0.898 0.951 1.060 1.242
Social assistance 0.821 0.913 1.013 0.981 1.053 1.031 0.988 1.078
Child protection 0.511 0.564 0.602 0.660 0.720 0.795 0.872 0.979
Care for the elderly and disabled 5.833 6.769 7.111 7.581 7.926 8.847 9.690 11.148
Culture 0.039 0.046 0.048 0.051 0.050 0.054 0.066 0.082
Municipal roads 0.215 0.234 0.224 0.252 0.256 0.289 0.325 0.352
Water supply and sanitation 0.776 0.852 0.880 0.932 0.960 1.019 1.013 1.132
Other infrastructure -0.046 -0.048 -0.053 -0.043 -0.049 -0.041 -0.041 -0.049
Number of observations 332 331 331 331 331 330 330 330
Comparing the baseline model (1) with the preferred panel data models (time effects and 
time and region effects models 2, 7, 8), some key differences are observed. In the 
administration sector, the effects on the minimum required expenditure are much lower in 
the baseline model than in the time effects and time and region effects models, implying 
that not including time and/or regional effects in the model specification produces 
estimates that are biased downwards in this sector. In the primary schools sector the 
baseline model predicts a higher effect of the 6 – 12 year old children than models with 
time effects, but underestimates the effect of 13  – 15 year olds. Furthermore, the effect of 
the distance to the district centre is much lower in the model with both time and region 
effects both in this sector and in health care, suggesting that the economies of scale are 
captured by region effects when regional heterogeneity is accounted for. Similarly, the 
effect of refugees on the minimum spending on other education is  lower in the model with 
time and region effects and highest in the baseline model. This suggests that introducing 
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time effects into the model removes some of the upward bias on the estimates, and the 
same is true to an even greater degree for the regional effects. The most significant 
difference between the models  is observed in the child care sector. The effect of small 
children is negative and not significant in the baseline model, which is in conflict with 
theoretical expectations. This  effect is largest in the model with time and regional effects, 
with the time effects model predicting a slightly lower estimate. In fact the effect is only 
positive in the models where time effects are included, suggesting that omitting time 
effects produces biased results, particularly apparent in the child care sector. This is not 
surprising as we indeed expect the minimum required expenditure on child care to be 
increasing over the years, not only due to income growth but also due to policy measures 
that affect all municipalities. 
In the social assistance sector the marginal effect of refugees with and without integration 
grants is lower in the baseline model. The baseline model also underestimates the effect 
of the unemployed and the divorced and separated on the social assistance minimum 
spending and the effect of children with a single parent on the minimum child protection 
spending. However, the effect of the poor is overestimated by the baseline model both in 
the social assistance and the child protection sectors. The effect of the disablement 
pensioners is small and not significant in the time and region effects model, but higher 
and significant when region effects are not included. 
The baseline model underestimates the effect of the 67 – 79 year olds on minimum care 
for the elderly and disabled spending, and overestimates the effect of the share of people 
of age 90 years and above. Thus the difference between the effects of these two age 
groups is inflated in the baseline model. The economies of scale effect in culture and 
effect of road length in the municipal roads sector are also lower in the baseline model. 
The effects of snowfall in the municipal roads sector, and purification capacity and inverse 
population size in the water supply and sanitation sector are lowest in the model with both 
time and region effects and highest in the model with only time effects. 
The effects of average education, the composition of the local council and the population 
density are generally lower in the model with time and region effects than in the baseline 
model. The share of socialists has a negative effect on the health care and social services 
marginal budget shares in the time and region effects model. The effect is  however not 
significant in the social services sector. The health care marginal budget shares are also 
negative in densely populated areas according to the models with region and both time 
and region effects. A particularly surprising result is that the marginal budget share of 
primary schools spending is  relatively large and negative in the time and region effect 
model for municipalities with higher average education. The result is surprising since one 
expects that primary education is prioritised by municipalities  where the level of average 
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education is  higher. The model with time and region effects also shows a higher savings 
(net operating result) in densely populated areas, while the effect is opposite in the other 
models.
Finally, the partial adjustment model yields some interesting results. However, these are 
not directly comparable to the estimates in other models as this model estimates the 
effects on the desired or equilibrium minimum required expenditures and marginal budget 
shares. The effects on the equilibrium minimum spending are generally higher in the partial 
adjustment model than in the baseline, time and fixed effects models. This is in line with 
the underlying assumptions of the partial adjustment model, where the short-term effects 
are lower than the long-term effects. Only a fraction of the optimal spending is achieved in 
each period as spending is relatively slow to adjust to its optimal level due to adjustment 
sluggishness (speed of adjustment is 0.169). 
One can, however, calculate the estimated effects on the actual expenditure from the 
long-run values and the partial adjustment coefficient. The partial adjustment model may 
be written as:
(6.5) uit = λα it + λβi yt − α it
i=0
12
∑⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+ 1− λ( ) ytyt−1
uit−1 + λεit
which is directly comparable to Model 2 with λ =1.
Hence multiplying the coefficients in Tables 6.15 – 6.30 by 0.169 yields short-run effects 
comparable to the other models where adjustment is by definition instantaneous.
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7. Conclusion
The primary focus of this paper is estimating a Linear Expenditure System model in a 
dynamic context. Although panel data methods such as fixed effects and random effects 
are well-documented in the literature, it is less so for their application to a system of 
equations estimated in structural form. This paper proposes specifying each equation in 
the system to include fixed effects, time effects and/or a combination of the two. These 
models are then estimated by the maximum likelihood method. The model with both time 
and fixed effects performs well in explaining the behaviour of local governments over the 
years analysed. The fact that this model produces markedly different results from the 
benchmark model with no time or fixed effects suggests that local government spending 
is subject to both time and economic region unobserved heterogeneity beyond that due 
to average income growth. This finding has important implications for policy conclusions 
with respect to the effect of different service target groups and technology factors on the 
service sector minimum required expenditures. The pitfalls  of relying on the benchmark’s 
model’s estimates are particularly evident in the child care service sector, where the 
benchmark model predicts a theoretically unjustifiable negative effect of the share of small 
children on the minimum child care spending. The models with time effects, however 
predict the expected positive and significant effect. In the model where both time and 
region effects are included, an additional child increases minimum spending by NOK 
10700 in 2001 and NOK 58154 in 2008. The estimates are particularly sensitive to the 
inclusion of time effects, suggesting that time heterogeneity is large, while municipality 
heterogeneity is significant but relatively smaller. 
The average minimum required expenditures are increasing over time as a result of the 
significant time effects as well as increasing income, with child care and care for the 
elderly and disabled showing particularly high increases. This is consistent with the 
observed increase in average spending in these sectors. The average minimum required 
expenditure in the culture service sector has also increased significantly from 2001 to 
2008, as well as from 2007 to 2008  showing an increased priority placed on culture. In 
the care for the elderly and disabled sector, subsistence output is increasing with age and 
the sector is prioritised by local councils with the larger share of socialists. However, the 
share of socialists has a negative effect on the share of the budget allocated to health 
care in the time and region effects model. The health care marginal budget shares are 
also negative in densely populated areas according to the models with region and both 
time and region effects. A particularly surprising result is that the marginal budget share of 
primary schools spending is  relatively large and negative in the time and region effect 
model for municipalities with higher average education level. The result is surprising since 
one expects that primary education is  prioritised by municipalities with higher average 
education. 
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In addition to the fixed and time effects  models, a dynamic partial adjustment model is 
estimated, relaxing the assumption that municipality expenditures adjust instantaneously 
from one year to the next. In contrast to the other models, the partial adjustment model 
shows a positive, instead of negative, effect of average education on the marginal budget 
share in the primary schools sector. Thus, in equilibrium, the sign of this effect conforms 
to theoretical expectations. The model also shows a relatively slow speed of adjustment 
of municipality spending to its  optimal level and relatively higher effects on the optimal 
minimum spending and marginal budget shares. Although this model yields some 
important insights into the dynamics of local governments‘ spending behaviour, it has low 
explanatory power and can be developed further. First, it is possible to estimate the model 
assuming that the speed of adjustment varies across service sectors. It is also possible to 
specify the speed of adjustment parameter as a function of explanatory variables, for 
example municipality size, given by the inverse population size variable. Second, the 
assumption on the minimum savings specification should be examined further, and a 
positive long-term growth trend in the real income (α00 < 0) considered as an alternative to 
the current zero long-term growth assumption. Third, the partial adjustment model may 
be extended to include municipality or region fixed effects in the optimal expenditure 
specification. Finally, as an alternative to fixed effects estimation, a random coefficient 
model may also be considered in future work, where the minimum required expenditure 
parameters can be assumed to be random draws from a Normal distribution. However, 
this assumption requires careful consideration as it is difficult to specify the correct 
distribution from which the random parameters originate. 
Based on the results  discussed in this paper, panel data methods are found to be very 
well suited to the analysis  of local government behaviour in Norway over time, as 
unobserved time and municipality heterogeneity play an important role in the changes in 
spending patterns. Moreover, the observed sluggishness of adjustment over time 
suggests that a combination of fixed and/ time effects with a dynamic partial adjustment 
is a promising specification, which should be developed in future work on the subject.
  71
8. Bibliography
Aaberge, R., Bhuller, M., Langørgen, A. and M. Mogstad (2010): “The Distributional 
Impact of Public Services When Needs Differ”, IZA Discussion Paper 4826, Institute for 
the Study of Labor (IZA), http://ftp.iza.org/dp4826.pdf, accessed 12 April 2010.
Aaberge, R. and A. Langørgen (2003): “Fiscal and spending behaviour of local 
governments: Identification of price effects when prices are not observed”, Public Choice, 
Vol. 117, 125 – 161.
Aaberge, R. and A. Langørgen (2006): “Measuring the Benefits from Public Services: The 
Effects of Local Government Spending on the Distribution of Income in Norway”, The 
Review of Income and Wealth, Vol. 52, No. 1, 61 – 83.
Ahangarani, P. M. (1999): “Demand system estimation with panel data”, www-
scf.usc.edu/~mashayek/paper/AIDSpaper.pdf, accessed 2 April 2010. 
Allers, M. (2007): “Deriving spending needs from local government budget data: an 
alternative approach”, Paper to be presented at the IIPF Congress in Warwick, https://
editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=IIPF63&paper_id=55, 
accessed 20 November 2009. 
Allers, M. A. and J. P. Elhorst (2007): “Independent Behaviour of Local Governments: 
Dutch Evidence Using a Linear Expenditure System”, Paper prepared for presentation at 
the Spatial Econometrics Conference in Cambridge 11-14th July and the 47th Congress 
of the European Regional Science Association in Paris, August 29th to September 2rd 
2007, https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?
db_name=IIPF63&paper_id=54, accessed 20 February 2010. 
Arellano, M. (2003): Panel Data Econometrics. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Arellano, M. and B. Honoré (2000): “Panel Data Models: Some Recent Developments”, 
Working paper 0016, ftp://ftp.cemfi.es/wp/00/0016.pdf, accessed 2 March 2010. 
Bai, J. (2006): “Panel Data Models with Interactive Fixed Effects”, www.atl-res.com/
macro/papers/Bai%20paper.pdf , accessed 20 February 2010.  
Balestra, P. and S. Negassi (1992): “A Random Coefficient Simultaneous Equation System 
with an Application to Direct Foreign Investment by French Firms”, Empirical Economics, 
Vol. 17, 205 – 220. 

72
Baltagi, B. H. (2005): Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, 3rd ed. John Wiley & Sons 
Ltd., Chichester.
Beck, N. (2004): “Longitudinal (Panel and Time Series Cross-Section Data”, Note, http://
weber.ucsd.edu/~tkousser/Beck%20Notes/longitude20041short.pdf, accessed 30 March 
2010. 
Beck, N. (2006): “Time-Series-Cross-Section Methods”, Draft of June 5, 2006, http://
as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2576/beck.pdf, accessed 30 March 2010. 
Biørn, E. (1999): “Estimating Regression Systems from Unbalanced Panel Data: A 
Stepwise Maximum Likelihood Procedure”, Department of Economics, University of Oslo, 
Memorandum No. 20.
Bhuller, M. (2009): “Inndeling av Norge i arbeidsmarkedregioner”, Statistisk sentralbyrå, 
Notat 2009/24, http://www.ssb.no/emner/00/00/20/notat_200924/notat_200924.pdf , 
accessed 9 April 2010. 
Borge, L-E., Rattsø, J. and R. Sørensen (1995): “Local government service production: 
The politics of allocative sluggishness”, Public Choice, Vol. 82, 135 – 157. 
Borge, L-E. (1995): “Economic and political determinants of fee income in Norwegian 
local governments”, Public Choice, Vol. 83, 353 – 373. 
Chamberlain, G. (1980): "Analysis of Covariance with Qualitative Data," Review of 
Economic Studies, Vol. 47,  NO.1, 225-238.
Elhorst, J. P. (2003): “Specification and Estimation of Spacial Panel Data Models”, 
International Regional Science Review, Vol, 26, No. 3, 244 – 268.
Greene, W. (2001):"Estimating Econometric Models with Fixed Effects", New York 
University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Series 01-10, 
New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business.
Greene, W. H. (2003): Econometric Analysis, 5th ed. Prentice Hall, New Jersey.
Gujarati, D.N. (2003): Basic Econometrics, 4th ed. McGraw-Hill, New York.
Hausman, J. A. and W. E. Taylor (1981): “Panel data and unobservable individual effects”, 
Econometrica, Vol. 49, No. 6, 1377 – 1398. 
  73
Honoré, B. E. (2002): “Nonlinear Models with Panel Data”, Portuguese Economic Journal, 
Vol. 1, No. 2, 163 – 179. 
Hsiao, C: (1975): “Some estimation methods for a Random Coefficient Model”, 
Econometrica, Vol. 43, No. 2, 305 – 325. 
Hsiao, C. (1985): “Benefits and limitations of panel data”, Econometric Reviews, Vol, 4, 
No. 1, 121 – 174. 
Hsiao, C. (2003): Analysis of Panel Data, 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge.
Hsiao, C. and M. H. Pesaran (2004): “Random Coefficient Panel Data Models”, CESifo 
working paper 1233, http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocCIDL/cesifo1_wp1233.pdf, 
accessed 9 April 2010. 
Hübler, O. (2006): “Multilevel and nonlinear models”, Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv, Vol. 
90, 121 – 136. 
Langørgen, A., Galloway, T. A., Mogstad, M. and R. Aaberge (2005): “Sammenlikning av 
simultane og partielle analyser av kommunenes økonomiske atferd”, Rapporter 2005/25, 
Statistisk sentralbyrå.
Langørgen, A., Pedersen, S. and R. Aaberge (forthcoming): “Stabilitet og endring i 
kommunenes økonomiske atferd 2001-2008”, Statistisk sentralbyrå. 
McCloskey, D. N. and S. T: Ziliak (1996): “The Standard Error of Regressions”, Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol. XXXIV, 97 – 114.
Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development (2009): “Rapport fra Det 
tekniske beregningsutvalg for kommunal og fylkeskommunal økonomi”, http://
www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/krd/dep/443466/Teknisk-beregningsutvalg-for-kommunal-
og.html , accessed 3 November 2009. 
Neyman, J. and E. L. Scott (1948): “Consistent estimates based on partially consistent 
observations”, Econometrica, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1 – 32.
Norges offentlige utredninger NOU (2005/18): “Fordeling, forenkling, forbedring - 
Inntektssytemet for kommuner og fylkeskommuner”, http://www.regjeringen.no/Rpub/
NOU/20052005/018/PDFS/NOU200520050018000DDDPDFS.pdf, accessed 4 January 
2010. 

74
Pedersen, S. (2008): “Kommunenes økonomiske atferd 2001 - 2007”, Notater 2008/60, 
Statistisk sentralbyrå.
Pinheiro, J. C. and D. M. Bates (2000): Mixed Effects Models in S and S-Plus, Springer, 
New York. 
Polacheck, S. W. and M-K. Kim (1994): “Panel estimates of the gender earnings gap: 
individual-specific intercept and individual-specific slope models”, Journal of 
Econometrics, Vol. 61, 23 – 42. 
Pollak, R. A. and T: J. Wales (1981): “Demographic Variables in Demand Analysis”, 
Econometrica, Vol. 49, No. 6, 1533 – 1551. 
Rongen, G. (1995): “Efficiency in the provision of local public goods in Norway”, European 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 11, 253 – 264. 
Statistics Norway (2009a): “Culture Statistics 2007”, http://www.ssb.no/english/subject/
07/nos_cultural/nos_d410_en/nos_d410_en.pdf, accessed 4 January 2010. 
Statistics Norway (2009b): “Kulturstatistikk 2008”, http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/
KKD/Kultur/Rapporter%20og%20utredninger/Kulturstatistikk2008-nos_d429.pdf, 
accessed 2 April 2010. 
Stoltenberg, J. (2005): “The Stoltenberg II Government’s inaugural address to the 
Storting”, http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/smk/aktuelt/taler_og_artikler/statsministeren/
statsminister_jens_stoltenberg/2005/the-stoltenberg-ii-governments-inaugural.html?
id=420704, accessed 20 April 2010.
Terzi, S. (1992): “Simultaneous Equations with Random Coefficients: Estimating the 
Structural Form”, Statistical Methods and Applications, Vol. 1, No. 2, 275 – 286. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002a): Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. The MIT 
Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002b): Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, 2nd ed. 
South-Western, div. of Thomson Learning.
  75
9. Appendices
Appendix A Outlier municipalities and income index derivation
Table A.1. Municipalities that are outliers in 1 year or more
No. Name no. yrs  
out
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0104 Moss 3 1 1 1
0105 Sarpsborg 1 1
0111 Hvaler 3 1 1 1
0121 Rømskog 3 1 1 1
0301 Oslo 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0402 Kongsvinger 1 1
0434 Engerdal 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0441 Os 1 1
0501 Lillehammer 3 1 1 1
0511 Dovre 1 1
0512 Lesja 1 1
0514 Lom 1 1
0515 Vågå 1 1
0520 Ringebu 1 1
0521 Øyer 1 1
0544 Øystre Slidre 2 1 1
0545 Vang 1 1
0619 Ål 5 1 1 1 1 1
0632 Rollag 6 1 1 1 1 1 1
0821 Bø 1 1
0830 Nissedal 1 1
0831 Fyresdal 1 1
0834 Vinje 1 1
0928 Birkenes 1 1
0935 Iveland 1 1
0938 Bygland 1 1
0941 Bykle 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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1021 Marnardal 2 1 1
1026 Åseral 5 1 1 1 1 1
1027 Audnedal 2 1 1
1029 Lindesnes 1 1
1046 Sirdal 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1129 Forsand 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1133 Hjelmeland 1 1
1151 Utsira 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1219 Bømlo 1 1
1224 Kvinnherad 2 1 1
1227 Jondal 1 1
1232 Eidfjord 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1233 Ulvik 5 1 1 1 1 1
1242 Samnanger 1 1
1243 Os 1 1
1252 Modalen 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1256 Meland 1 1
1259 Øygarden 1 1
1265 Fedje 1 1
1411 Gulen 1 1
1412 Solund 1 1
1417 Vik 3 1 1 1
1418 Balestrand 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1419 Leikanger 1 1
1421 Aurland 2 1 1
1424 Årdal 1 1
1431 Jølster 1 1
1433 Naustdal 1 1
1438 Bremanger 2 1 1
1503 Kristiansund 1 1
1524 Norddal 1 1
1534 Haram 2 1 1
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1535 Vestnes 2 1 1
1546 Sandøy 1 1
1547 Aukra 1 1
1554 Averøy 1 1
1569 Aure 1 1
1573 Smøla 3 1 1 1
1617 Hitra 1 1
1664 Selbu 1 1
1665 Tydal 2 1 1
1721 Verdal 1 1
1739 Røyrvik 6 1 1 1 1 1 1
1740 Namskogan 3 1 1 1
1749 Flatanger 1 1
1755 Leka 1 1
1805 Narvik 1 1
1811 Bindal 1 1
1822 Leirfjord 4 1 1 1 1
1826 Hattfjelldal 2 1 1
1827 Dønna 1 1
1828 Nesna 1 1
1832 Hemnes 1 1
1833 Rana 1 1
1834 Lurøy 4 1 1 1 1
1835 Træna 3 1 1 1
1836 Rødøy 3 1 1 1
1840 Saltdal 1 1
1842 Skjerstad 2 1 1
1853 Evenes 1 1
1856 Røst 1 1
1857 Værøy 1 1
1859 Flakstad 1 1
1911 Kvæfjord 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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1919 Gratangen 1 1
1920 Lavangen 1 1
1923 Salangen 4 1 1 1 1
1929 Berg 3 1 1 1
1939 Storfjord 1 1
1943 Kvænangen 1 1
2003 Vadsø 2 1 1
2014 Loppa 2 1 1
2015 Hasvik 1 1
2017 Kvalsund 1 1
2021 Karasjok 3 1 1 1
2027 Unjárga 
Nesseby
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Total by year 
(103 
municipalities)
243 30 28 25 28 30 26 45 31
Table A.2. Descriptive statistics for total per capita income used in calculating the income index 
for an unbalanced panel data set where only municipalities that are considered outliers in at 
least 1 year are excluded
Year Observations Obs excl. missingMean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
2001 332 329 32.837 7.322 21.68 62.415
2002 331 329 34.173 7.551 23.372 66.779
2003 331 329 36.554 7.803 22.768 72.80
2004 331 330 38.237 8.144 25.22 77.791
2005 331 330 40.175 8.371 26.946 77.785
2006 330 329 44.792 9.428 30.675 81.98
2007 330 329 46.976 10.425 32.543 87.118
2008 330 328 50.054 11.25 34.736 92.316
All values in thousands Norwegian kroner. 
Table A.3. Descriptive statistics for total per capita income, used in calculating the income index 
for an unbalanced panel data set where municipalities that are considered outliers in at least 2 
years are excluded
Year Observations Obs excl. missing Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
2001 392 389 33.807 7.900 21.68 62.415
2002 391 388 35.19 8.194 23.372 66.779
2003 391 389 37.786 8.740 22.768 72.80
2004 391 390 39.445 8.963 25.22 77.791
2005 391 390 41.385 9.2 26.946 77.785
2006 389 388 46.20 10.405 30.675 86.914
2007 389 388 48.437 11.487 32.543 89.032
2008 388 385 51.577 12.4 33.949 96.907
All values in thousands Norwegian kroner. 
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Table A.4. Descriptive statistics for total per capita income used in calculating the income index 
for a balanced panel data set where municipalities that are considered outliers in at least 1 year 
are excluded as well as municipalities that have missing data in some of the years
Year Observations Obs excl. missing Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
2001 315 315 32.808 7.276 21.68 62.415
2002 315 315 34.242 7.561 23.372 66.779
2003 315 315 36.629 7.873 22.768 72.80
2004 315 315 38.33 8.243 25.22 77.791
2005 315 315 40.288 8.483 26.946 77.785
2006 315 315 44.89 9.528 30.675 81.98
2007 315 315 47.079 10.544 32.543 87.118
2008 315 315 50.132 11.402 34.736 92.316
All values in thousands Norwegian kroner. 
Table A.5. Descriptive statistics for total per capita income used in calculating the income index 
for a balanced panel data set where municipalities that are considered outliers in at least 2 
years are excluded as well as municipalities that have missing data in some of the years
Year ObservationsObs excl. missing Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
2001 370 370 33.786 7.885 21.68 62.415
2002 370 370 35.285 8.233 23.372 66.779
2003 370 370 37.872 8.818 22.768 72.80
2004 370 370 39.529 9.048 25.22 77.791
2005 370 370 41.506 9.279 26.946 77.785
2006 370 370 46.34 10.499 30.675 86.914
2007 370 370 48.567 11.611 32.543 89.032
2008 370 370 51.688 12.501 33.949 96.907
All values in thousands Norwegian kroner. 
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Table A.6. List of municipalities that have missing values for some of the years for the variables 
included in the model
Number Name Years missing
0216 Nesodden 2002
0430 Stor-Elvdal 2002, 2003
0513 Skjåk 2002
0718 Ramnes 2001
1101 Eigersund 2005
1102 Sandnes 2005
1154 Vindafjord 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005
1159 Ølen 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005
1160 Vindafjord 2006
1201 Bergen 2001
1211 Etne 2001
1214 Ølen 2001
1216 Sveio 2005
1219 Bømlo 2005
1244 Austevoll 2001, 2002
1503 Kristiansund 2007
1505 Kristiansund 2008
1556 Frei 2007
1569 Aure 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005
1572 Tustna 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005
1576 Aure 2006
1842 Skjerstad 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
1856 Røst 2002, 2003
1871 Andøy 2003, 2004
1874 Moskenes 2002, 2003, 2008
1928 Torsken 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008
1939 Storfjord 2008
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Appendix B  Time-invariant variables and correlation plots
Table B1 Model 6 version A – inflated standard errors
Sector Variable (first difference) Estimate Std error t-value
Budget surplus Growth in municipality incomes 0.516 0.026 20.23
Administration Inverse population size 4.603 2.217 2.08
Index of farming industry -18.133 12.195 -1.49
Primary schools Population share 6-12 years of age 30.324 3.143 9.65
Population share 13-15 years of age 19.465 3.256 5.98
Distance to centre of municipal sub-district 0.114 0.199 0.57
Inverse population size 4.435 1.129 3.93
Other education Share of fulltime working women 20-44 years -0.889 1.188 -0.75
Refugees with integration grants 17.773 1.662 10.69
Child care Population share 1-5 years of age -14.335 3.127 -4.58
Share of fulltime working women 20-44 years 20.317 1.748 11.62
Health care Distance to centre of municipal sub-district 0.019 0.075 0.26
Inverse population size 3.858 0.485 7.96
Social services Refugees with integration grants 24.131 2.018 11.96
Refugees without integration grants 65.349 29.465 2.22
Share of divorced/ separated 16-59 years 1.227 2.067 0.59
Unemployed 16-59 years share of total population 13.689 1.599 8.56
Number of poor share of total population 3.220 0.806 3.99
Share of disablement pensioners 18-49 years -6.776 3.771 -1.80
Child protection Share of children 0-15 years with single mother/ father 4.506 1.783 2.53
Number of poor share of total population -0.773 0.600 -1.29
Care for the Population share 67-79 years of age 30.424 5.689 5.35
elderly and Population share 80-89 years of age 23.296 8.525 2.73
disabled Population share 90 years and above 75.810 14.710 5.15
High-cost recipients share of total population 400.545 51.283 7.81
Share of mentally disabled 16 years and above without grant 15.133 22.623 0.67
Share of mentally disabled 16 years and above  with grant -115.539 365.500 -0.32
Distance to centre of municipal sub-district 0.295 0.312 0.95
Inverse population size 7.799 1.861 4.19
Culture Inverse population size -0.004 0.555 -0.01
Municipal roads Amount of snowfall 0.023 0.004 6.12
Kilometers of municipal roads -6.157 4.476 -1.38
Water supply Capacity of advanced purification 0.039 0.064 0.62
and sanitation Inverse population size 1.124 0.969 1.16
Other infrastructure Inverse population size -2.824 1.370 -2.06
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Correlation plots
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Appendix C  Residual plots
Model 2 (A)
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Residual plots by sector
Model 2 (A)
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Residual plots for Model 2 by year and by sector
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Appendix D Finding significant fixed 
effects in Model 4
Table D. 1. Municipality dummy numbers
Dummy number Name Municipality #
1 Halden 0101
2 Fredrikstad 0106
3 Aremark 0118
4 Marker 0119
5 Trøgstad 0122
6 Spydeberg 0123
7 Askim 0124
8 Eidsberg 0125
9 Skiptvet 0127
10 Rakkestad 0128
11 Råde 0135
12 Rygge 0136
13 Våler 0137
14 Hobøl 0138
15 Vestby 0211
16 Ski 0213
17 Ås 0214
18 Frogn 0215
19 Nesodden 0216
20 Oppegård 0217
21 Bærum 0219
22 Asker 0220
23 Aurskog-Høland 0221
24 Sørum 0226
25 Fet 0227
26 Rælingen 0228
27 Enebakk 0229
28 Lørenskog 0230
29 Skedsmo 0231
30 Nittedal 0233
31 Gjerdrum 0234
32 Ullensaker 0235
33 Nes 0236
34 Eidsvoll 0237
35 Nannestad 0238
36 Hurdal 0239
37 Hamar 0403
38 Ringsaker 0412
39 Løten 0415
40 Stange 0417
41 Nord-Odal 0418
42 Sør-Odal 0419
43 Eidskog 0420
44 Grue 0423
45 Åsnes 0425
46 Våler 0426
47 Elverum 0427
48 Trysil 0428
49 Åmot 0429
50 Stor-Elvdal 0430
51 Rendalen 0432
52 Tolga 0436
53 Tynset 0437
54 Alvdal 0438
55 Folldal 0439
56 Gjøvik 0502
57 Skjåk 0513
58 Nord-Fron 0516
59 Sel 0517
60 Sør-Fron 0519
61 Gausdal 0522
62 Østre Toten 0528
63 Vestre Toten 0529
64 Jevnaker 0532
65 Lunner 0533
66 Gran 0534
67 Søndre Land 0536
68 Nordre Land 0538
69 Sør-Aurdal 0540
70 Etnedal 0541
71 Nord-Aurdal 0542
72 Vestre Slidre 0543
73 Drammen 0602
74 Kongsberg 0604
75 Ringerike 0605
76 Hole 0612
77 Flå 0615
78 Nes 0616
79 Gol 0617
80 Hemsedal 0618
81 Hol 0620
82 Sigdal 0621
83 Krødsherad 0622
84 Modum 0623
85 Øvre Eiker 0624
86 Nedre Eiker 0625
87 Lier 0626
88 Røyken 0627
89 Hurum 0628
90 Flesberg 0631
91 Nore og Uvdal 0633
92 Borre 0701
93 Holmestrand 0702
94 Tønsberg 0704
95 Sandefjord 0706
96 Larvik 0709
97 Svelvik 0711
98 Sande 0713
99 Hof 0714
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100 Re 0716
101 Ramnes 0718
102 Andebu 0719
103 Stokke 0720
104 Nøtterøy 0722
105 Tjøme 0723
106 Lardal 0728
107 Porsgrunn 0805
108 Skien 0806
109 Notodden 0807
110 Siljan 0811
111 Bamble 0814
112 Kragerø 0815
113 Drangedal 0817
114 Nome 0819
115 Sauherad 0822
116 Tinn 0826
117 Hjartdal 0827
118 Seljord 0828
119 Kviteseid 0829
120 Tokke 0833
121 Risør 0901
122 Grimstad 0904
123 Arendal 0906
124 Gjerstad 0911
125 Vegårdshei 0912
126 Tvedestrand 0914
127 Froland 0919
128 Lillesand 0926
129 Åmli 0929
130 Evje og Hornnes 0937
131 Valle 0940
132 Kristiansand 1001
133 Mandal 1002
134 Farsund 1003
135 Flekkefjord 1004
136 Vennesla 1014
137 Songdalen 1017
138 Søgne 1018
139 Lyngdal 1032
140 Hægebostad 1034
141 Kvinesdal 1037
142 Eigersund 1101
143 Sandnes 1102
144 Stavanger 1103
145 Haugesund 1106
146 Sokndal 1111
147 Lund 1112
148 Bjerkreim 1114
149 Hå 1119
150 Klepp 1120
151 Time 1121
152 Gjesdal 1122
153 Sola 1124
154 Randaberg 1127
155 Strand 1130
156 Suldal 1134
157 Sauda 1135
158 Finnøy 1141
159 Rennesøy 1142
160 Kvitsøy 1144
161 Bokn 1145
162 Tysvær 1146
163 Karmøy 1149
164 Vindafjord 1154
165 Ølen 1159
166 Vindafjord 1160
167 Bergen 1201
168 Etne 1211
169 Ølen 1214
170 Sveio 1216
171 Stord 1221
172 Fitjar 1222
173 Tysnes 1223
174 Odda 1228
175 Ullensvang 1231
176 Granvin 1234
177 Voss 1235
178 Kvam 1238
179 Fusa 1241
180 Austevoll 1244
181 Sund 1245
182 Fjell 1246
183 Askøy 1247
184 Vaksdal 1251
185 Osterøy 1253
186 Radøy 1260
187 Lindås 1263
188 Austrheim 1264
189 Masfjorden 1266
190 Flora 1401
191 Hyllestad 1413
192 Høyanger 1416
193 Sogndal 1420
194 Lærdal 1422
195 Luster 1426
196 Askvoll 1428
197 Fjaler 1429
198 Gaular 1430
199 Førde 1432
200 Vågsøy 1439
201 Selje 1441
202 Eid 1443
203 Hornindal 1444
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204 Gloppen 1445
205 Stryn 1449
206 Molde 1502
207 Ålesund 1504
208 Kristiansund 1505
209 Vanylven 1511
210 Sande 1514
211 Herøy 1515
212 Ulstein 1516
213 Hareid 1517
214 Volda 1519
215 Ørsta 1520
216 Ørskog 1523
217 Stranda 1525
218 Stordal 1526
219 Sykkylven 1528
220 Skodje 1529
221 Sula 1531
222 Giske 1532
223 Rauma 1539
224 Nesset 1543
225 Midsund 1545
226 Fræna 1548
227 Eide 1551
228 Frei 1556
229 Gjemnes 1557
230 Tingvoll 1560
231 Sunndal 1563
232 Surnadal 1566
233 Rindal 1567
234 Halsa 1571
235 Tustna 1572
236 Aure 1576
237 Trondheim 1601
238 Hemne 1612
239 Snillfjord 1613
240 Frøya 1620
241 Ørland 1621
242 Agdenes 1622
243 Rissa 1624
244 Bjugn 1627
245 Åfjord 1630
246 Roan 1632
247 Osen 1633
248 Oppdal 1634
249 Rennebu 1635
250 Meldal 1636
251 Orkdal 1638
252 Røros 1640
253 Holtålen 1644
254 Midtre Gauldal 1648
255 Melhus 1653
256 Skaun 1657
257 Klæbu 1662
258 Malvik 1663
259 Steinkjer 1702
260 Namsos 1703
261 Meråker 1711
262 Stjørdal 1714
263 Frosta 1717
264 Leksvik 1718
265 Levanger 1719
266 Mosvik 1723
267 Verran 1724
268 Mandalseid 1725
269 Inderøy 1729
270 Snåsa 1736
271 Lierne 1738
272 Grong 1742
273 Høylandet 1743
274 Overhalla 1744
275 Fosnes 1748
276 Vikna 1750
277 Nærøy 1751
278 Bodø 1804
279 Sømna 1812
280 Brønnøy 1813
281 Vega 1815
282 Vevelstad 1816
283 Herøy 1818
284 Alstahaug 1820
285 Vefsn 1824
286 Grane 1825
287 Meløy 1837
288 Gildeskål 1838
289 Beiarn 1839
290 Fauske 1841
291 Sørfold 1845
292 Steigen 1848
293 Hamarøy 1849
294 Tysfjord 1850
295 Lødingen 1851
296 Tjeldsund 1852
297 Ballangen 1854
298 Vestvågøy 1860
299 Vågan 1865
300 Hadsel 1866
301 Bø 1867
302 Øksnes 1868
303 Sortland 1870
304 Andøy 1871
305 Moskenes 1874
306 Harstad 1901
307 Tromsø 1902
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308 Skånland 1913
309 Bjarkøy 1915
310 Ibestad 1917
311 Bardu 1922
312 Målselv 1924
313 Sørreisa 1925
314 Dyrøy 1926
315 Tranøy 1927
316 Torsken 1928
317 Lenvik 1931
318 Balsfjord 1933
319 Karlsøy 1936
320 Lyngen 1938
321 Kåfjord 1940
322 Skjervøy 1941
323 Nordreisa 1942
324 Vardø 2002
325 Hammerfest 2004
326 Kautokeino 2011
327 Alta 2012
328 Måsøy 2018
329 Nordkapp 2019
330 Porsanger 2020
331 Lebesby 2022
332 Gamvik 2023
333 Berlevåg 2024
334 Tana 2025
335 Båtsfjord 2028
336 Sør-Varanger 2030
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Table D.2. Step 1.1 : finding 
the significant fixed effects 
by iteratively testing each 
municipality in all 12 sectors 
simultaneously . 
Significance criteria: 50% of 
median adjusted sector 
expenditure
Parameter Estimate
theta1_103 2.404057
theta1_129 -2.66378
theta1_131 2.290095
theta1_149 -3.2466
theta1_160 -3.93952
theta1_161 -3.55073
theta1_176 -2.19223
theta1_180 2.270809
theta1_192 3.127054
theta1_195 -2.41826
theta1_236 3.447772
theta1_247 -2.31918
theta1_248 -2.39635
theta1_253 2.215618
theta1_291 2.414206
theta1_292 4.084143
theta1_293 2.966558
theta1_294 2.949771
theta1_295 2.703473
theta1_296 2.968162
theta1_309 3.628285
theta1_315 3.794161
theta1_316 7.930382
theta1_319 3.212174
theta1_321 4.829273
theta1_326 2.547324
theta1_331 4.548194
theta1_332 3.259316
theta1_38 -2.58827
theta1_43 3.171417
theta1_5 -2.82006
theta1_57 -3.04013
theta1_81 -4.94442
theta1_82 -3.62313
theta1_9 -3.44967
theta2_316 6.342183
theta3_112 0.698214
theta3_130 -0.86624
theta3_131 1.013903
theta3_149 -0.65107
theta3_162 0.645201
theta3_193 -0.69541
theta3_204 1.252457
theta3_212 0.738463
theta3_213 0.720791
theta3_216 0.722032
theta3_225 0.970766
theta3_227 0.985286
theta3_261 0.694881
theta3_280 0.756862
theta3_282 -0.71083
theta3_292 0.678692
theta3_309 0.772991
theta3_310 1.156009
theta3_316 1.221829
theta3_327 0.736867
theta3_334 0.661489
theta3_58 -0.68513
theta3_77 -0.83687
theta3_81 -0.94337
theta3_82 -0.75033
theta3_83 -0.62043
theta3_91 -1.39847
theta4_21 -2.07514
theta4_316 3.915541
theta4_321 2.395222
theta4_326 2.080152
theta4_329 1.957284
theta4_332 1.746173
theta4_77 -2.52762
theta4_81 -2.32969
theta5_106 -1.05959
theta5_110 -1.21387
theta5_137 -1.18654
theta5_156 -2.07
theta5_160 -2.01137
theta5_161 -1.627
theta5_186 1.424814
theta5_188 1.293389
theta5_192 1.097574
theta5_194 1.546095
theta5_198 1.531417
theta5_204 1.085437
theta5_225 1.636792
theta5_236 1.540516
theta5_247 -1.05927
theta5_248 -1.28538
theta5_272 1.615199
theta5_273 1.126029
theta5_292 1.289591
theta5_294 1.54802
theta5_295 1.194185
theta5_298 1.458837
theta5_316 1.130055
theta5_320 1.388373
theta5_326 2.982329
theta5_327 1.264381
theta5_329 1.595299
theta5_330 1.113504
theta5_334 1.739266
theta5_335 1.206732
theta5_38 -1.66219
theta5_43 2.192481
theta5_49 -1.26666
theta5_52 1.462753
theta5_70 -1.47176
theta5_77 -1.58851
theta5_81 -1.70193
theta5_83 -1.80093
theta5_9 -2.14543
theta5_91 -1.55885
theta6_100 0.763381
theta6_124 1.180949
theta6_16 0.77392
theta6_167 1.126614
theta6_17 -0.93898
theta6_171 0.783714
theta6_199 0.762514
theta6_247 1.111636
theta6_284 1.171212
theta6_290 0.95498
theta6_317 -1.20385
theta6_324 0.93081
theta6_328 -1.07171
theta6_331 0.765217
theta6_43 0.977553
theta6_44 1.151028
theta6_45 0.846589
theta6_50 1.179623
theta6_52 1.269983
theta6_58 -0.82491
theta6_80 -0.78239
theta6_81 -1.21995
theta6_84 -0.74826
theta7_11 0.562993
theta7_129 0.619829
theta7_130 -0.56771
theta7_131 -0.56336
theta7_140 -0.71193
theta7_158 1.003216
theta7_160 -0.81661
theta7_174 0.67088
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theta7_176 -0.65609
theta7_185 0.67363
theta7_187 0.671623
theta7_198 0.758549
theta7_218 -0.73307
theta7_229 0.683547
theta7_239 0.931053
theta7_250 0.587988
theta7_261 -0.65074
theta7_263 0.692625
theta7_281 0.817853
theta7_282 -0.62124
theta7_283 1.184047
theta7_286 -0.63074
theta7_316 1.061718
theta7_323 0.693972
theta7_331 0.587057
theta7_55 -0.56089
theta7_57 -0.7997
theta7_78 0.823883
theta7_91 1.032027
theta8_316 7.589541
theta8_331 8.089162
theta8_77 -8.28568
theta8_81 -7.59881
theta9_100 1.01388
theta9_110 -1.01464
theta9_118 0.923678
theta9_120 1.244113
theta9_124 -0.89083
theta9_131 1.914893
theta9_135 0.88411
theta9_137 -1.10925
theta9_141 1.26723
theta9_149 -1.20403
theta9_15 -1.01588
theta9_174 1.288746
theta9_176 -0.89274
theta9_192 1.78163
theta9_203 -1.35044
theta9_21 -1.09607
theta9_216 -1.24239
theta9_224 0.966738
theta9_229 1.01988
theta9_23 -1.01279
theta9_242 -1.03744
theta9_245 -1.19931
theta9_247 -1.45589
theta9_25 -0.89443
theta9_252 1.387739
theta9_260 1.049503
theta9_282 0.93606
theta9_286 -1.24486
theta9_29 -1.38128
theta9_293 1.18994
theta9_294 1.085808
theta9_295 1.282079
theta9_3 1.695476
theta9_30 -1.4425
theta9_316 2.293634
theta9_321 1.290059
theta9_322 1.520106
theta9_323 0.891887
theta9_326 1.738271
theta9_328 -1.08181
theta9_329 1.621966
theta9_331 1.972695
theta9_332 1.144739
theta9_336 2.082639
theta9_37 -0.94503
theta9_38 -1.58528
theta9_39 -1.31639
theta9_43 1.56987
theta9_61 -0.98052
theta9_64 -1.07913
theta9_65 -1.33154
theta9_70 -0.88242
theta9_72 -0.92107
theta9_77 -2.95127
theta9_79 -0.89704
theta9_81 -2.38197
theta9_83 -1.03935
theta9_89 -0.92963
theta9_9 -1.16864
theta10_116 -0.41599
theta10_131 0.693728
theta10_135 0.493697
theta10_148 -0.43757
theta10_149 -0.58219
theta10_159 0.46295
theta10_160 -0.57921
theta10_189 -0.88912
theta10_191 0.406919
theta10_215 0.44846
theta10_218 0.489732
theta10_225 0.388109
theta10_238 -0.51054
theta10_245 -0.57854
theta10_248 -0.48088
theta10_279 -0.42923
theta10_282 -0.69048
theta10_289 0.505231
theta10_291 0.877839
theta10_292 0.3897
theta10_301 0.640167
theta10_309 0.84836
theta10_310 0.715607
theta10_313 0.63757
theta10_315 0.865825
theta10_316 1.3887
theta10_317 0.525375
theta10_319 0.899104
theta10_320 0.395722
theta10_321 0.557889
theta10_322 0.59834
theta10_324 -0.4604
theta10_325 0.657532
theta10_331 1.121825
theta10_332 0.679638
theta10_333 -0.47974
theta10_38 -0.39369
theta10_49 -0.49275
theta10_50 -0.45041
theta10_51 -0.55062
theta10_55 -0.66427
theta10_57 -0.91424
theta10_61 -0.4643
theta10_64 -0.38908
theta10_65 -0.43242
theta10_77 -0.87967
theta10_81 -0.62981
theta10_83 -0.5096
theta10_9 -0.4905
theta10_91 -0.43558
theta11_105 1.570932
theta11_113 -1.13633
theta11_121 1.397151
theta11_126 1.746544
theta11_129 -1.32254
theta11_140 -2.03057
theta11_148 -1.13767
theta11_156 -2.48381
theta11_160 -2.60046
theta11_171 1.626438
theta11_182 -1.76152
theta11_189 -1.23077
theta11_203 -1.50873
theta11_217 2.244192
theta11_230 1.060146
theta11_233 -1.23731
theta11_236 1.068391
theta11_24 -1.2123
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theta11_246 1.480379
theta11_259 1.351866
theta11_260 1.162224
theta11_262 -1.06232
theta11_266 -1.18993
theta11_272 1.128706
theta11_276 1.287011
theta11_286 -1.15916
theta11_287 -1.07203
theta11_289 -1.11993
theta11_291 -1.11112
theta11_294 1.497659
theta11_305 -1.22923
theta11_309 1.239804
theta11_312 1.150815
theta11_316 2.589788
theta11_318 -1.40946
theta11_319 1.241107
theta11_329 1.317011
theta11_331 1.362959
theta11_332 1.562619
theta11_334 1.413035
theta11_47 -1.47334
theta11_64 -1.0799
theta11_65 -1.19759
theta11_69 1.11716
theta11_71 1.160781
theta11_72 1.066333
theta11_80 2.266015
theta11_9 -1.40978
theta11_90 1.071149
theta12_103 1.806263
theta12_110 -2.1854
theta12_114 2.435614
theta12_117 -2.32232
theta12_12 1.697484
theta12_120 2.963367
theta12_131 1.638038
theta12_137 -1.89879
theta12_141 2.570161
theta12_144 -1.69412
theta12_149 -3.43906
theta12_15 -1.51954
theta12_153 -1.71347
theta12_174 2.348354
theta12_175 2.279476
theta12_176 -1.95005
theta12_179 -1.91504
theta12_184 2.399103
theta12_189 -2.09002
theta12_193 -1.62494
theta12_194 3.11192
theta12_216 -1.50363
theta12_227 -1.73945
theta12_236 2.334612
theta12_238 -2.20622
theta12_239 2.501142
theta12_245 -1.7439
theta12_260 1.844493
theta12_261 -2.24588
theta12_271 3.715081
theta12_272 1.912137
theta12_282 -2.9557
theta12_295 2.235561
theta12_296 1.837957
theta12_3 1.656567
theta12_301 1.547405
theta12_309 -3.06046
theta12_316 3.557688
theta12_320 1.818825
theta12_321 2.008455
theta12_322 2.652602
theta12_323 1.501828
theta12_326 2.471078
theta12_328 -1.63554
theta12_331 1.665773
theta12_333 -3.80595
theta12_335 -1.76931
theta12_38 -3.03992
theta12_39 -1.65795
theta12_4 -1.69906
theta12_40 -1.77555
theta12_43 1.908517
theta12_46 3.153131
theta12_5 -1.94082
theta12_56 -1.75913
theta12_57 -3.71838
theta12_62 -2.11997
theta12_64 -1.75334
theta12_65 -2.64933
theta12_78 2.634668
theta12_80 2.521675
theta12_81 -2.44852
theta12_83 -3.79524
theta12_9 -3.14685
theta12_99 -1.60724
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Table D.3. Step 1.2 : finding 
the significant fixed effects 
by iteratively testing each 
municipality in each sector 
separately. Significance 
criteria: 50% of median 
adjusted sector expenditure
Parameter Estimate
theta1_49 2.675429
theta1_77 2.447552
theta1_129 -2.61258
theta1_161 -2.80228
theta1_292 2.561889
theta1_293 2.174959
theta1_296 2.944082
theta1_315 3.031456
theta1_316 2.325234
theta1_321 2.178223
theta3_69 -0.72318
theta3_91 -0.89141
theta3_108 0.653298
theta3_112 0.790381
theta3_130 -0.86873
theta3_131 0.902343
theta3_162 0.619189
theta3_189 0.740446
theta3_193 -0.67446
theta3_204 1.084486
theta3_212 0.682027
theta3_213 0.7749
theta3_216 0.790045
theta3_225 0.679343
theta3_227 1.12961
theta3_261 0.769137
theta3_280 0.682911
theta3_282 -0.62712
theta3_310 1.106615
theta3_326 -1.13103
theta5_52 1.18638
theta5_70 -1.11806
theta5_79 1.313334
theta5_117 1.279862
theta5_119 1.308152
theta5_141 -1.28824
theta5_156 -1.52663
theta5_161 -1.18956
theta5_173 1.229448
theta5_186 1.291621
theta5_188 1.152739
theta5_189 1.397765
theta5_194 1.116138
theta5_198 1.145146
theta5_272 1.067865
theta5_282 1.185119
theta5_291 -1.3611
theta5_296 -1.3892
theta5_316 -1.90145
theta5_326 1.717065
theta5_328 1.221282
theta5_333 1.438533
theta5_335 1.484908
theta6_16 0.76074
theta6_17 -0.91809
theta6_44 1.00963
theta6_45 0.759663
theta6_50 1.189923
theta6_52 1.084153
theta6_80 -0.77019
theta6_81 -0.89684
theta6_84 -0.72857
theta6_89 0.788844
theta6_124 1.297489
theta6_167 0.949125
theta6_190 -0.76672
theta6_247 1.318633
theta6_284 1.184726
theta6_290 0.875752
theta6_317 -1.18945
theta6_324 0.803027
theta6_328 -0.94841
theta7_5 0.574164
theta7_55 -0.56491
theta7_57 -0.59888
theta7_78 0.781906
theta7_81 0.664595
theta7_83 0.654688
theta7_91 1.22706
theta7_129 0.672908
theta7_130 -0.65441
theta7_131 -0.65921
theta7_140 -0.67016
theta7_158 0.917371
theta7_160 -0.71154
theta7_176 -0.58503
theta7_185 0.648741
theta7_187 0.602232
theta7_189 0.568557
theta7_198 0.615895
theta7_217 -0.58095
theta7_218 -0.71089
theta7_229 0.607823
theta7_239 0.840565
theta7_250 0.635286
theta7_260 -0.5905
theta7_263 0.745341
theta7_271 -0.592
theta7_281 0.745883
theta7_283 1.203853
theta7_286 -0.57212
theta7_296 -0.70757
theta7_329 -0.61393
theta9_3 1.305605
theta9_54 0.912712
theta9_57 1.050132
theta9_77 -1.10134
theta9_80 -0.89288
theta9_84 1.050792
theta9_131 1.384572
theta9_147 0.903929
theta9_161 1.060093
theta9_194 -1.12884
theta9_225 -0.98143
theta9_247 -1.17927
theta9_252 1.557777
theta9_261 1.101456
theta9_267 -1.04635
theta9_282 1.863152
theta9_305 -0.9662
theta9_319 -0.97212
theta9_330 -1.01706
theta9_336 1.306519
theta10_48 0.430449
theta10_51 -0.51072
theta10_55 -0.48696
theta10_57 -0.5422
theta10_129 0.48258
theta10_131 0.49746
theta10_159 0.503876
theta10_173 0.47712
theta10_176 0.526341
theta10_189 -0.61743
theta10_193 0.516093
theta10_218 0.549219
theta10_253 -0.41456
theta10_282 -0.64367
theta10_285 0.398382
theta10_288 -0.40124
theta10_291 0.617929
theta10_300 -0.45889
theta10_301 0.467864
theta10_309 0.51387
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theta10_310 0.614615
theta10_313 0.490303
theta10_314 0.396658
theta10_315 0.628729
theta10_317 0.513632
theta10_319 0.563562
theta10_324 -0.52513
theta10_325 0.744901
theta10_326 -0.75253
theta10_331 0.611699
theta11_24 -1.19743
theta11_47 -1.38467
theta11_55 1.076062
theta11_72 1.224848
theta11_75 -1.25027
theta11_80 2.443337
theta11_105 1.588572
theta11_121 1.28425
theta11_126 1.745308
theta11_129 -1.19009
theta11_140 -2.0513
theta11_156 -2.10452
theta11_160 -1.96153
theta11_171 1.360916
theta11_182 -1.38481
theta11_203 -1.07476
theta11_217 2.131248
theta11_246 1.655787
theta11_259 1.058892
theta11_262 -1.11148
theta11_276 1.43714
theta11_277 1.068457
theta11_287 -1.11591
theta11_288 -1.22303
theta11_289 -1.33623
theta11_290 -1.22585
theta11_291 -1.54209
theta11_293 -1.30073
theta11_305 -1.36397
theta11_309 1.133231
theta11_316 1.277997
theta11_318 -1.38101
theta11_322 -1.46219
theta12_46 2.64055
theta12_57 -2.01023
theta12_70 1.921818
theta12_77 2.569448
theta12_78 2.433505
theta12_79 1.808474
theta12_80 3.095128
theta12_83 -2.11764
theta12_91 2.715081
theta12_114 1.613251
theta12_117 -2.04918
theta12_120 1.56106
theta12_144 -1.93198
theta12_156 1.485173
theta12_157 2.050122
theta12_158 -1.49348
theta12_160 3.254111
theta12_175 1.634188
theta12_184 1.548583
theta12_194 2.734418
theta12_237 1.478127
theta12_239 2.892337
theta12_247 1.885476
theta12_261 -1.61098
theta12_271 2.919608
theta12_282 -3.01394
theta12_291 -1.49728
theta12_294 -1.86956
theta12_309 -4.7214
theta12_315 -1.65668
theta12_331 -1.4713
theta12_332 -1.47994
theta12_333 -3.13194
theta12_335 -1.65296
theta12_336 -1.80781
theta0_2 -1.08427
theta0_3 -1.85679
theta0_4 1.065492
theta0_5 1.448805
theta0_6 0.502213
theta0_7 0.620795
theta0_9 3.212049
theta0_10 -0.50797
theta0_11 -0.45135
theta0_12 -0.8952
theta0_13 0.565355
theta0_15 1.350448
theta0_18 -0.52221
theta0_19 0.473782
theta0_21 1.540622
theta0_23 1.517267
theta0_25 0.840511
theta0_26 1.082202
theta0_28 -0.45771
theta0_29 1.430644
theta0_30 1.744571
theta0_34 0.714256
theta0_37 1.570725
theta0_38 3.220085
theta0_39 1.992623
theta0_40 1.280709
theta0_42 0.952414
theta0_43 -2.5243
theta0_44 -0.51509
theta0_46 -0.90824
theta0_47 0.784008
theta0_48 0.561184
theta0_49 0.965651
theta0_52 -1.49464
theta0_54 -0.535
theta0_55 1.31035
theta0_56 1.071145
theta0_57 2.481737
theta0_58 1.009483
theta0_59 -0.46032
theta0_61 1.956757
theta0_62 1.768722
theta0_64 1.721936
theta0_65 2.530854
theta0_66 0.719493
theta0_67 0.723852
theta0_68 0.649073
theta0_69 -1.40252
theta0_70 1.195802
theta0_71 -0.97487
theta0_72 0.836836
theta0_73 -1.28805
theta0_76 1.605037
theta0_77 3.335019
theta0_78 -0.9109
theta0_80 -1.26168
theta0_81 3.170913
theta0_82 1.513362
theta0_83 2.665912
theta0_86 0.517231
theta0_89 1.029835
theta0_90 -0.98953
theta0_92 -0.89099
theta0_93 -1.21688
theta0_96 -0.65276
theta0_97 -1.00515
theta0_99 0.548412
theta0_100 -0.86821
theta0_103 -1.44984
theta0_106 0.788311
theta0_107 -0.4936
theta0_109 -0.7943
theta0_110 1.764727
theta0_114 -1.3054
theta0_117 1.039107
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theta0_118 -1.37758
theta0_120 -1.65463
theta0_121 -0.49379
theta0_122 -0.57739
theta0_124 2.011116
theta0_125 1.127203
theta0_129 0.5623
theta0_131 -3.38981
theta0_135 -1.46442
theta0_137 1.79168
theta0_138 1.059496
theta0_139 0.761058
theta0_140 0.728076
theta0_141 -1.34219
theta0_144 0.560805
theta0_145 -1.13697
theta0_147 -0.7315
theta0_148 1.542388
theta0_149 2.592547
theta0_150 0.969751
theta0_152 1.003066
theta0_153 0.783099
theta0_154 1.118718
theta0_155 0.639283
theta0_156 1.036514
theta0_158 -0.85289
theta0_159 -1.49675
theta0_160 2.338303
theta0_161 0.893329
theta0_164 0.595244
theta0_168 0.887902
theta0_170 0.653876
theta0_171 -0.81488
theta0_174 -2.05132
theta0_175 -1.25682
theta0_176 1.847951
theta0_178 -0.95782
theta0_179 1.094608
theta0_180 -1.28312
theta0_182 1.298062
theta0_184 -0.77795
theta0_186 -0.62131
theta0_188 -0.63852
theta0_189 2.003406
theta0_190 -1.23224
theta0_191 -1.04553
theta0_192 -2.77074
theta0_193 1.215782
theta0_194 -0.98964
theta0_195 0.522417
theta0_196 -0.44554
theta0_198 -1.59018
theta0_199 -0.53516
theta0_203 1.892306
theta0_204 -0.94715
theta0_205 -0.46038
theta0_206 -0.61526
theta0_213 0.710306
theta0_215 -1.12145
theta0_216 1.814372
theta0_217 -1.15547
theta0_218 -1.25263
theta0_219 -0.66539
theta0_221 0.794129
theta0_224 -1.34555
theta0_225 -1.09943
theta0_227 1.843773
theta0_229 -0.87869
theta0_230 -0.63382
theta0_233 0.980511
theta0_234 -0.93491
theta0_236 -2.37316
theta0_238 1.624696
theta0_241 -0.85586
theta0_242 1.122105
theta0_245 2.063861
theta0_246 0.887386
theta0_247 2.273133
theta0_248 1.596903
theta0_249 1.15039
theta0_250 0.455395
theta0_251 1.471437
theta0_252 -1.81495
theta0_253 -1.32105
theta0_254 -1.02625
theta0_255 0.838881
theta0_259 -1.46131
theta0_260 -1.78362
theta0_261 0.670739
theta0_262 -0.65558
theta0_264 -0.89529
theta0_266 1.001853
theta0_269 0.454789
theta0_271 -2.06453
theta0_272 -1.13246
theta0_273 -0.47732
theta0_275 -0.87427
theta0_277 -0.7015
theta0_279 1.164979
theta0_281 0.827389
theta0_282 0.960478
theta0_286 1.156234
theta0_288 0.515526
theta0_289 -0.64542
theta0_290 -0.50994
theta0_292 -1.8741
theta0_293 -1.99079
theta0_294 -2.10157
theta0_295 -2.13101
theta0_296 -2.23417
theta0_300 0.952365
theta0_301 -1.4465
theta0_302 -0.93668
theta0_307 -0.65346
theta0_308 0.844743
theta0_309 -0.56257
theta0_311 -1.43473
theta0_312 -0.91633
theta0_313 -0.86962
theta0_314 0.770876
theta0_315 -0.99681
theta0_316 -4.65528
theta0_317 -0.88818
theta0_318 0.948898
theta0_319 -1.89237
theta0_320 -1.60093
theta0_321 -2.79152
theta0_322 -2.51557
theta0_323 -1.34995
theta0_324 1.127504
theta0_326 -3.57345
theta0_328 0.865011
theta0_329 -2.26257
theta0_330 -0.48776
theta0_331 -4.00124
theta0_332 -2.27405
theta0_333 1.167172
theta0_334 -0.65499
theta0_335 0.603645
theta0_336 -2.49253
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Table D.4. Step 1.3 : finding the significant 
fixed effects by iteratively testing each 
municipality in each sector separately. 
Significance criteria: Significance criteria : t-
value >=1.5
Parameter Estimate t-value
theta0_124 2.011 2.99
theta0_137 1.792 2.88
theta0_149 2.593 1.61
theta0_15 1.350 1.92
theta0_156 1.037 2.18
theta0_160 2.338 2.97
theta0_161 0.893 1.70
theta0_176 1.848 2.45
theta0_189 2.003 5.00
theta0_203 1.892 1.74
theta0_21 1.541 1.85
theta0_216 1.814 2.57
theta0_227 1.844 3.52
theta0_245 2.064 1.89
theta0_247 2.273 3.29
theta0_266 1.002 1.52
theta0_333 1.167 1.71
theta0_38 3.220 2.45
theta0_39 1.993 1.82
theta0_49 0.966 1.84
theta0_55 1.310 2.44
theta0_57 2.482 1.68
theta0_61 1.957 3.16
theta0_65 2.531 3.15
theta0_70 1.196 1.88
theta0_77 3.335 5.18
theta0_81 3.171 7.67
theta0_82 1.513 2.28
theta0_83 2.666 2.38
theta0_9 3.212 2.76
theta1_11 0.858 1.74
theta1_124 0.701 1.55
theta1_131 0.630 2.04
theta1_140 1.113 3.22
theta1_158 1.554 2.38
theta1_170 0.465 1.50
theta1_22 1.425 2.89
theta1_234 0.894 1.75
theta1_242 1.071 1.72
theta1_246 1.382 3.11
theta1_253 1.933 4.95
theta1_277 0.756 1.50
theta1_286 1.401 1.98
theta1_288 0.907 2.42
theta1_289 0.630 1.55
theta1_290 1.386 1.52
theta1_291 1.174 3.04
theta1_292 2.562 4.68
theta1_293 2.175 4.45
theta1_294 1.591 4.72
theta1_296 2.944 7.83
theta1_297 1.914 5.15
theta1_300 1.129 2.79
theta1_305 1.707 3.22
theta1_309 2.128 4.24
theta1_315 3.031 5.64
theta1_321 2.178 3.85
theta1_331 1.496 2.68
theta1_332 0.824 2.76
theta1_333 1.593 4.56
theta1_47 0.873 1.64
theta1_49 2.675 5.30
theta1_60 1.095 2.45
theta1_77 2.448 8.16
theta1_80 0.947 1.68
theta1_90 1.452 3.06
theta1_91 1.207 2.55
theta2_110 1.330 2.32
theta2_120 1.817 4.26
theta2_124 0.925 2.78
theta2_129 1.189 3.93
theta2_138 0.645 1.54
theta2_141 1.118 2.95
theta2_160 2.108 4.93
theta2_161 1.031 1.55
theta2_176 1.401 2.98
theta2_197 1.157 2.19
theta2_198 0.824 2.17
theta2_200 1.479 4.90
theta2_229 1.126 3.39
theta2_239 1.354 2.80
theta2_246 0.956 3.48
theta2_247 1.595 4.93
theta2_266 0.839 2.31
theta2_270 1.033 2.05
theta2_275 1.023 1.84
theta2_281 0.714 1.82
theta2_288 1.254 3.07
theta2_291 2.713 5.77
theta2_308 1.635 1.74
theta2_311 1.951 5.04
theta2_321 2.870 4.03
theta2_326 2.494 4.38
theta2_330 2.893 5.91
theta2_334 1.252 2.82
theta2_43 1.138 1.58
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theta2_54 0.895 2.37
theta2_55 1.247 3.48
theta2_58 1.240 1.59
theta2_72 1.154 2.68
theta2_88 2.014 5.38
theta2_90 0.656 1.71
theta3_108 0.653 1.57
theta3_112 0.790 1.62
theta3_121 0.588 1.82
theta3_131 0.902 4.93
theta3_156 0.402 1.51
theta3_162 0.619 2.05
theta3_189 0.740 3.77
theta3_19 0.459 3.93
theta3_191 0.507 1.82
theta3_204 1.084 7.38
theta3_212 0.682 3.32
theta3_213 0.775 5.26
theta3_216 0.790 2.39
theta3_225 0.679 3.67
theta3_227 1.130 5.10
theta3_229 0.320 2.78
theta3_23 0.523 2.43
theta3_230 0.446 4.76
theta3_238 0.556 2.86
theta3_24 0.336 1.83
theta3_261 0.769 2.93
theta3_269 0.489 3.35
theta3_279 0.346 1.56
theta3_280 0.683 2.30
theta3_283 0.609 2.74
theta3_285 0.407 3.16
theta3_292 0.402 2.35
theta3_293 0.277 2.15
theta3_295 0.252 2.38
theta3_309 0.463 4.99
theta3_310 1.107 10.71
theta3_328 0.477 2.12
theta3_334 0.354 1.64
theta3_52 0.335 1.50
theta3_67 0.206 2.99
theta3_72 0.396 7.80
theta3_96 0.588 1.69
theta4_116 1.214 2.90
theta4_136 1.054 3.78
theta4_14 0.340 1.76
theta4_145 0.752 2.75
theta4_151 0.413 1.54
theta4_153 1.028 4.19
theta4_155 0.804 3.59
theta4_159 0.756 3.61
theta4_160 1.178 4.25
theta4_162 0.922 3.09
theta4_181 0.536 1.56
theta4_182 1.243 6.43
theta4_183 0.822 4.49
theta4_191 0.866 1.50
theta4_212 0.900 7.61
theta4_221 0.797 2.71
theta4_222 0.314 1.62
theta4_225 0.958 1.87
theta4_227 0.504 1.88
theta4_229 0.992 3.37
theta4_247 1.205 2.64
theta4_248 0.719 1.70
theta4_262 0.572 1.66
theta4_264 0.857 2.59
theta4_276 0.887 3.96
theta4_296 0.789 2.31
theta4_30 0.644 2.81
theta4_317 0.823 2.12
theta4_32 0.346 2.26
theta4_321 1.407 3.70
theta4_326 0.933 2.04
theta4_329 1.472 2.20
theta4_33 0.394 1.56
theta4_332 1.066 3.39
theta4_335 0.895 1.77
theta4_42 0.687 1.56
theta4_6 0.379 1.90
theta5_116 0.992 3.03
theta5_117 1.280 6.11
theta5_118 0.654 1.55
theta5_119 1.308 2.99
theta5_13 0.803 2.16
theta5_173 1.229 2.12
theta5_186 1.292 2.15
theta5_188 1.153 3.71
theta5_189 1.398 7.78
theta5_194 1.116 2.39
theta5_198 1.145 4.61
theta5_216 0.414 1.60
theta5_217 0.659 2.60
theta5_218 0.674 1.82
theta5_225 0.626 1.66
theta5_240 0.513 2.00
theta5_25 0.505 1.54
theta5_261 0.409 1.51
theta5_264 0.699 1.73
theta5_268 0.670 3.29
theta5_270 0.489 2.29
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theta5_272 1.068 1.90
theta5_273 0.976 2.96
theta5_279 0.566 2.48
theta5_281 0.483 3.10
theta5_282 1.185 6.46
theta5_292 0.431 1.65
theta5_293 0.301 1.94
theta5_294 0.708 3.80
theta5_298 1.023 4.19
theta5_299 0.340 2.11
theta5_317 0.662 1.60
theta5_318 1.011 2.20
theta5_320 0.809 2.96
theta5_326 1.717 9.78
theta5_327 0.555 2.46
theta5_328 1.221 7.24
theta5_333 1.439 5.59
theta5_334 0.944 1.89
theta5_335 1.485 5.84
theta5_43 0.655 3.22
theta5_50 0.824 3.18
theta5_52 1.186 1.86
theta5_71 0.605 3.05
theta5_79 1.313 3.78
theta6_100 0.656 2.33
theta6_104 0.294 1.70
theta6_108 0.421 2.28
theta6_124 1.297 6.14
theta6_126 0.388 2.22
theta6_131 0.554 2.86
theta6_16 0.761 3.57
theta6_167 0.949 1.72
theta6_171 0.651 2.01
theta6_176 0.408 1.57
theta6_199 0.690 3.48
theta6_2 0.625 2.42
theta6_225 0.330 2.24
theta6_230 0.466 1.82
theta6_247 1.319 3.48
theta6_278 0.363 1.81
theta6_284 1.185 4.50
theta6_287 0.509 1.69
theta6_290 0.876 2.44
theta6_291 0.283 1.55
theta6_294 0.586 2.99
theta6_324 0.803 5.69
theta6_329 0.398 2.23
theta6_331 0.487 1.96
theta6_333 0.408 2.45
theta6_37 0.619 1.97
theta6_43 0.708 3.35
theta6_44 1.010 6.10
theta6_45 0.760 3.12
theta6_49 0.533 2.01
theta6_50 1.190 3.65
theta6_52 1.084 4.34
theta6_55 0.372 4.07
theta6_59 0.576 1.55
theta6_70 0.326 2.03
theta6_89 0.789 6.35
theta6_96 0.546 1.78
theta7_10 0.471 2.58
theta7_115 0.395 2.47
theta7_119 0.377 2.20
theta7_129 0.673 8.09
theta7_137 0.478 1.80
theta7_14 0.448 2.05
theta7_142 0.545 2.34
theta7_15 0.450 1.97
theta7_158 0.917 3.82
theta7_174 0.554 4.52
theta7_185 0.649 1.93
theta7_186 0.221 1.60
theta7_187 0.602 2.65
theta7_189 0.569 3.20
theta7_191 0.445 2.91
theta7_198 0.616 3.16
theta7_229 0.608 7.54
theta7_239 0.841 9.12
theta7_243 0.469 1.77
theta7_250 0.635 4.31
theta7_263 0.745 3.48
theta7_266 0.460 2.78
theta7_27 0.347 1.77
theta7_281 0.746 3.68
theta7_283 1.204 12.40
theta7_309 0.399 3.51
theta7_323 0.552 2.51
theta7_324 0.185 1.60
theta7_331 0.365 1.97
theta7_335 0.223 1.74
theta7_5 0.574 2.90
theta7_59 0.215 2.46
theta7_70 0.285 2.10
theta7_78 0.782 6.24
theta7_81 0.665 3.54
theta7_83 0.655 5.69
theta7_91 1.227 10.87
theta7_93 0.467 2.02
theta8_125 4.655 3.40
theta8_140 1.766 2.24
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theta8_141 3.806 3.21
theta8_180 1.910 1.57
theta8_184 3.637 5.55
theta8_191 2.215 1.94
theta8_192 1.552 2.85
theta8_203 3.100 3.27
theta8_210 4.546 7.29
theta8_225 2.203 2.11
theta8_233 2.567 1.76
theta8_254 1.767 2.01
theta8_257 1.921 1.95
theta8_266 2.599 4.66
theta8_268 2.288 1.97
theta8_271 2.784 3.61
theta8_281 4.653 3.75
theta8_282 5.073 7.20
theta8_288 3.546 4.57
theta8_289 1.569 1.50
theta8_300 2.613 3.62
theta8_302 2.238 2.12
theta8_304 1.971 2.75
theta8_306 2.638 3.36
theta8_308 2.780 3.05
theta8_309 1.400 1.92
theta8_312 1.638 2.46
theta8_314 2.861 2.60
theta8_324 3.251 3.69
theta8_331 3.386 5.09
theta8_44 2.732 3.14
theta8_48 1.930 1.56
theta8_69 2.192 2.82
theta8_75 1.718 1.83
theta9_10 0.469 1.51
theta9_118 0.579 4.09
theta9_120 0.450 2.38
theta9_131 1.385 8.00
theta9_135 0.583 1.84
theta9_144 0.756 3.43
theta9_147 0.904 2.73
theta9_153 0.477 2.12
theta9_156 0.876 6.87
theta9_160 0.451 2.52
theta9_161 1.060 6.52
theta9_162 0.554 1.73
theta9_174 0.591 2.03
theta9_190 0.413 1.56
theta9_192 0.695 1.53
theta9_2 0.451 1.54
theta9_202 0.652 1.59
theta9_218 0.521 2.17
theta9_229 0.527 1.76
theta9_230 0.696 1.56
theta9_252 1.558 3.89
theta9_261 1.101 3.41
theta9_275 0.619 2.20
theta9_277 0.683 2.01
theta9_282 1.863 7.99
theta9_293 0.754 2.10
theta9_296 0.505 3.04
theta9_3 1.306 4.92
theta9_50 0.377 1.64
theta9_54 0.913 3.30
theta9_57 1.050 4.12
theta9_59 0.750 2.53
theta9_83 0.451 1.94
theta9_84 1.051 1.87
theta9_91 0.400 2.45
theta9_95 0.656 1.96
theta9_99 0.823 1.78
theta9_329 0.473 1.91
theta9_331 0.398 1.66
theta9_333 0.353 1.76
theta9_336 1.307 6.82
theta10_129 0.483 3.69
theta10_131 0.497 6.62
theta10_135 0.352 2.58
theta10_140 0.191 2.60
theta10_146 0.229 1.55
theta10_159 0.504 4.17
theta10_161 0.167 1.65
theta10_173 0.477 3.64
theta10_176 0.526 8.28
theta10_181 0.299 1.79
theta10_191 0.230 2.92
theta10_193 0.516 2.14
theta10_195 0.226 1.70
theta10_198 0.226 3.89
theta10_203 0.369 2.00
theta10_215 0.372 4.51
theta10_218 0.549 6.72
theta10_220 0.298 2.90
theta10_226 0.258 1.69
theta10_271 0.137 2.91
theta10_285 0.398 3.08
theta10_287 0.317 2.10
theta10_289 0.368 4.24
theta10_291 0.618 4.51
theta10_299 0.218 1.53
theta10_301 0.468 3.49
theta10_309 0.514 4.27
theta10_310 0.615 5.55
theta10_313 0.490 2.46
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theta10_314 0.397 1.76
theta10_315 0.629 5.59
theta10_317 0.514 3.65
theta10_319 0.564 4.19
theta10_320 0.183 1.85
theta10_325 0.745 6.05
theta10_331 0.612 4.54
theta10_332 0.273 3.49
theta10_48 0.430 3.28
theta11_105 1.589 2.95
theta11_121 1.284 1.90
theta11_126 1.745 3.85
theta11_128 0.800 4.23
theta11_130 0.903 3.48
theta11_138 0.919 2.43
theta11_171 1.361 2.24
theta11_18 0.779 1.91
theta11_217 2.131 5.54
theta11_241 0.786 2.24
theta11_246 1.656 4.52
theta11_259 1.059 5.16
theta11_267 0.684 2.02
theta11_276 1.437 3.36
theta11_294 0.867 3.30
theta11_30 0.938 1.78
theta11_309 1.133 1.88
theta11_312 0.889 2.63
theta11_332 1.042 3.08
theta11_54 0.775 1.79
theta11_59 0.760 1.61
theta11_70 0.818 5.78
theta11_72 1.225 2.29
theta11_80 2.443 5.66
theta11_94 0.962 2.60
theta12_114 1.613 1.84
theta12_116 1.459 3.14
theta12_12 1.163 3.12
theta12_120 1.561 4.88
theta12_130 0.699 2.30
theta12_156 1.485 7.13
theta12_157 2.050 8.96
theta12_160 3.254 5.65
theta12_175 1.634 4.17
theta12_18 0.566 1.51
theta12_184 1.549 3.23
theta12_194 2.734 5.76
theta12_217 1.278 1.80
theta12_237 1.478 2.42
theta12_239 2.892 6.51
theta12_247 1.885 5.51
theta12_266 0.767 1.76
theta12_271 2.920 6.44
theta12_272 0.982 2.66
theta12_275 0.946 2.39
theta12_296 1.117 2.50
theta12_301 0.997 1.66
theta12_305 1.429 2.57
theta12_320 0.780 1.53
theta12_46 2.641 5.30
theta12_49 0.839 1.60
theta12_70 1.922 4.20
theta12_72 1.101 1.72
theta12_77 2.569 8.15
theta12_78 2.434 4.36
theta12_79 1.808 5.88
theta12_80 3.095 12.59
theta12_81 1.205 2.05
theta12_91 2.715 5.28
theta12_92 0.829 1.92
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Table D. 5.  Summary of the number of significant effects in estimating model 4
Service sector
Number of 
significant 
fixed effects 
(12 sectors 
simultaneously  
tested )
Number of 
significant fixed 
effects (13 
sectors 
simultaneously 
tested )
Number of significant 
fixed effects (13 
sectors separately 
tested ). Significance 
criterium: 50% median 
adjusted expenditure
Number of significant 
fixed effects (13 
sectors separately 
tested ). Significance 
criterium: t-value >= 
1,5
0. Budget surplus 0 328 215 30
1. Administration 35 310 10 37
2. Primary schools 1 273 0 35
3. Other education 27 283 20 37
4. Child care 8 288 1 37
5. Health care 40 310 23 45
6. Social assistance 23 256 19 37
7. Child protection 29 274 31 38
8. Care for the elderly 
and disabled 4 286 0 34
9. Culture 59 316 20 41
10. Municipal roads 50 309 30 38
11. Water supply and 
sanitation 49 303 33 25
12. Other infrastructure 65 319 35 35
    
Total without sector 0 390 n/a 222 439
Total with sector 0 390 3855 437 469
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Table D. 6. Step 2.1: Model 4 estimates with 
the significant fixed effects found in step 1.1
Estimate t-value
theta1_103 1.207 1.40
theta1_129 -2.146 -6.03
theta1_131 2.447 5.92
theta1_149 -0.918 -1.05
theta1_160 -2.345 -6.48
theta1_161 -3.065 -7.28
theta1_176 -1.289 -1.75
theta1_180 0.536 0.78
theta1_192 1.780 2.63
theta1_195 -1.263 -2.43
theta1_236 2.739 0.24
theta1_247 -1.591 -3.64
theta1_248 -0.579 -0.51
theta1_253 1.719 5.79
theta1_291 2.014 5.56
theta1_292 3.246 6.95
theta1_293 2.630 4.72
theta1_294 2.725 7.69
theta1_295 1.303 1.92
theta1_296 3.140 9.20
theta1_309 2.263 5.07
theta1_315 3.908 8.38
theta1_316 6.463 0.18
theta1_319 2.233 3.50
theta1_321 2.690 5.38
theta1_326 1.029 1.81
theta1_331 3.856 1.35
theta1_332 1.977 4.17
theta1_38 -0.693 -0.54
theta1_43 0.481 0.55
theta1_5 -1.356 -2.99
theta1_57 -1.173 -1.26
theta1_81 -0.771 -0.30
theta1_82 -1.580 -3.87
theta1_9 -1.224 -1.16
theta2_316 3.917 0.09
theta3_112 0.792 1.98
theta3_130 -0.749 -3.49
theta3_131 0.999 3.69
theta3_149 -0.270 -0.63
theta3_162 0.684 3.41
theta3_193 -0.585 -1.66
theta3_204 1.231 10.32
theta3_212 0.754 4.67
theta3_213 0.828 7.62
theta3_216 0.816 3.13
theta3_225 0.760 4.65
theta3_227 1.130 5.70
theta3_261 0.802 3.52
theta3_280 0.672 3.42
theta3_282 -0.397 -1.25
theta3_292 0.576 4.34
theta3_309 0.857 7.35
theta3_310 1.309 16.06
theta3_316 0.868 0.14
theta3_327 0.499 1.67
theta3_334 0.454 1.22
theta3_58 -0.529 -1.37
theta3_77 -0.259 -0.65
theta3_81 -0.345 -0.50
theta3_82 -0.473 -0.82
theta3_83 -0.356 -0.96
theta3_91 -0.961 -3.31
theta4_21 -1.962 -3.31
theta4_316 2.793 0.16
theta4_321 1.844 2.72
theta4_326 1.498 1.43
theta4_329 1.677 1.68
theta4_332 1.676 2.65
theta4_77 -1.573 -1.35
theta4_81 -1.062 -0.36
theta5_106 -0.678 -1.72
theta5_110 -0.273 -0.64
theta5_137 -0.526 -0.59
theta5_156 -1.659 -4.45
theta5_160 -1.285 -3.19
theta5_161 -1.461 -8.46
theta5_186 1.325 2.60
theta5_188 1.203 4.97
theta5_192 0.264 0.59
theta5_194 1.325 3.28
theta5_198 1.080 6.52
theta5_204 0.666 1.70
theta5_225 0.814 2.88
theta5_236 1.007 0.14
theta5_247 -0.893 -2.75
theta5_248 -0.364 -0.43
theta5_272 1.257 2.88
theta5_273 0.936 3.80
theta5_292 0.739 3.55
theta5_294 1.022 6.89
theta5_295 0.424 0.82
theta5_298 1.169 7.11
theta5_316 0.116 0.01
theta5_320 0.806 3.40
theta5_326 2.209 6.68
theta5_327 0.894 5.29
theta5_329 0.831 2.29
theta5_330 0.178 0.45
theta5_334 1.134 2.68
theta5_335 1.359 5.47
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theta5_38 -0.734 -0.70
theta5_43 0.982 5.31
theta5_49 -0.715 -1.27
theta5_52 1.069 2.59
theta5_70 -1.309 -3.53
theta5_77 -0.424 -0.90
theta5_81 -0.038 -0.02
theta5_83 -0.887 -1.17
theta5_9 -1.098 -0.84
theta5_91 -0.759 -1.46
theta6_100 0.756 3.48
theta6_124 1.338 8.56
theta6_16 0.789 5.45
theta6_167 1.016 2.84
theta6_17 -0.779 -3.81
theta6_171 0.738 3.20
theta6_199 0.728 5.01
theta6_247 1.189 3.11
theta6_284 1.172 6.00
theta6_290 0.880 3.05
theta6_317 -1.155 -5.94
theta6_324 0.751 6.52
theta6_328 -1.099 -3.07
theta6_331 0.732 0.96
theta6_43 0.832 2.42
theta6_44 1.121 8.99
theta6_45 0.856 4.53
theta6_50 1.198 3.71
theta6_52 1.193 5.75
theta6_58 -0.684 -2.92
theta6_80 -0.593 -2.00
theta6_81 -1.078 -0.64
theta6_84 -0.726 -5.00
theta7_11 0.526 1.28
theta7_129 0.719 8.16
theta7_130 -0.613 -1.90
theta7_131 -0.589 -1.19
theta7_140 -0.551 -2.30
theta7_158 0.945 5.52
theta7_160 -0.685 -0.84
theta7_174 0.590 5.87
theta7_176 -0.557 -2.75
theta7_185 0.645 2.69
theta7_187 0.598 3.83
theta7_198 0.614 4.23
theta7_218 -0.739 -2.13
theta7_229 0.571 8.75
theta7_239 0.903 12.61
theta7_250 0.702 6.50
theta7_261 -0.494 -1.52
theta7_263 0.702 4.34
theta7_281 0.754 4.88
theta7_282 -0.367 -1.22
theta7_283 1.256 16.57
theta7_286 -0.436 -1.94
theta7_316 0.919 0.10
theta7_323 0.605 3.31
theta7_331 0.580 0.69
theta7_55 -0.517 -2.42
theta7_57 -0.678 -1.99
theta7_78 0.824 7.92
theta7_91 1.203 8.77
theta8_316 4.386 0.06
theta8_331 6.132 4.74
theta8_77 -2.942 -2.60
theta8_81 -1.633 -0.27
theta9_100 0.531 1.97
theta9_110 -0.077 -0.15
theta9_118 0.503 5.39
theta9_120 0.787 5.92
theta9_124 -0.540 -1.82
theta9_131 1.568 2.94
theta9_135 0.664 2.85
theta9_137 -0.375 -0.57
theta9_141 0.416 1.80
theta9_149 -0.022 -0.03
theta9_15 -0.225 -0.51
theta9_174 0.787 3.24
theta9_176 -0.519 -2.34
theta9_192 0.990 3.28
theta9_203 -0.879 -3.04
theta9_21 -0.646 -1.24
theta9_216 -0.830 -1.64
theta9_224 0.198 0.81
theta9_229 0.505 2.38
theta9_23 -0.232 -0.42
theta9_242 -0.255 -0.72
theta9_245 -0.160 -0.87
theta9_247 -1.173 -5.62
theta9_25 -0.406 -0.50
theta9_252 1.444 5.30
theta9_260 0.928 1.77
theta9_282 1.456 6.00
theta9_286 -0.588 -1.38
theta9_29 -0.511 -1.78
theta9_293 0.997 2.92
theta9_294 0.843 3.41
theta9_295 0.578 1.07
theta9_3 1.417 7.18
theta9_30 -0.736 -2.57
theta9_316 1.331 0.07
theta9_321 0.178 0.35
theta9_322 0.600 2.70
theta9_323 0.106 0.21
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theta9_326 0.758 2.96
theta9_328 -0.474 -1.78
theta9_329 0.877 4.66
theta9_331 1.731 1.83
theta9_332 0.681 2.12
theta9_336 1.361 10.79
theta9_37 -0.177 -0.40
theta9_38 -0.702 -0.91
theta9_39 -0.600 -0.99
theta9_43 0.061 0.07
theta9_61 -0.355 -0.72
theta9_64 -0.187 -0.35
theta9_65 -0.521 -0.62
theta9_70 -0.790 -4.11
theta9_72 -0.726 -2.61
theta9_77 -1.466 -5.01
theta9_79 -0.802 -4.34
theta9_81 -0.380 -0.21
theta9_83 -0.007 -0.01
theta9_89 -0.623 -1.39
theta9_9 -0.052 -0.04
theta10_116 -0.200 -2.46
theta10_131 0.753 7.03
theta10_135 0.413 4.33
theta10_148 -0.239 -2.05
theta10_149 -0.204 -0.46
theta10_159 0.410 5.23
theta10_160 -0.210 -0.66
theta10_189 -0.579 -2.13
theta10_191 0.219 3.87
theta10_215 0.373 7.01
theta10_218 0.523 7.72
theta10_225 0.132 0.52
theta10_238 -0.306 -1.54
theta10_245 -0.225 -1.48
theta10_248 -0.184 -0.88
theta10_279 -0.331 -2.62
theta10_282 -0.325 -2.16
theta10_289 0.500 4.43
theta10_291 0.876 7.44
theta10_292 0.215 0.95
theta10_301 0.560 4.95
theta10_309 0.837 6.06
theta10_310 0.777 10.38
theta10_313 0.539 3.18
theta10_315 0.836 10.32
theta10_316 1.167 0.17
theta10_317 0.556 4.57
theta10_319 0.779 5.74
theta10_320 0.257 3.20
theta10_321 0.275 3.30
theta10_322 0.320 2.82
theta10_324 -0.446 -2.54
theta10_325 0.726 7.38
theta10_331 1.048 3.36
theta10_332 0.549 7.16
theta10_333 -0.346 -3.76
theta10_38 -0.126 -0.31
theta10_49 -0.307 -2.56
theta10_50 -0.363 -1.01
theta10_51 -0.520 -3.29
theta10_55 -0.495 -3.30
theta10_57 -0.586 -4.85
theta10_61 -0.272 -1.04
theta10_64 -0.112 -0.61
theta10_65 -0.212 -1.04
theta10_77 -0.315 -1.13
theta10_81 0.053 0.13
theta10_83 -0.154 -0.64
theta10_9 -0.101 -0.14
theta10_91 -0.055 -0.24
theta11_105 1.584 4.75
theta11_113 -1.009 -1.45
theta11_121 1.197 3.06
theta11_126 1.695 5.98
theta11_129 -1.299 -1.52
theta11_140 -1.859 -2.59
theta11_148 -0.781 -2.08
theta11_156 -2.063 -3.20
theta11_160 -1.731 -2.58
theta11_171 1.444 4.14
theta11_182 -1.289 -5.91
theta11_189 -0.984 -4.49
theta11_203 -1.193 -2.12
theta11_217 2.302 9.71
theta11_230 0.938 0.77
theta11_233 -0.926 -1.76
theta11_236 0.745 0.07
theta11_24 -1.177 -12.35
theta11_246 1.604 6.95
theta11_259 1.102 8.92
theta11_260 1.093 2.37
theta11_262 -1.031 -0.81
theta11_266 -1.222 -2.12
theta11_272 0.837 1.14
theta11_276 1.442 5.41
theta11_286 -0.776 -0.92
theta11_287 -0.902 -1.24
theta11_289 -1.275 -1.27
theta11_291 -1.285 -2.86
theta11_294 1.430 7.70
theta11_305 -1.216 -1.99
theta11_309 0.790 1.78
theta11_312 0.923 4.05
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theta11_316 2.104 0.12
theta11_318 -1.287 -5.50
theta11_319 1.000 1.71
theta11_329 0.811 0.99
theta11_331 1.227 0.64
theta11_332 1.085 2.56
theta11_334 1.072 0.70
theta11_47 -1.258 -0.76
theta11_64 -0.613 -0.82
theta11_65 -0.799 -0.83
theta11_69 0.741 1.95
theta11_71 0.838 1.72
theta11_72 1.074 2.45
theta11_80 2.507 7.31
theta11_9 -0.747 -0.34
theta11_90 0.894 1.91
theta12_103 1.024 0.99
theta12_110 -0.565 -0.72
theta12_114 1.460 2.86
theta12_117 -2.204 -6.04
theta12_12 1.078 4.91
theta12_120 1.954 7.84
theta12_131 0.610 0.62
theta12_137 -0.783 -0.63
theta12_141 1.568 2.24
theta12_144 -1.531 -3.38
theta12_149 -1.561 -0.38
theta12_15 -0.263 -0.17
theta12_153 -0.845 -0.89
theta12_174 1.487 3.37
theta12_175 1.838 7.06
theta12_176 -1.526 -3.74
theta12_179 -1.060 -0.99
theta12_184 1.545 5.13
theta12_189 -1.411 -2.29
theta12_193 -0.631 -0.75
theta12_194 2.805 9.01
theta12_216 -0.881 -0.97
theta12_227 -0.415 -0.26
theta12_236 1.707 0.99
theta12_238 -1.269 -1.93
theta12_239 3.382 11.56
theta12_245 0.114 0.13
theta12_260 1.618 2.31
theta12_261 -2.225 -4.53
theta12_271 2.432 7.62
theta12_272 1.288 3.30
theta12_282 -2.989 -5.25
theta12_295 0.823 1.26
theta12_296 1.454 4.63
theta12_3 1.265 3.27
theta12_301 0.793 1.78
theta12_309 -4.315 -7.39
theta12_316 1.448 0.04
theta12_320 0.946 2.34
theta12_321 0.122 0.14
theta12_322 0.927 1.81
theta12_323 0.136 0.28
theta12_326 1.147 2.01
theta12_328 -1.763 -3.18
theta12_331 0.527 0.45
theta12_333 -3.700 -9.44
theta12_335 -1.661 -2.81
theta12_38 -1.529 -0.80
theta12_39 -0.391 -0.23
theta12_4 -0.484 -0.90
theta12_40 -0.948 -0.91
theta12_43 -0.371 -0.36
theta12_46 2.599 8.37
theta12_5 -1.018 -0.65
theta12_56 -0.686 -0.70
theta12_57 -2.628 -5.05
theta12_62 -1.145 -0.63
theta12_64 -0.481 -0.36
theta12_65 -1.248 -0.72
theta12_78 2.472 5.97
theta12_80 3.242 17.39
theta12_81 0.455 0.13
theta12_83 -2.287 -2.86
theta12_9 -1.470 -0.87
theta12_99 -1.154 -1.33
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Table D.7. Step 2.2: Model 4 estimates with 
the significant fixed effects found in step 1.2
Estimate t-value
theta1_49 2.563 5.86
theta1_77 2.128 6.11
theta1_129 -2.194 -1.72
theta1_161 -2.908 -5.40
theta1_292 2.527 5.18
theta1_293 1.887 4.38
theta1_296 2.199 3.16
theta1_315 3.503 6.04
theta1_316 2.116 0.60
theta1_321 2.119 4.46
theta3_69 -0.728 -1.24
theta3_91 -0.887 -4.45
theta3_108 0.732 2.22
theta3_112 0.837 2.45
theta3_130 -0.735 -3.51
theta3_131 0.880 4.74
theta3_162 0.670 3.40
theta3_189 0.719 3.44
theta3_193 -0.517 -1.38
theta3_204 1.183 10.61
theta3_212 0.744 4.79
theta3_213 0.801 7.54
theta3_216 0.815 3.32
theta3_225 0.648 4.44
theta3_227 1.100 7.10
theta3_261 0.854 3.42
theta3_280 0.632 3.21
theta3_282 -0.371 -0.88
theta3_310 1.239 15.51
theta3_326 -0.993 -2.53
theta4_316 2.390 0.52
theta5_52 1.184 2.73
theta5_70 -0.912 -3.04
theta5_79 1.375 5.47
theta5_117 1.192 7.50
theta5_119 1.324 4.44
theta5_141 -1.251 -4.22
theta5_156 -1.642 -3.93
theta5_161 -1.136 -5.12
theta5_173 1.146 1.90
theta5_186 1.287 2.80
theta5_188 1.194 5.94
theta5_189 1.404 9.01
theta5_194 1.267 3.55
theta5_198 1.064 7.44
theta5_272 1.053 3.13
theta5_282 1.285 4.45
theta5_291 -1.317 -3.07
theta5_296 -1.025 -3.17
theta5_316 -1.432 -0.58
theta5_326 1.363 6.10
theta5_328 1.357 9.12
theta5_333 1.675 6.61
theta5_335 1.710 7.71
theta6_16 0.766 5.03
theta6_17 -0.755 -3.59
theta6_44 1.084 8.48
theta6_45 0.846 4.26
theta6_50 1.131 4.58
theta6_52 1.106 5.67
theta6_80 -0.665 -2.13
theta6_81 -0.935 -2.80
theta6_84 -0.609 -4.02
theta6_89 0.851 9.19
theta6_124 1.358 9.18
theta6_167 0.991 2.56
theta6_190 -0.656 -5.14
theta6_247 1.258 3.34
theta6_284 1.197 5.90
theta6_290 0.855 2.30
theta6_317 -1.163 -6.08
theta6_324 0.790 6.94
theta6_328 -0.911 -3.25
theta7_5 0.546 3.76
theta7_55 -0.467 -2.19
theta7_57 -0.581 -1.80
theta7_78 0.853 8.31
theta7_81 0.529 2.95
theta7_83 0.613 3.11
theta7_91 1.325 14.55
theta7_129 0.671 4.11
theta7_130 -0.577 -1.69
theta7_131 -0.449 -2.15
theta7_140 -0.491 -1.83
theta7_158 0.872 4.76
theta7_160 -0.583 -1.63
theta7_176 -0.549 -2.96
theta7_185 0.605 2.67
theta7_187 0.592 3.59
theta7_189 0.615 4.40
theta7_198 0.551 3.81
theta7_217 -0.545 -1.10
theta7_218 -0.743 -2.38
theta7_229 0.534 8.59
theta7_239 0.873 12.42
theta7_250 0.655 6.03
theta7_260 -0.629 -1.77
theta7_263 0.633 3.96
theta7_271 -0.412 -1.73
theta7_281 0.858 5.63
theta7_283 1.249 16.26
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theta7_286 -0.452 -3.63
theta7_296 -0.648 -2.15
theta7_329 -0.668 -2.16
theta9_3 1.252 6.46
theta9_54 0.832 4.17
theta9_57 0.787 2.10
theta9_77 -0.586 -1.93
theta9_80 -0.448 -1.20
theta9_84 0.999 2.02
theta9_131 1.421 9.04
theta9_147 0.940 3.53
theta9_161 0.777 5.64
theta9_194 -0.666 -7.50
theta9_225 -0.861 -2.89
theta9_247 -0.752 -5.15
theta9_252 1.457 4.95
theta9_261 1.032 3.69
theta9_267 -0.948 -1.93
theta9_282 1.831 7.00
theta9_305 -0.851 -2.59
theta9_319 -0.737 -1.50
theta9_330 -0.990 -3.67
theta9_336 1.083 7.65
theta10_48 0.435 5.06
theta10_51 -0.492 -2.77
theta10_55 -0.466 -3.09
theta10_57 -0.491 -3.68
theta10_129 0.381 1.08
theta10_131 0.711 11.90
theta10_159 0.419 5.21
theta10_173 0.408 3.40
theta10_176 0.533 10.83
theta10_189 -0.483 -1.72
theta10_193 0.504 2.65
theta10_218 0.526 8.80
theta10_253 -0.379 -2.85
theta10_282 -0.337 -1.90
theta10_285 0.455 5.00
theta10_288 -0.265 -1.98
theta10_291 0.703 4.64
theta10_300 -0.348 -3.87
theta10_301 0.487 5.41
theta10_309 0.645 7.14
theta10_310 0.678 8.88
theta10_313 0.557 3.78
theta10_314 0.504 2.71
theta10_315 0.851 9.23
theta10_317 0.546 4.52
theta10_319 0.603 5.74
theta10_324 -0.442 -2.41
theta10_325 0.790 8.69
theta10_326 -0.748 -3.94
theta10_331 0.662 6.47
theta11_24 -1.212 -11.67
theta11_47 -1.294 -0.79
theta11_55 0.959 1.37
theta11_72 1.132 3.63
theta11_75 -1.267 -2.08
theta11_80 2.360 6.11
theta11_105 1.655 4.56
theta11_121 1.151 2.61
theta11_126 1.739 5.47
theta11_129 -1.306 -0.91
theta11_140 -1.998 -2.62
theta11_156 -2.265 -3.63
theta11_160 -1.238 -2.28
theta11_171 1.404 3.82
theta11_182 -1.224 -5.33
theta11_203 -0.957 -2.14
theta11_217 2.247 7.52
theta11_246 1.520 6.92
theta11_259 1.104 8.33
theta11_262 -1.070 -0.96
theta11_276 1.348 4.81
theta11_277 0.901 1.70
theta11_287 -1.028 -1.29
theta11_288 -1.420 -3.44
theta11_289 -1.351 -1.71
theta11_290 -1.206 -1.18
theta11_291 -1.713 -2.66
theta11_293 -1.331 -2.14
theta11_305 -1.586 -2.86
theta11_309 0.482 1.13
theta11_316 0.801 0.19
theta11_318 -1.432 -5.57
theta11_322 -1.592 -2.89
theta12_46 2.696 8.64
theta12_57 -1.560 -3.57
theta12_70 1.853 5.92
theta12_77 2.207 6.33
theta12_78 2.558 6.02
theta12_79 2.068 10.00
theta12_80 2.939 9.59
theta12_83 -1.785 -2.81
theta12_91 2.593 6.40
theta12_114 1.580 2.94
theta12_117 -1.595 -3.92
theta12_120 1.508 6.17
theta12_144 -1.569 -3.27
theta12_156 0.345 1.56
theta12_157 1.929 13.40
theta12_158 -0.859 -1.53
theta12_160 0.898 2.23
theta12_175 1.843 6.60
  171
theta12_184 1.514 4.84
theta12_194 2.374 7.37
theta12_237 1.602 4.59
theta12_239 3.121 10.04
theta12_247 1.458 5.43
theta12_261 -1.121 -3.74
theta12_271 2.389 7.35
theta12_282 -2.075 -4.07
theta12_291 -1.676 -3.69
theta12_294 -1.859 -4.45
theta12_309 -4.687 -10.67
theta12_315 -0.584 -1.07
theta12_331 -1.856 -8.96
theta12_332 -1.679 -5.47
theta12_333 -2.715 -6.09
theta12_335 -1.456 -2.20
theta12_336 -0.823 -0.59
Table D. 8. Step 2.3: Model 4 estimates with 
the sector 0 significant fixed effects found in 
step 1.3 and the other effects found in step 
1.2
Estimate t-value
theta0_124 1.364 2.33
theta0_137 1.901 3.33
theta0_149 2.528 1.94
theta0_15 1.173 1.81
theta0_156 -0.383 -0.57
theta0_160 2.437 2.64
theta0_161 0.837 1.36
theta0_176 2.345 2.65
theta0_189 2.071 1.89
theta0_203 1.811 1.60
theta0_21 1.643 2.19
theta0_216 1.682 1.55
theta0_227 1.508 2.40
theta0_245 2.142 1.89
theta0_247 2.243 1.65
theta0_266 1.676 2.64
theta0_333 2.053 2.91
theta0_38 3.127 2.60
theta0_39 1.901 1.98
theta0_49 1.601 3.24
theta0_55 1.319 0.81
theta0_57 2.602 1.05
theta0_61 1.990 3.49
theta0_65 2.535 3.42
theta0_70 1.952 1.63
theta0_77 4.432 4.21
theta0_81 3.545 4.48
theta0_82 1.999 3.32
theta0_83 2.132 2.02
theta0_9 3.619 3.27
theta1_49 2.627 5.95
theta1_77 2.541 4.25
theta1_129 -2.216 -1.69
theta1_161 -2.893 -5.06
theta1_292 2.520 5.25
theta1_293 1.870 4.31
theta1_296 2.176 3.08
theta1_315 3.469 6.06
theta1_316 2.067 0.57
theta1_321 2.108 4.46
theta3_69 -0.717 -1.27
theta3_91 -0.906 -4.30
theta3_108 0.730 2.25
theta3_112 0.838 2.32
theta3_130 -0.733 -3.59
theta3_131 0.873 4.50
theta3_162 0.670 3.37
theta3_189 0.691 2.30
theta3_193 -0.528 -1.40
theta3_204 1.188 10.69
theta3_212 0.744 4.76
theta3_213 0.807 7.57
theta3_216 0.809 2.08
theta3_225 0.667 4.54
theta3_227 1.092 4.91
theta3_261 0.848 3.40
theta3_280 0.635 3.18
theta3_282 -0.377 -0.84
theta3_310 1.239 15.43
theta3_326 -0.987 -2.49
theta4_316 2.421 0.52
theta5_52 1.178 2.67
theta5_70 -0.873 -2.11
theta5_79 1.366 5.41
theta5_117 1.182 7.45
theta5_119 1.317 4.36
theta5_141 -1.246 -4.22
theta5_156 -1.623 -3.38
theta5_161 -1.132 -4.17
theta5_173 1.142 1.84
theta5_186 1.280 2.75
theta5_188 1.187 5.87
theta5_189 1.448 4.51
theta5_194 1.261 3.47
theta5_198 1.059 7.28
theta5_272 1.049 3.11
theta5_282 1.241 4.25
theta5_291 -1.327 -3.00
theta5_296 -1.030 -3.14
theta5_316 -1.447 -0.57
theta5_326 1.369 6.01
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theta5_328 1.340 8.99
theta5_333 1.660 6.02
theta5_335 1.684 7.14
theta6_16 0.767 5.07
theta6_17 -0.764 -3.62
theta6_44 1.086 8.50
theta6_45 0.851 4.31
theta6_50 1.134 4.72
theta6_52 1.112 5.67
theta6_80 -0.661 -2.09
theta6_81 -0.955 -2.21
theta6_84 -0.600 -3.98
theta6_89 0.855 9.25
theta6_124 1.342 8.77
theta6_167 0.981 2.46
theta6_190 -0.661 -5.22
theta6_247 1.239 2.78
theta6_284 1.197 5.94
theta6_290 0.848 2.29
theta6_317 -1.164 -6.14
theta6_324 0.802 7.02
theta6_328 -0.887 -3.19
theta7_5 0.553 3.81
theta7_55 -0.473 -0.87
theta7_57 -0.592 -1.63
theta7_78 0.853 8.32
theta7_81 0.525 2.64
theta7_83 0.606 3.05
theta7_91 1.338 14.63
theta7_129 0.680 4.03
theta7_130 -0.575 -1.70
theta7_131 -0.434 -2.00
theta7_140 -0.480 -1.76
theta7_158 0.877 4.71
theta7_160 -0.560 -1.35
theta7_176 -0.547 -2.40
theta7_185 0.609 2.68
theta7_187 0.593 3.60
theta7_189 0.597 2.03
theta7_198 0.558 3.82
theta7_217 -0.545 -1.09
theta7_218 -0.733 -2.28
theta7_229 0.541 8.67
theta7_239 0.883 12.61
theta7_250 0.655 6.04
theta7_260 -0.630 -1.77
theta7_263 0.647 4.08
theta7_271 -0.407 -1.71
theta7_281 0.861 5.64
theta7_283 1.248 16.32
theta7_286 -0.450 -3.60
theta7_296 -0.638 -2.10
theta7_329 -0.674 -2.16
theta9_3 1.240 6.45
theta9_54 0.822 4.16
theta9_57 0.894 2.32
theta9_77 -0.428 -1.40
theta9_80 -0.465 -1.23
theta9_84 0.997 2.03
theta9_131 1.409 8.98
theta9_147 0.932 3.51
theta9_161 0.767 4.81
theta9_194 -0.678 -7.65
theta9_225 -0.866 -2.95
theta9_247 -0.710 -4.19
theta9_252 1.450 4.97
theta9_261 1.024 3.68
theta9_267 -0.951 -1.93
theta9_282 1.752 6.49
theta9_305 -0.866 -2.61
theta9_319 -0.736 -1.49
theta9_330 -0.992 -3.69
theta9_336 1.083 7.69
theta10_48 0.430 5.05
theta10_51 -0.493 -2.82
theta10_55 -0.457 -2.95
theta10_57 -0.468 -2.98
theta10_129 0.378 1.03
theta10_131 0.700 11.52
theta10_159 0.423 5.30
theta10_173 0.408 3.39
theta10_176 0.563 11.42
theta10_189 -0.481 -1.34
theta10_193 0.503 2.65
theta10_218 0.535 8.91
theta10_253 -0.370 -2.80
theta10_282 -0.344 -1.91
theta10_285 0.454 4.97
theta10_288 -0.271 -2.06
theta10_291 0.693 4.63
theta10_300 -0.353 -3.97
theta10_301 0.478 5.32
theta10_309 0.641 7.13
theta10_310 0.673 8.90
theta10_313 0.562 3.84
theta10_314 0.508 2.67
theta10_315 0.854 9.29
theta10_317 0.542 4.52
theta10_319 0.598 5.69
theta10_324 -0.446 -2.45
theta10_325 0.790 8.66
theta10_326 -0.757 -3.97
theta10_331 0.657 6.46
theta11_24 -1.216 -11.66
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theta11_47 -1.299 -0.82
theta11_55 0.974 0.94
theta11_72 1.132 3.59
theta11_75 -1.272 -2.04
theta11_80 2.341 5.97
theta11_105 1.646 4.53
theta11_121 1.149 2.59
theta11_126 1.739 5.48
theta11_129 -1.309 -0.90
theta11_140 -1.997 -2.49
theta11_156 -2.240 -3.51
theta11_160 -1.209 -2.22
theta11_171 1.400 3.75
theta11_182 -1.225 -5.30
theta11_203 -0.945 -1.83
theta11_217 2.238 7.42
theta11_246 1.515 6.91
theta11_259 1.100 8.27
theta11_262 -1.073 -0.96
theta11_276 1.341 4.80
theta11_277 0.911 1.72
theta11_287 -1.019 -1.26
theta11_288 -1.416 -3.43
theta11_289 -1.350 -1.61
theta11_290 -1.210 -1.16
theta11_291 -1.710 -2.54
theta11_293 -1.330 -2.08
theta11_305 -1.607 -2.81
theta11_309 0.454 1.05
theta11_316 0.754 0.18
theta11_318 -1.424 -5.54
theta11_322 -1.606 -2.93
theta12_46 2.691 8.65
theta12_57 -1.321 -3.00
theta12_70 1.993 4.02
theta12_77 2.691 6.21
theta12_78 2.554 5.98
theta12_79 2.062 9.94
theta12_80 2.905 9.34
theta12_83 -1.693 -2.65
theta12_91 2.627 6.40
theta12_114 1.579 2.94
theta12_117 -1.609 -3.94
theta12_120 1.519 6.23
theta12_144 -1.559 -3.25
theta12_156 0.363 1.33
theta12_157 1.934 13.39
theta12_158 -0.893 -1.58
theta12_160 0.844 1.89
theta12_175 1.816 6.44
theta12_184 1.509 4.82
theta12_194 2.357 7.26
theta12_237 1.612 4.60
theta12_239 3.082 9.81
theta12_247 1.612 3.28
theta12_261 -1.134 -3.75
theta12_271 2.376 7.29
theta12_282 -2.165 -4.14
theta12_291 -1.679 -3.61
theta12_294 -1.875 -4.44
theta12_309 -4.712 -10.75
theta12_315 -0.613 -1.12
theta12_331 -1.865 -8.96
theta12_332 -1.706 -5.47
theta12_333 -2.727 -6.18
theta12_335 -1.461 -2.18
theta12_336 -0.830 -0.59
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Table D. 9. Step 2.4: Model 4 estimates with 
all significant fixed effects found in step 1.3
Estimate t-value
theta0_124 1.738 1.33
theta0_137 1.973 3.13
theta0_149 2.446 1.8
theta0_15 1.364 1.77
theta0_156 1.282 1.45
theta0_160 4.317 1.82
theta0_161 2.547 4.46
theta0_176 1.739 1.41
theta0_189 1.192 1.16
theta0_203 1.987 1.38
theta0_21 1.777 2.21
theta0_216 1.817 1.2
theta0_227 1.590 1.89
theta0_245 1.965 1.75
theta0_247 2.832 1.49
theta0_266 0.705 0.47
theta0_333 2.965 0.82
theta0_38 3.393 2.77
theta0_39 2.142 2.1
theta0_49 1.425 2.61
theta0_55 0.484 0.56
theta0_57 2.872 1.74
theta0_61 2.279 3.85
theta0_65 2.556 3.39
theta0_70 1.668 0.57
theta0_77 4.979 4.83
theta0_81 2.598 4.26
theta0_82 1.461 2.32
theta0_83 2.758 2.33
theta0_9 3.572 2.89
theta1_11 0.673 2.05
theta1_124 0.770 1.05
theta1_131 2.516 7.03
theta1_140 1.278 3.66
theta1_158 1.425 2.79
theta1_170 0.358 1.7
theta1_22 1.118 3.81
theta1_234 0.789 2.19
theta1_242 1.006 2.44
theta1_246 1.723 3.96
theta1_253 1.775 6.59
theta1_277 1.027 2.05
theta1_286 1.356 2.75
theta1_288 1.370 3.11
theta1_289 1.169 3.25
theta1_290 1.111 1.49
theta1_291 2.289 6.37
theta1_292 3.069 7.08
theta1_293 2.920 4.6
theta1_294 1.946 8.17
theta1_296 3.531 6.51
theta1_297 1.695 5.88
theta1_300 0.858 1.84
theta1_305 1.639 4.19
theta1_309 2.531 4.52
theta1_315 3.571 8.02
theta1_321 2.834 5.89
theta1_331 2.806 3.51
theta1_332 1.210 3.14
theta1_333 2.316 3
theta1_47 0.624 1.69
theta1_49 2.824 5.6
theta1_60 1.061 3.39
theta1_77 2.815 6.77
theta1_80 1.628 3.53
theta1_90 1.569 3.61
theta1_91 2.347 5.2
theta2_110 1.295 3.44
theta2_120 2.150 6.71
theta2_124 0.934 2.2
theta2_129 1.251 2.44
theta2_138 0.495 1.54
theta2_141 1.499 5.06
theta2_160 2.253 5.55
theta2_161 1.751 2.27
theta2_176 1.124 2.18
theta2_197 0.950 2.27
theta2_198 1.612 2.45
theta2_200 1.467 6.86
theta2_229 1.580 2.16
theta2_239 1.746 4.51
theta2_246 1.231 5.84
theta2_247 1.682 5.78
theta2_266 1.407 2.57
theta2_270 1.357 2.7
theta2_275 1.480 3.63
theta2_281 1.838 5.01
theta2_288 1.692 4.6
theta2_291 2.690 6.84
theta2_308 1.828 1.64
theta2_311 1.923 7.51
theta2_321 2.871 3.47
theta2_326 2.869 5.69
theta2_330 2.730 7.14
theta2_334 1.591 3.64
theta2_43 1.410 2.7
theta2_54 1.261 3.87
theta2_55 1.035 2.61
theta2_58 1.148 2.41
theta2_72 1.459 3.82
theta2_88 1.844 7.63
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theta2_90 0.971 2.55
theta3_108 0.718 2.27
theta3_112 0.827 2.72
theta3_121 0.692 3.64
theta3_131 1.358 7.47
theta3_156 0.549 1.99
theta3_162 0.694 2.84
theta3_189 0.841 3.9
theta3_19 0.606 7.75
theta3_191 0.497 0.98
theta3_204 1.238 13.03
theta3_212 0.688 3.16
theta3_213 0.824 8.48
theta3_216 0.830 2.57
theta3_225 0.808 2.57
theta3_227 1.120 5.42
theta3_229 0.417 1.54
theta3_23 0.428 3.19
theta3_230 0.593 8.18
theta3_238 0.646 5.39
theta3_24 0.339 2.49
theta3_261 0.918 3.05
theta3_269 0.584 6.1
theta3_279 0.369 1.82
theta3_280 0.701 4.13
theta3_283 0.526 2.21
theta3_285 0.454 4.56
theta3_292 0.622 5.54
theta3_293 0.571 3.04
theta3_295 0.242 3.28
theta3_309 0.942 9.92
theta3_310 1.420 19.99
theta3_328 0.463 2.84
theta3_334 0.542 2.4
theta3_52 0.559 3.4
theta3_67 0.220 4.66
theta3_72 0.669 14.49
theta3_96 0.664 2.37
theta4_116 1.364 2.82
theta4_136 0.963 3.77
theta4_14 0.616 1.51
theta4_145 0.857 3.17
theta4_151 0.706 2.76
theta4_153 1.479 4.72
theta4_155 0.819 4.08
theta4_159 1.276 5.79
theta4_160 1.381 3.19
theta4_162 1.265 2.41
theta4_181 0.790 2.24
theta4_182 1.678 9.35
theta4_183 0.885 4.97
theta4_191 1.136 1.56
theta4_212 1.160 6.18
theta4_221 0.873 3.26
theta4_222 0.502 2.87
theta4_225 1.419 2.34
theta4_227 0.458 1.29
theta4_229 1.156 1.67
theta4_247 0.954 2
theta4_248 0.662 1.64
theta4_262 0.795 2.61
theta4_264 0.829 2.02
theta4_276 0.580 2.61
theta4_296 1.476 2.51
theta4_30 0.809 2.6
theta4_317 0.867 1.02
theta4_32 0.424 2.91
theta4_321 1.544 2.43
theta4_326 1.045 1.71
theta4_329 1.779 3.39
theta4_33 0.319 1.34
theta4_332 1.587 2.9
theta4_335 1.299 1.98
theta4_42 0.450 1.18
theta4_6 0.260 1.37
theta5_116 1.188 6.35
theta5_117 1.285 10.04
theta5_118 0.724 2.29
theta5_119 1.280 5.13
theta5_13 0.796 4
theta5_173 1.164 2.01
theta5_186 1.280 3.2
theta5_188 1.159 6.69
theta5_189 1.500 7.15
theta5_194 1.309 4.55
theta5_198 1.227 1.99
theta5_216 0.561 2.27
theta5_217 0.850 4.79
theta5_218 0.684 2.52
theta5_225 0.950 1.81
theta5_240 0.584 4.27
theta5_25 0.481 2.7
theta5_261 0.668 1.96
theta5_264 0.695 2.2
theta5_268 0.796 4.36
theta5_270 0.660 3.84
theta5_272 1.165 3.5
theta5_273 0.978 4.64
theta5_279 0.676 3.64
theta5_281 1.063 4.45
theta5_282 1.468 12.92
theta5_292 0.787 4.9
theta5_293 0.761 3.59
theta5_294 1.046 8.11
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theta5_298 1.038 7.61
theta5_299 0.397 4.47
theta5_317 0.681 1.36
theta5_318 1.011 4.12
theta5_320 0.880 4.74
theta5_326 1.954 13.77
theta5_327 0.725 5.73
theta5_328 1.383 11.73
theta5_333 1.940 2.11
theta5_334 1.281 3.82
theta5_335 1.647 8.66
theta5_43 0.917 6.87
theta5_50 1.044 3.46
theta5_52 1.210 2.82
theta5_71 0.656 6.01
theta5_79 1.345 6.52
theta6_100 0.624 2.97
theta6_104 0.410 3.48
theta6_108 0.596 4.3
theta6_124 1.279 7.69
theta6_126 0.486 3.44
theta6_131 0.643 3.97
theta6_16 0.832 6.06
theta6_167 1.054 2.98
theta6_171 0.769 3.61
theta6_176 0.362 1.32
theta6_199 0.755 5.57
theta6_2 0.787 2.48
theta6_225 0.481 1.75
theta6_230 0.697 3.22
theta6_247 1.240 2.21
theta6_278 0.448 3.01
theta6_284 1.322 8.48
theta6_287 0.445 2.22
theta6_290 0.955 3.7
theta6_291 0.156 1.19
theta6_294 0.645 2.41
theta6_324 1.122 8.28
theta6_329 0.646 3.44
theta6_331 0.852 1.89
theta6_333 0.594 1.02
theta6_37 0.718 3.01
theta6_43 0.883 4.65
theta6_44 1.248 8.68
theta6_45 0.889 5.02
theta6_49 0.607 2.44
theta6_50 1.409 4.53
theta6_52 1.265 6.43
theta6_55 0.611 6.64
theta6_59 0.774 2.68
theta6_70 0.487 1.65
theta6_89 0.914 10.85
theta6_96 0.592 2.4
theta7_10 0.521 2.29
theta7_115 0.438 4.07
theta7_119 0.473 4.32
theta7_129 0.816 10.11
theta7_137 0.502 2.51
theta7_14 0.517 1.49
theta7_142 0.546 3.41
theta7_15 0.517 2.89
theta7_158 1.011 5.32
theta7_174 0.476 4.97
theta7_185 0.659 2.92
theta7_186 0.264 2.45
theta7_187 0.612 3.83
theta7_189 0.712 2.79
theta7_191 0.410 1.03
theta7_198 0.673 4.45
theta7_229 0.654 4.41
theta7_239 1.004 10.77
theta7_243 0.526 2.92
theta7_250 0.741 7.09
theta7_263 0.755 4.84
theta7_266 0.617 3.95
theta7_27 0.408 2.98
theta7_281 0.895 2.68
theta7_283 1.280 15.72
theta7_309 0.568 5.26
theta7_323 0.611 4.25
theta7_324 0.218 1.55
theta7_331 0.476 1.42
theta7_335 0.244 2.09
theta7_5 0.612 4.15
theta7_59 0.345 3.94
theta7_70 0.509 2
theta7_78 0.892 8.96
theta7_81 0.694 3.51
theta7_83 0.687 3.18
theta7_91 1.435 10.75
theta7_93 0.468 3.04
theta8_125 4.221 5.02
theta8_140 1.924 2.76
theta8_141 3.924 3.54
theta8_180 1.600 1.71
theta8_184 3.778 8.31
theta8_191 3.410 1.83
theta8_192 2.212 5.85
theta8_203 3.451 4.2
theta8_210 4.406 10.76
theta8_225 3.321 4.43
theta8_233 2.650 2.93
theta8_254 2.184 4
theta8_257 1.344 1.93
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theta8_266 2.985 6.09
theta8_268 2.948 2.08
theta8_271 2.752 4.46
theta8_281 5.636 5.54
theta8_282 5.740 9.5
theta8_288 4.187 4.45
theta8_289 2.215 2.24
theta8_300 2.538 2.76
theta8_302 2.035 2.89
theta8_304 1.632 3.85
theta8_306 2.339 4.44
theta8_308 3.811 4.35
theta8_309 1.845 1.87
theta8_312 1.482 0.98
theta8_314 3.458 4.18
theta8_324 3.000 3.38
theta8_331 5.235 8.93
theta8_44 3.560 4.81
theta8_48 3.141 3.06
theta8_69 2.149 4.27
theta8_75 2.081 3.24
theta9_10 0.350 1.01
theta9_118 0.595 5.01
theta9_120 0.928 6.57
theta9_131 1.558 8.97
theta9_135 0.559 2.84
theta9_144 0.763 6.03
theta9_147 0.827 3.36
theta9_153 0.604 3.14
theta9_156 1.096 9.05
theta9_160 1.741 3.7
theta9_161 1.388 7.89
theta9_162 0.572 1.71
theta9_174 0.484 2.32
theta9_190 0.339 2.12
theta9_192 0.801 3.12
theta9_2 0.487 1.39
theta9_202 0.562 1.95
theta9_218 0.775 4.15
theta9_229 0.654 2.2
theta9_230 0.691 1.48
theta9_252 1.528 5.58
theta9_261 1.160 3.14
theta9_275 1.099 5.06
theta9_277 0.609 1.93
theta9_282 2.279 12.36
theta9_293 0.918 1.89
theta9_296 1.123 10.29
theta9_3 1.251 6.68
theta9_50 0.567 2.19
theta9_54 1.027 5.66
theta9_57 1.124 6.77
theta9_59 0.834 3.54
theta9_83 0.538 1.47
theta9_84 1.048 2.81
theta9_91 0.794 5.62
theta9_95 0.686 3.1
theta9_99 0.783 2.8
theta9_329 0.679 3.66
theta9_331 1.149 5.34
theta9_333 0.932 2.05
theta9_336 1.248 10.6
theta10_129 0.510 2.54
theta10_131 0.888 13.47
theta10_135 0.383 4.05
theta10_140 0.346 5.29
theta10_146 0.209 2.19
theta10_159 0.434 4.98
theta10_161 0.287 3.05
theta10_173 0.430 3.3
theta10_176 0.542 10.5
theta10_181 0.252 1.97
theta10_191 0.344 4.64
theta10_193 0.496 2.73
theta10_195 0.375 4.06
theta10_198 0.219 1.03
theta10_203 0.480 2.86
theta10_215 0.377 6.99
theta10_218 0.591 9.85
theta10_220 0.323 4.69
theta10_226 0.304 3.14
theta10_271 0.323 5.23
theta10_285 0.465 4.64
theta10_287 0.346 3.42
theta10_289 0.636 9.1
theta10_291 0.933 8.04
theta10_299 0.255 2.38
theta10_301 0.589 5.56
theta10_309 0.915 9.72
theta10_310 0.745 9.95
theta10_313 0.589 4.1
theta10_314 0.599 3
theta10_315 0.923 11.34
theta10_317 0.558 3.68
theta10_319 0.759 8.83
theta10_320 0.240 3.06
theta10_325 0.764 8.08
theta10_331 0.992 7.81
theta10_332 0.442 5.11
theta10_48 0.514 5.68
theta11_105 1.685 3.78
theta11_121 1.364 2.51
theta11_126 1.813 3.88
theta11_128 0.866 5.81
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theta11_130 1.051 4.72
theta11_138 1.109 3.15
theta11_171 1.430 3.1
theta11_18 0.958 2.42
theta11_217 2.482 3.76
theta11_241 0.764 2.78
theta11_246 1.749 4.88
theta11_259 1.191 7.32
theta11_267 0.633 2.37
theta11_276 1.325 3.59
theta11_294 1.122 3.21
theta11_30 1.077 1.88
theta11_309 0.956 1.42
theta11_312 0.902 0.86
theta11_332 0.681 1.07
theta11_54 0.941 2.22
theta11_59 0.922 1.77
theta11_70 0.938 1.9
theta11_72 1.469 3.44
theta11_80 2.652 5.84
theta11_94 0.986 3.15
theta12_114 1.503 2.76
theta12_116 1.643 4.75
theta12_12 1.092 4.51
theta12_120 2.316 8.59
theta12_130 1.023 4.63
theta12_156 2.086 8.57
theta12_157 2.113 14.09
theta12_160 3.172 3.43
theta12_175 1.646 5.47
theta12_18 0.729 2.26
theta12_184 1.676 4.27
theta12_194 2.967 8.66
theta12_217 1.533 1.63
theta12_237 1.540 4.25
theta12_239 3.363 9.86
theta12_247 2.459 4.38
theta12_266 1.022 1.88
theta12_271 2.682 3.98
theta12_272 1.141 4.02
theta12_275 1.762 4.97
theta12_296 2.514 6.65
theta12_301 1.193 2.42
theta12_305 1.205 2.79
theta12_320 0.772 1.6
theta12_46 2.620 7.88
theta12_49 1.309 2.72
theta12_70 2.491 1.2
theta12_72 1.591 2.78
theta12_77 3.496 9.82
theta12_78 2.642 5.91
theta12_79 2.256 10.2
theta12_80 3.751 16.31
theta12_81 1.936 4.3
theta12_91 3.766 7.51
theta12_92 0.656 2.31
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Table D.10. Additional significant fixed effects revealed in step 3 of estimating Model 4 where 
each municipality is tested in 12 service sectors simultaneously conditioning on the effects 
found to be significant in step 1.1 
Service sector Municipality name Municipality number
1. Administration
Moskenes
Nordkapp 18742019
2. Primary schools none none
3. Other education
Risør
Masfjorden"
Sør-Aurdal"
0901
1266
0540
4. Child care none none
5. Health care
Åmli
Snillfjord"
Tjeldsund"
0929
1613
1852
6. Social services
Valle 
Kristiansand"
Fredrikstad"
0940
1001
0106
7. Child protection StrandaTjeldsund"
1525
1852
8. Care for the elderly and disabled none none
9. Culture SuldalBardu"
1134
1922
10. Municipal roads
Åmli
Odda"
Vefsn"
Dyrøy"
0929
1228
1824
1926
11. Water supply and sanitation VevelstadRingerike"
1816
0605
12. Other infrastructure
Sauda
Askøy "
Nore og Uvdal
1135
1247
0633
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Table D.11. Model 4 parameter estimates where step 3 was carried out in 12 sectors 
simultaneously
Sector Parameter Estimate t-value 
Budget surplus Intercept -2.340 -
Growth in municipality incomes 0.556 25.15
Administration Intercept 1.411 17.92
Inverse population size 4.390 29.10
Index of farming industry 5.463 6.87
Primary schools Intercept -0.917 -3.61
Population share 6-12 years of age 54.939 19.77
Population share 13-15 years of age 70.270 13.13
Distance to centre of municipal sub-district 1.691 31.58
Inverse population size 2.510 14.12
Other education Intercept 0.463 10.44
Share of fulltime working women 20-44 years 5.373 8.90
Refugees with integration grants 33.241 25.80
Child care Intercept 1.114 6.56
Population share 1-5 years of age 0.440 0.16
Share of fulltime working women 20-44 years 22.329 13.97
Health care Intercept 0.601 13.77
Distance to centre of municipal sub-district 0.357 13.27
Inverse population size 1.823 22.13
Social services Intercept -0.317 -5.25
Refugees with integration grants 52.401 30.81
Refugees without integration grants 3.475 2.39
Share of divorced/ separated 16-59 years 11.383 12.81
Unemployed 16-59 years share of total population 13.654 7.98
Number of poor share of total population 6.534 6.72
Share of disablement pensioners 18-49 years 8.978 4.74
Child protection Intercept 0.248 5.53
Share of children 0-15 years with single mother/ father 14.738 13.49
Number of poor share of total population 4.875 6.79
Care for the Intercept 1.068 4.49
elderly and Population share 67-79 years of age 30.925 9.16
disabled Population share 80-89 years of age 66.160 11.93
Population share 90 years and above 203.886 12.91
High-cost recipients share of total population 739.977 13.17
Share of mentally disabled 16 years and above without grant 222.763 11.47
Share of mentally disabled 16 years and above  with grant 505.276 16.33
Distance to centre of municipal sub-district 0.795 8.55
Inverse population size 2.117 8.17
Culture Intercept 0.614 15.70
Inverse population size 0.451 6.23
Municipal roads Intercept 0.021 1.13
Amount of snowfall 0.065 14.73
Kilometers of municipal roads 25.190 36.26
Water supply Intercept 1.000 21.85
and sanitation Capacity of advanced purification 0.585 19.71
Inverse population size 0.423 3.67
Other infrastructure Intercept 0.799 9.89
Inverse population size 1.573 10.57
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Table D.12. Effects on the marginal budget shares in Model 4 with municipality effects included 
in 12 service sectors
Sector Explanatory variable Estimate t-value
1. Administration Constant 0.184 20.65
Average education -0.027 -10.09
Share of socialists 0.001 0.14
Share of residents in a densely populated area 0.004 0.71
2. Primary schools Constant 0.167 18.18
Average education -0.024 -7.78
Share of socialists -0.001 -0.07
Share of residents in a densely populated area 0.002 0.29
3. Other education Constant -0.014 -4.56
Average education 0.007 6.56
Share of socialists 0.017 5.55
Share of residents in a densely populated area 0.008 4.02
4. Child care Constant -0.060 -6.89
Average education 0.050 17.70
Share of socialists -0.018 -1.91
Share of residents in a densely populated area -0.023 -4.22
5. Health care Constant 0.072 13.53
Average education -0.005 -3.27
Share of socialists 0.006 1.41
Share of residents in a densely populated area 0.002 0.81
6. Social assistance Constant -0.009 -2.40
Average education 0.004 3.07
Share of socialists 0.012 3.23
Share of residents in a densely populated area 0.016 5.52
7. Child protection Constant 0.001 0.33
Average education 0.003 2.97
Share of socialists -0.007 -2.40
Share of residents in a densely populated area 0.016 9.14
8. Care for the elderly and disabled Constant 0.245 14.75
Average education -0.019 -3.41
Share of socialists 0.007 0.54
Share of residents in a densely populated area -0.005 -0.65
9. Culture Constant 0.058 14.08
Average education 0.001 1.08
Share of socialists -0.000 -0.08
Share of residents in a densely populated area 0.012 4.55
10. Municipal roads Constant 0.017 6.93
Average education -0.001 -0.95
Share of socialists -0.010 -4.67
Share of residents in a densely populated area 0.013 9.42
11. Water supply and sanitation Constant 0.045 6.75
Average education -0.003 -1.72
Share of socialists -0.012 -1.87
Share of residents in a densely populated area 0.017 4.15
12. Other infrastructure Constant 0.123 14.74
Average education 0.003 1.04
Share of socialists 0.033 4.72
Share of residents in a densely populated area -0.041 -7.75
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Appendix E  Economic regions and region fixed effects
Table E.1. Labour market regions
Labour market region Region number
ØST-NORGE
1 Sør-Østfold 11
2 Oslo 12
3 Vestfold 13
4 Kongsberg 14
5 Hallingdal 15
6 Valdres 21
7 Gudbrandsdalen 22
8 Lillehammer 23
9 Gjøvik 24
10 Hamar 25
11 Kongsvinger 26
12 Elverum 27
13 Tynset/Røros 28
SØR-NORGE
14 Nordvest-Telemark 31
15 Øst-Telemark 32
16 Sør-Telemark 33
17 Arendal 34
18 Kristiansand 35
19 Lister 36
VEST-NORGE
20 Stavanger 41
21 Haugesund 42
22 Sunnhordland 43
23 Bergen 44
24 Sunnfjord (Førde/Florø) 51
25 Sognefjord (Sogndal/Årdal) 52
26 Nordfjord 53
27 Søndre Sunnmøre 54
28 Ålesund 55
29 Molde 56
30 Nordmøre 57
31 Kristiansund 58
MIDT-NORGE
32 Trondheim 61
33 Midt-Trøndelag 62
34 Namsos 63
35 Ytre Helgeland 64
36 Indre Helgeland 65
NORD-NORGE
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37 Bodø 71
38 Narvik 72
39 Vesterålen 73
40 Lofoten 74
41 Harstad 75
42 Midt-Troms 76
43 Tromsø 77
44 Alta 81
45 Hammerfest 82
46 Vadsø 83
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Table E.2. Municipalities 
grouped by labour market 
region
Region Municipality
11 0101
0105
0106
0111
0118
0128
12 0104
0119
0121
0122
0123
0124
0125
0127
0135
0136
0137
0138
0211
0213
0214
0215
0216
0217
0219
0220
0221
0226
0227
0228
0229
0230
0231
0233
0234
0235
0236
0237
0238
0239
0301
0532
0533
0534
0602
0605
0612
0621
0622
0623
0624
0625
0626
0627
0628
0711
0713
13 0701
0702
0704
0706
0709
0714
0716
0719
0720
0722
0723
0728
14 0604
0631
0632
0633
15 0615
0616
0617
0618
0619
0620
21 0540
0541
0542
0543
0544
0545
22 0511
0512
0513
0514
0515
0516
0517
0519
0520
23 0501
0521
0522
24 0502
0528
0529
0536
0538
25 0403
0412
0415
0417
26 0402
0418
0419
0420
0423
0425
27 0426
0427
0428
0429
0430
0434
28 0432
0436
0437
0438
0439
0441
1640
1644
31 0826
0828
0829
0830
0831
0833
0834
32 0807
0821
0822
0827
33 0805
0806
0811
0814
0815
0817
0819
34 0901
0904
0906
0911
0912
0914
0919
0929
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35 0926
0928
0935
0937
0938
0940
0941
1001
1002
1014
1017
1018
1021
1026
1027
1029
36 1003
1004
1032
1034
1037
1046
41 1101
1102
1103
1111
1112
1114
1119
1120
1121
1122
1124
1127
1129
1130
1133
1141
1142
1144
42 1106
1134
1135
1145
1146
1149
1151
1160
1211
1216
43 1219
1221
1222
1223
1224
44 1201
1227
1228
1231
1232
1233
1234
1235
1238
1241
1242
1243
1244
1245
1246
1247
1251
1252
1253
1256
1259
1260
1263
1264
1265
1266
1411
51 1401
1412
1413
1416
1418
1428
1429
1430
1431
1432
1433
1438
52 1417
1419
1420
1421
1422
1424
1426
53 1439
1441
1443
1444
1445
1449
54 1511
1514
1515
1516
1517
1519
1520
55 1504
1523
1524
1525
1526
1528
1529
1531
1532
1534
1546
56 1502
1535
1539
1543
1545
1547
1548
1551
1557
57 1560
1563
1566
1567
1571
58 1503
1554
1573
1576
1576
61 1601
1612
1613
1617
1620
1621
1622
1624
1627
1630
1632
1633

186
1634
1635
1636
1638
1648
1653
1657
1662
1663
1664
1665
1711
1714
1718
1723
62 1702
1717
1719
1721
1724
1725
1729
1736
63 1703
1738
1739
1740
1742
1743
1744
1748
1749
1750
1751
1755
64 1811
1812
1813
1815
1816
1818
1820
1822
1827
1834
1835
65 1824
1825
1826
1828
1832
1833
71 1804
1836
1837
1838
1839
1840
1841
1845
1848
1849
72 1805
1850
1851
1852
1853
1854
1919
73 1866
1867
1868
1870
1871
74 1856
1857
1859
1860
1865
1874
75 1901
1911
1913
1915
1917
76 1920
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1931
77 1902
1933
1936
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
81 2011
2012
2014
2015
82 2004
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
83 2002
2003
2024
2025
2027
2028
2030
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Table E.3. Regional effects in model 7 for sector 0 – 12
Region    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
11 4.416 3.220 2.900 0.387 1.213 1.474 0.731 0.445 5.594 2.690 0.573 1.276 4.539
13 -2.685 -1.386 -0.718 -0.272 -0.550 -0.800 0.149 -0.213 -2.103 -0.547 -0.220 -0.027 -1.352
14 4.010 3.891 2.500 0.008 1.218 1.060 0.468 0.577 4.853 2.184 0.497 1.389 4.510
15 -12.824 -8.127 -7.243 -1,738* -3.877 -3.266 -0.934 -0.471 -15.558 -5.602 -1.504 -1.552 -8.054
21 -5.666 -3.383 -1.748 -0.716 -1.418 -1.139 0.163 -0.298 -4.318 -1.895 -0.594 0.263 -2.489
22 -9.880 -6.816 -4.927 -1.448 -1.836 -2.556 -0.306 -0.943 -10.881 -3.387 -1.344 -1.245 -7.665
23 12.408 8.321 7.320 1.261 2.802 3.484 1,273* 0.380 14.165 5.208 1.398 3.254 9.455
24 4.894 3.061 2.572 0.668 0.989 1.420 0.723 0.205 5.458 2.226 0.489 1.281 3.571
25 -3.695 -2.966 -2.498 -0.510 -0.958 -1.333 0.310 -0.524 -4.557 -1.997 -0.609 -0.543 -3.749
26 3.866 3.753 3.517 0.717 1.352 1.756 1.153 0.169 7.716 2.145 0.547 1.171 4.252
27 -1.279 0.053 -0.519 -0.212 -0.254 0.116 0.616 -0.379 -0.590 -0.332 -0.248 -0.386 0.355
28 -7.662 -4.803 -2.975 -0.819 -1.816 -1.484 0.172 -0.541 -7.475 -2.159 -1.087 -0.679 -4.578
31 14.065 9.467 8.942 1.486 3.884 5.146 1.029 0.869 14.684 6.521 1.647 3.109 12.345
32 -12.761 -7.993 -5.164 -1.188 -2.973 -2.633 -0.291 -0.786 -12.519 -4.625 -1.414 -1.800 -9.110
33 -11.909 -7.562 -5.995 -1.049 -2.589 -3.130 -0.436 -0.772 -12.531 -4.540 -1.318 -2.403 -8.213
34 -10.554 -6,961* -4.804 -1.064 -2.232 -3,104* 0.030 -0.635 -9.423 -3.852 -1.079 -1.403 -7.242
35 7.527 5.427 4.477 0.755 2,304* 2.174 0,807** 0.399 8.775 3,470* 1.009 2,015** 6.434
36-29,160*-18,540*-14,293* -2,871* -6,830* -8,354* -1,742* -1,933** -27,411* -11,091* -3,174* -5,638* -21,161*
41 -0.084 -0.430 -0.041 -0.244 0.512 -0.271 0.126 0.077 -0.205 0.206 -0.033 -0.354 -0.310
42 -3.201 -2.356 -0.696 -0.254 0.023 -1.110 0.228 -0.312 -2.324 -0.560 -0.325 -0.658 -1.607
43 -17.083 -10.641 -7.797 -1.811 -4.171 -4.365 -0.720 -1.208 -16.669 -6.635 -1.843 -2.567 -12.139
44 -8,541* -5.137 -3.220 -0.843 -1.656 -1.963 -0.082 -0,524* -7.193 -2.944 -0.838 -1,821* -5.748
51 0.842 1.164 1.721 0.234 0.808 0.997 0,491* 0.152 3.100 1.141 0.252 0.412 2.006
52 0.170 1.113 1.595 -0.067 0.637 1.131 0.587 0.075 2.469 0.700 0.232 0.384 1.908
53 -8.938 -6.198 -4.238 -0.845 -2.093 -2.518 -0.426 -0,790* -7.450 -3.359 -0.827 -2.160 -6.120
54 0.451 0.521 1.556 0.371 0.738 0.276 0.102 -0.151 2.293 0.514 0.297 0.168 1.147
55 -6.138 -4.008 -2.609 -0.410 -1.149 -1.314 -0.277 -0,802** -5.468 -2.391 -0.431 -0.962 -4.337
56 -8.047 -4.514 -3.082 -0.518 -1.365 -1.936 -0.142 -0.798 -5.530 -2.609 -0.569 -1.277 -5.216
57 -5.322 -3.112 -1.892 -0.347 -0.854 -1.443 0.093 -0.328 -3.899 -1.296 -0.538 -0.718 -3.319
58 -6.085 -3.359 -2.735 -0.544 -1.288 -1.562 -0.037 -0.453 -4.916 -2.003 -0.594 -1.113 -3.809
61 -2.104 -1.071 -0.592 -0.099 -0.123 -0.459 0.126 -0,229* -1.923 -0.617 -0.268 -0.437 -0.838
62 2.186 1.859 1.639 0.249 1.108 1.063 0.311 0.059 3.418 1.073 0.336 0.206 2.438
63 -7,859* -4.513 -2.895 -0.764 -1.283 -1.432 -0.221 -0,680** -5.676 -2.395 -0.835 -0.498 -4.035
64 -3.269 -1.715 -0.602 -0.163 -0.228 0.032 0.379 -0.015 -0.297 -0.758 -0.440 -0.925 -2.064
65 -18.667 -11.698 -9.465 -1.793 -3.462 -4.791 -0.747 -1.518 -19.749 -7.455 -1.866 -3.869 -13.984
71 -3.122 0.536 0.409 -0.150 -0.291 0.038 0.371 -0.054 0.202 -0.449 -0.030 -1,275* -1.056
72-28,005* -15.474 -13.075 -2.765 -5.832 -7.146 -1.427 -2,077** -26.899 -10.169 -3.025 -4.817 -20.041
73 9.607 7.579 6.079 1.145 2.905 3.450 0.791 0.363 13.965 4.359 1.327 2.049 8.118
74 -8.103 -4.317 -3.011 -0.660 -0.919 -1.125 -0.163 -0.815 -5.745 -2.970 -0.649 -2.286 -5.458
75 12,483* 9,419* 8,631** 1,743** 3,487* 3,974* 0.542 0.668 17,219** 5,524* 2,060** 2,919** 9.171
76 4.240 4.120 3,863* 0.685 1,771* 1.804 0.284 0.141 7.404 2.483 1,070** 1,469* 4.108
77 -3.309 -0.029 1.017 -0.105 0.442 0.273 0.130 -0.233 1.352 -0.385 0.112 -0.911 -0.434
81-53,380* -32.411 -23.014 -5.623 -11.378 -12.611 -3.120 -3.152 -51.989 -20.332 -6.224 -9.736 -39.090
82 1.749 4.031 3.540 0.547 1,740** 2.051 0,606** 0.198 5.663 1.925 0.848 1.202 2.295
83 5.839 5,479* 5,020** 0,859* 1,782** 3,188** 0,987** 0,549* 9,342* 3,391* 0.772 1,837* 4.324
Region 12 (Oslo) is the base region.
* indicates significance at 10% significance level
** indicates significance at 5% significance level
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Table E.4. Regional effects in model 8 for sectors 0 – 12.
Region 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
11 -1.364 -0.371 0.075 -0.126 -0.466 -0.099 0,447** 0.123 -0.334 0.469 -0.084 0.185 0.374
13 -0.601 0.058 0.367 -0.006 0.286 -0.169 0,283** -0.055 0.333 0.418 0.041 0,423** 0.367
14 -1.391 0.634 -0.380 -0,483* -0.392 -0.449 0.139 0,358* -0.759 -0.032 -0.126 0.355 0.423
15 2.133 1,936** 0.490 -0.170 -0.461 0,981** -0.012 0,510** 0.134 0.294 0.168 1,127** 2,990**
21 -1.202 -0.362 0.739 -0,192** -0.570 0.197 0,496** -0.016 0.640 -0.114 -0.080 1,133** 1.039
22 -3.011 -1,943** -0.567 -0.505 -0,975* -0.485 0.127 -0,485** -3,074* -0.395 -0,428** 0.158 -1,678*
23 -0.908 -1.174 -0.357 0.172 -0.962 -0.503 0.386 -0.615 -0.518 -0.553 -0.329 0.358 0.059
24 -0.069 -0.122 0.125 0.157 -0.114 0.063 0,422** -0.081 0.112 0.349 -0.075 0.341 -0.106
25 -0.794 -1.037 -0.815 -0.140 -0.343 -0.506 0,495* -0.367 -1.576 -0.917 -0.247 -0.020 -1.352
26 -2.408 -0.722 0.169 0.066 -0.104 -0.115 0,787** -0,199* 0.774 -0.445 -0.194 -0.081 -0.637
27 -1.828 0.005 -0.430 -0.136 -0.397 0.162 0,597** -0,425** -0.727 -0.368 -0,239** -0.361 0.360
28 -3,279** -1,692** -0.463 -0,225* -0,922** -0.098 0,448** -0,304** -2,363** -0.271 -0,526** 0.223 -0.849
31 -3,644** -1,645* 0.108 -0.213 -0.649 0.462 0.008 -0.178 -3,568** -0.406 -0,317* -0.079 -0.594
32 -3.688 -1.838 -0.292 -0.130 -0.994 0.034 0.277 -0.308 -2.730 -0.928 -0.308 -0.036 -1.712
33 -1.268 -0.323 -0.106 0,215** -0.213 -0.081 0,226* -0.071 -0.738 -0.019 0.014 -0.233 0.324
34 -0.981 -0.682 0.180 -0.004 0.031 -0,428* 0,609** -0.055 0.818 0.009 0.039 0,381** 0.220
35 1.568 1,621** 1,103** 0.094 0,941** 0.479 0,423** 0.029 2,363** 1,131** 0,295** 0,757** 1,612**
36 -1.092 -0.031 0.587 0.074 -0,635** -0.311 -0.014 -0,311* 2,539** 0.343 0.066 -0.143 0.571
41 0.234 -0.169 0.289 -0,172** 0.095 -0.146 0,159* 0.096 0.198 0,404* -0.000 -0.225 0.053
42 -3,529** -1,904** -0.204 -0.133 -0,652** -0,973** 0,221* -0,310** -1,652** -0.421 -0,254** -0,525** -0,865**
43 -2.310 -0.873 0.009 -0.164 -0,873** -0.042 0.168 -0.360 -0.663 -0.671 -0.078 0.274 -0.468
44 -2,102** -0,732** 0.283 -0.091 -0,358** -0.028 0,324** -0,145** 0.048 -0.320 -0.088 -0,601** -0.509
51 -2,709** -0,980** -0.166 -0.128 -0.382 0.087 0,262** -0.047 -0.315 -0.244 -0,144* -0.233 -0.572
52 -5,218** -1,532** -0.366 -0,517* -1,126* 0.046 0.238 -0.165 -1.775 -1,373** -0,265** -0.436 -1,369*
53 -0.996 -0.945 -0.030 -0.008 -0.358 -0.189 0.050 -0,369** 1.138 -0.118 0.086 -0,577* 0.144
54 -0.492 -0.046 1,071** 0,284** 0,715** 0.047 0.050 -0,197* 1,343* 0.207 0,167* -0.005 0.489
55 -1,599* -0,704* 0.088 0.121 -0,441* 0.080 0.052 -0,498** -0.060 -0.380 0.119 0.065 -0.420
56 -2.055 -0.173 0.506 0.215 -0.151 -0.027 0.290 -0,418** 1.587 0.048 0.173 0.002 -0.055
57 -3,202** -1,364* -0.463 -0.014 -0.722 -0,759* 0,231* -0.119 -0.936 -0.225 -0,237** -0.240 -1.039
58 -1.525 -0.019 -0.335 -0.090 -0.070 -0.160 0.244 -0.165 0.146 -0.204 -0.072 -0.221 -0.094
61 -1,075* -0.319 0.084 0.028 -0.096 -0.164 0,172** -0,157** -0,814* -0.210 -0,144** -0,260** 0.058
62 -1.671 -0.432 -0.250 -0.126 0.101 0.124 0.042 -0.108 -0.510 -0.486 -0.086 -0,436** -0.328
63 -2,909** -0,960** -0.147 -0,172* -0.273 0.136 0.030 -0,420** 0.104 -0.354 -0,197** 0,442** 0.067
64 -3,145** -1,169** 0.053 0.040 -0.508 0.265 0,412** 0.033 0.531 -0.484 -0,347** -0,662** -1,308**
65 -3.254 -1.062 -0.375 0.019 -0.752 -0.339 0.152 -0.580 -2.669 -1.025 0.057 -0.701 -1.367
71 -3,228** 0,996* 0,721* -0.022 -0.339 0.230 0,386** -0.039 0.965 -0.251 0.033 -1,144** -0.557
72 -4,852** 0.759 0.062 -0.163 -0.603 -0.228 0.014 -0,698** -0.846 -0.294 -0.225 0.016 -0.960
73 -2.231 0.167 0.288 0.044 0.116 0.266 0.034 -0.318 2.304 -0.201 -0.014 -0.170 -0.416
74 -3.044 -0.354 0.467 0.067 -0.253 0.527 0.125 -0.506 0.700 -0.623 0.062 -0,994* -0.682
75 -0.959 0.862 1,659** 0,368** 0.778 0.260 -0.230 -0.036 4,160** 0.308 0,529** 0.478 -0.749
76 -3,167** -0.441 0.163 -0.066 -0.241 -0.152 -0,200* -0,227** 0.082 -0.414 0,232** 0.166 -1,285**
77 -4,076** -0.044 1,111** -0.048 0.270 0.268 0.054 -0,253** 1,274* -0,491* 0.081 -0,983** -0.428
81 -9.102 -2.377 1.118 -0,495** -1.144 0.485 -0.485 -0.287 -2.681 -1,882** -0.793 -0.783 -3,389**
82 -6,626** -0.465 0.618 -0.013 -0,897** 0.317 0.076 -0,352** -1,985* -1,093** 0.028 -0.115 -2,772**
83 -6,130** -1.275 0.333 -0.016 -1,808** 0.423 0.251 -0.161 -1.929 -0,973** -0,489** -0.162 -3,216**
Region 12 (Oslo) is the base region.
* indicates significance at 10% significance level
** indicates significance at 5% significance level
  189
